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One year after its major Enlargement to 10 new Member States, Europe is facing 
several challenges. It has known a relatively long period of slow growth, with one or two 
percentage points below the United States in the last decade; at the same time, consecutive to 
its Enlargement to 10 new Member States, it has to face a huge redistribution of political and 
economic powers, both internally and vis-à-vis its partners; finally, Europe is facing an ever 
growing integration of international trade and most notably the emergence of the two low-
wage giants, China and India, sometimes presented as the “world suppliers” of labour 
intensive goods and services. 
Its success with respect to these challenges is mixed: Europe remains one of the 
wealthiest areas in the world; new Members grow at a fast rate; however, Europe still faces 
several structural problems. Most big countries in Europe, including France, Germany, Italy 
and Poland have inefficient labour markets, plagued with high unemployment rates and low 
participation rates in particular among the less educated workers. In a rapidly evolving 
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macroeconomic context, the preservation of living standards and the welfare state requires 
more adaptability of individuals and institutions.  
In particular, as this report will show, Europe has to invest more than ever in its 
comparative advantage: human capital. However, the answer cannot be simply quantitative: 
more money injected in the system may not be a solution in the absence of a serious reflection 
on the nature of education, on its macroeconomic and labour market impact and on the 
various imperfections it attenuates or on the contrary it reinforces. The report does not intend 
to provide such an exhaustive analysis. Instead, it aims at taking stock of the large economic 
literature on the subject, and at providing some hopefully useful policy guidelines.  
 
 
Summary of the report 
 
We will in particular emphasize that Europe has invested massively in the past 
decades in secondary education and along some dimensions, prevented a too large increase in 
wage and income inequality. Since the 1960’s, the average number of years of education of 
the working age population has risen by 3.5 years, and half of the gap with the US has been 
filled. Recent cohorts of young graduates  in Europe are more mobile than low skilled 
workers, and the over-education problem, meaning young graduate delaying ever and ever the 
entrance in the labour market, probably need to be more cautiously analysed: it appears that 
over-education is often the “ wrong” name given to something else we believe to be one of 
Europe’s main problem: skill mismatch and inadequacy of education and training to provide 
the right skills.  
On the negative side, we indeed see several manifestations of an inadequacy between 
demand and supply of skills and workers. Europe has very low geographical mobility of 
labour even for the most educated ones, especially compared to the US; there is a very large 
share of European workers reporting they don’t have the right skills for the job; more 
generally, labour market institutions promote longevity of jobs and thus favour specific skills, 
while at the same time demand for labour is increasingly volatile and would require general 
skills instead; finally, Europe faces difficulties to attract the most skilled and talented workers, 
with potentially large adverse consequences on long-run growth. 
As argued above, more investments in education are required, but they must come 
with well-thought provisions of incentives: first, incentives to do well must be imposed on the 
supplier of skills (secondary schools and tertiary establishments); and second, incentives to   3 
follow the right curriculum must be brought to the consumers of education (students and 
trainees). It is only if these conditions are fulfilled that Europe can simultaneously reach the 
dual objective of promoting equality and generating growth. Investing in secondary education 
is probably a good way to promote equality. Instilling a greater element of incentives is 
necessary if Europe wants to garnish universities with the same worldwide prestige and 




The importance of education 
 
On the last point, it has for long been recognized that education, notably tertiary 
education, is an important vehicle for growth and aggregate economic performance. Thus 
education has a subsequent impact on individuals’ life in a broad sense: their income, 
occupation, and health as well as longevity are all affected. This occurs through a very large 
number of channels, including socio-economic mechanisms, but also cultural and political 
ones: democracy and equality of opportunities only emerge in educated societies. 
The European Union is a potentially formidable economic power with highly educated 
labour force, excellent scientific and technological potentials and some of the most brilliant 
minds on earth. In spite of this during the nineties and ever since then the gap vis-à-vis the 
United States in terms of scientific and  technological advancement and its impact on 
productivity growth appears to be deepening (see Daveri, 2002). Certainly, many EU 
countries are late in adopting the recent information technologies and bio-technologies, and in 
the field of applied sciences, the US lead does not seem to be narrowing (see Gordon, 2004). 
Regarding the second of European priorities, suitably targeted educational policies are 
also instrumental in promoting equality. Indeed, some observers argue that, e.g., improving 
individuals’ access to financing educational investments will promote the dual objective of 
reducing inequality and increasing efficiency (Okun, 1975). Thus, certain educational policies 
create a win-win situation where the usual trade-off between equality and efficiency is absent.  
Europe, like all modern economies, invests large amounts in education: educational 
spending is about 5% of GDP in OECD countries, with a large upward trend over the past 
century. In the most recent cohorts, most individuals spend as much as 12 years into initial 
education: a large majority starts at the age of 6 in primary education and fully completes 
secondary education at the age of 18. In 1999 in the OECD, 78% of the 25-34 year old   4 
population had at least upper secondary education.
2 The corresponding fraction for the 55-64 
year old population was only 45%, which indicates that the education sector has expanded a 
lot during the last three decades.  
If on average OECD countries have consistently raised their effort of education 
provision, there are still large cross-country differences in the origin of funds (public or 
private). According to the OECD Education at a Glance, the OECD countries on average 
spent 5.23% of GDP in 1998. This aggregate number may be decomposed into: 3.64% of 
GDP in primary and secondary education (3.28% public and 0.37% private) and 1.59% in 
tertiary education (0.93 public and 0.67 private). Interestingly, in two very different countries 
– the US and France – public expenditure in tertiary education as a fraction of GDP is exactly 
the same, 1% of GDP. But in total, the US spent 2.29% of its GDP in tertiary education while 
France spent only 1.13%; all the difference between the two countries actually came from 
private money. Spain, Italy and Germany are very close to France in that private money is 
marginal, resulting in under-funding of tertiary education. 
In a European context, these issues are made more complex by the fact that labour 
markets are characterized by employment protection and social insurance policies. These 
features, designated as “labour market institutions”, have potentially pros and cons. On the 
one hand, they promote the stability of employment relationships and accordingly raise 
incentives to acquire sector or job specific skills, either in initial education or in training 
programs. On the other hand, in rapidly changing environments, labour markets institutions 
may affect mobility incentives, by both raising costs and reducing returns.
3 It is all the more 
important since in Europe, the context of the Enlargement will precisely require from workers 
an increased adaptability given the likely patterns of country specialization predicted by trade 
theory. Further, the European population is ageing: the median age in Western and Eastern 
Europe is now around 40 years, 10 years more than twenty years ago. The ability of societies 
to deal with aggregate and distributional changes is thus likely to be lower than in the past, 
making it even more important to design relevant institutions and notably education 
institutions to cope with these transformations.  
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Detailed plan 
 
This is the context Europe is facing with. This report will first deepen the analysis of 
facts presented above in providing a set of descriptive statistics; then it proceeds to analyse 
the determinants of demand and supply of education; and finally it derives a series of policy 
conclusions in terms of reforms and public spending.  
As economists, we attempt to detail the various links between human capital 
investments - notably education- and economic performance. We stratify the analysis in using 
our familiar concepts, namely the supply of education, the demand for education and the 
market interaction between the two. As stated above, the macroeconomic environment is 
characterized notably by the rising demand for skills from the private and public sectors, the 
rising demand for adaptability due to volatility in the demand for goods and the waves of 
labour reallocation across sectors and industries, and the need to develop an economy of 
knowledge where human and immaterial investments matter as much, if not more, than 
physical investments. 
Our report is organized as follows. In a first part (Sections 1-3), we investigate the 
supply of education and the role of labour market institutions and other imperfections. In a 
second part (Sections 4-5), we emphasize the interactions between the supply and demand for 
education in imperfect labour markets. In a last part (Section 6), we investigate the pure 
demand component, and notably the ability of the highest skilled workers to generate new 
knowledge and subsequent growth. 
In the first part,  Section 1  surveys evidence on the intensity of educational 
investments in Europe (EU15) with a comparison with non-European countries such as the 
United States of America or Canada. We examine various types of education as classified by 
UNESCO with ISCED-1997 (International Standard Classification of Education) and their 
supply in several OECD countries. We then look at stylized facts about the relation between 
wages and education, unemployment and education and mobility and education. We also 
survey the financing of education (as a fraction of GDP, per pupil/student and by origin, i.e. 
public or private). Section 2 looks more closely the quality of schooling by cohort, in several 
OECD countries, in exploiting the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) data. The 
IALS contains test score data for the adult population in almost 30 countries. We use these 
data to examine how skills have evolved for subsequent cohorts across countries. We show 
that skills have grown at a faster rate in Europe than in the US. Indeed, the level of skills in 
Europe is higher than in the US for the most recent cohort in the data (born in 1970). This   6 
section then attempts to examine the consequences of such differential trends on the returns to 
skills and relative wages.  Section 3  deals with the interaction between labour market 
institutions and the incentives to accumulate various skills. It starts with a brief theoretical 
survey on human capital, in relation with the efficiency of credit markets and labour markets. 
We then show how various institutions play different roles in human capital accumulation. 
Notably, the nature of skill investments is itself shaped by the nature of institutions. 
Employment protection may well increase the duration of employment and raise the returns to 
job specific skills, and may raise the duration of unemployment. This in turn reduces the 
returns to general skills. We then explore the impact of labour reallocation in the presence of 
specific human capital and show the existence of wage losses of displaced workers in new 
Member States, as well as large flows of workers out of the labour force.    
In the second part explicitly devoted to interactions between demand and supply, 
Section 4 investigates the links between education and within-country mobility and notably 
on how costs and returns to mobility are affected by workers of different educational levels. 
The higher the level of education, the higher the mobility of workers within country, the 
larger the likelihood to move for a job-related reason and the higher the likelihood to move 
outside the current area of residence. In that section, we base our claims on data from the 
European Community Household Panel.  Section 5  deals with over-education and skill 
mismatch, using data from the European Community Household Panel and from the Polish 
Labour Survey. In several European countries, we find strong evidence that skill mismatch 
(i.e. skills not suited for the current job) are a large scale phenomenon, and that over-
education is has no longer any strong effect on wages once skill mismatch is taken into 
account, except perhaps Spain. In Poland, like in Spain, over-education seem to play an 
important role, but evidence also suggest that over-educated/under-educated individuals are 
more likely to move to another job and that over-education is associated with skill mismatch.  
Section 6  will deal with between-country mobility and education, and notably the 
determinants of international immigration and out-migration of highly skilled foreign-born 
workers. Census data will be used to investigate this question. We point out that the EU do 
not attract highly skilled workers (“talents”) to the same extent as the US and show that the 
mobility of skilled workers across countries within the EU is low. Wage dispersion does not 
seem to be a strong determinant of mobility for highly skilled workers, whereas R&D 
spending plays a strong role.  Section 7  develops the various policy implications of the 
analysis and concludes.   7 
Section 1. Facts section 
 
 
European countries, as well as other OECD countries, have drastically increased their 
effort to improve educational attainments. In this section, we review the trends in the supply 
of education, the financing issues and exhibit some gross statistics on employment, 
unemployment, wages and mobility rates by education levels. We start with a rapid 
description of the methodology to compare educational outputs across countries, such as 




1.1. Classification of education 
 
To describe the educational attainments and their evolution, we will use the well-
known ISCED-97 classification designed by UNESCO. As stated in the operational manual 
(UNESCO, 1999), ”The world’s education systems differ considerably not only in respect to 
their structures but also in respect to their educational contents.  In consequence, it is often 
difficult for national educational policy-makers to compare their own education systems with 
those of other countries and to draw useful lessons from the educational experiences of other 
countries.  For this reason, UNESCO has been concerned since the Organization’s earliest 
days with the design of a standard classification system for education that would facilitate 
comparisons of education statistics and indicators of different countries on the basis of 
uniform and internationally agreed definitions for the different levels and fields of education.”  
The number of years of schooling is rather well captured by the 6 following levels of 
education:    
Level 0 –  Pre-primary education; 
Level 1 –  Primary education or First stage of basic education;  
Level 2 –  Lower secondary or Second stage of basic education;  
Level 3 –  Upper secondary education;  
Level 4 –  Post-secondary non-tertiary education;  
Level 5 –  First stage of tertiary education (not leading directly to an advanced research 
qualification); and   8 
Level 6 –  Second stage of tertiary education (leading to an advanced research qualification).  
 
which, roughly speaking, would correspond respectively to: less than 5 years, 5-7 years, 8-10 
years, 10-12 years, 12-14 years, 14+ years and 16+ years of education, with some overlap 
across levels and large cross-country differences (up to +/- 2 years).  
In addition, ISCED-97 characterizes the type of education with three letters (A, B and 
C), corresponding to the destination of pupils/students: C usually means that the completion 
of the degree is associated with the entry to the labour market and would typically refers to 
entirely vocational types of skills, B means access to the next educational level with likely 
termination and/or short duration (i.e. a type C program in the next level) and typically refers 
to program with a mix of general and pre-vocational skills; A means access to any of the next 
levels and typically refers to predominantly general education, although it also includes some 
purely vocational skills leading to longer duration programs in the next stage ( e.g. 
engineering). See Figure 1.1 for the transition pattern.  
For economists, the adequacy between the thin subdivisions of this classification and 
the theoretical concepts derived from human capital theory they may want to use is good, but 
not perfect. On the positive side, the number of years of schooling can be fitted reasonably 
well, even though there is an obvious measurement problem due to the diversity of schooling 
systems across countries. On the negative side, the letters A, B and C imperfectly match the 
degree of specificity of the training. As explained above, A – although dominantly general in 
that is gives an access to all superior levels – is also consistent with vocational skills. C 
typically refers to vocational skills but formally is actually meant to capture a curriculum 
leading straight away to the labour market. More generally, these letters are a measure of the 
expected duration of education in the next stage rather than of the nature of skills provided in 
the curriculum. Economists interested in knowing the degree of sectoral or occupational 
specialization of workers, and hereby, their adaptability in a world of labour reallocation 
across sectors, cannot use these classifications with certainty. Given the importance of skill 
mismatch and the needs of adaptability of the labour force in modern economies which we 
consistently point out in this report, it would certainly be interesting to develop a new 
classification harmonizing the degree of specialization of educational attainments instead of 
limiting the classification to the main destination after the completion of the diploma.    9 
1.2. The supply of education and its trends 
 
The basic supply of education is displayed in Table 1.1 for 14 European countries 
(EU-15 except Luxemburg), their population-weighted average and the United States and 
Canada. The average number of years of education of the 25-64 years old population is 
around 11.6 in Europe, with rather large differences across countries: Southern European 
countries have a less educated population (8.0 years in Portugal, 9.4 years in Italy, 10.3 in 
Spain), Nordic countries have a more educated population (13.3 in Denmark, 12.4 in Sweden 
and Finland). The population in the US and in Canada has completed on average one more 
year of education than in Europe (12.7 and 12.9 respectively). On average, in our sample of 
Western European countries (hereafter denoted by EU14), workers have completed 11.6 years 
of education, i.e. 1.3 years below the US. 
It is interesting to understand the nature of the gap, i.e. in which educational categories 
the difference is the largest between Europe and North America. Inspection of Table 1 
suggests that it can be equally attributed to a lack of tertiary education in Europe and of upper 
general secondary education (ISCED 3A). Further, the difference in tertiary education can 
mostly be attributed to the lack of supply of general and advanced research programs: the EU 
average reaches 14.2% of the population, while it is 29% in the US. Interestingly, if one 
imputed a value of 5 in both columns 7 and 8 to Italy to get rid of the missing value here, one 
would obtain that the EU14 average for column 7 is very close to the US one, 8.5% as 
compared to 9% in the US, the share of population in type A of tertiary education in the EU14 
- column 8 - being then imputed to 13.5% in the EU14. 
Where does the gap Europe-US in type A-tertiary education comes from? Additional 
unreported statistics allow for a gender decomposition of educational attainments. When 
computing the average of column 8 for males, one obtains 30% in the US, and 15% for 
Europe, suggesting that a part only of the gap is due to insufficient access of females to 
tertiary education. One may also think that the main part of the gap between Europe – or more 
precisely, Southern Europe – and North America is due to a catching up effect, as the US may 
have invested earlier into higher education. Table 1.2 shows that the answer is partly no. In 
this table, we present the attainment in tertiary education of various age categories. 
Comparison of the EU average with the US indicates that the gap between Europe and the US 
as regards to tertiary (type A) education is larger for older cohorts (merely 9.4% of those aged 
55-64 have tertiary type-A education), while the corresponding number is 26% in the US: the 
difference is thus 16.6 percentage points between Europe and the US. Now, it is interesting to   10 
observe that for cohorts aged 25-34, the gap is about the same magnitude, 16.9% in Europe 
and 31% in the US, i.e. a difference of 14.1. This means that in the last 40 years, Europe has 
not been able to catch–up more than 2.7 of the 17-percentage points difference.  
We now investigate the trends, going back to the 1960’s. In Table 1.3 we provide 
indicators of educational attainment f or the population aged 25-64 in some countries. The 
sample includes now some of the new EU Member States.
4 There are broadly three facts 
emerging from it. First, between 1960 and 2002, most of the difference between Europe and 
the US in the share of less skilled workers in total population has been absorbed: in 1960, 
76% of European workers had less than secondary education, while this number was 48%, i.e. 
28 percentage points less, in the US. In 1980 and 1990 (unreported numbers), the gap was still 
around 30 percentage points. In 2002, the fraction was 34% in Europe and 13% in the US, i.e. 
a 21-percentage points difference. In other words, about one third of the gap has been filled in 
a decade, which is a relatively good performance. A related observation is that Europe had a 
much lower share with upper-secondary schooling than the US but by 2002, the gap between 
Europe and the US has been more or less closed at the upper-secondary level. 
Second, interestingly, there was not such a big difference at the tertiary level in 1960, 
the difference being only of 3 percentage points (8% in the US, 5% in Europe). However, in 
2002, the difference had reached 16 percentage points (38 vs. 22). Thus, over the 40 years 
spanned by these data the EU-US gap in attainment has moved from the upper secondary 
level to the tertiary level. The gap has actually stabilized in the last decade: in 1991 
(unreported), the difference was by 15 percentage points (30% vs. 15%). 
Third, combining the two trends, there appears to be a general catch-up in terms of the 
average number of years of education. To see this, Table 1.3 also provides estimates of the 
number of years of schooling.
5 In 1960, the average European had completed 8 years of 
schooling, while the average American had 10.2 years of education. By 2002, this gap had 
                                                 
4 The educational attainment data for 2002 come from OECD (2004a). To obtain estimates for 1960 and 1980 we 
combine OECD data with estimates of the changes in educational attainment in the data compiled by De la 
Fuente and Domenech (2001). It is well-known that human capital measures in changes are plagued by 
measurement errors to a great extent. However, Serrano (2003) shows that the reliability of the De la Fuente and 
Domenech (2001) data, in changes, is much better than in the data derived by Barro and Lee (2001) that are most 
commonly used.  
5 The average years of schooling is then imputed using the attainment data and information on the typical length 
of schooling corresponding to each attainment level. In general, we use the “mapping” between educational 
attainment and years of schooling provided by De la Fuente and Domenech (2001). There are two exceptions 
and those pertain to years of schooling at the primary level in Switzerland and the United States. This is most 
likely an upward biased estimate of the actual number of years of schooling in the population. Nevertheless, they 
contain very interesting information about the broad picture of the evolution of the human capital stock since 
1960. Notice also that we have used a finer division into different attainment levels when predicting years of 
schooling; furthermore, we use the same mapping for all years.   11 
been reduced by almost a year. The reduction of the gap comes mostly from the educational 
expansion in Southern European and some continental European countries having started out 
from very low levels in 1960. Thus, there is convergence in the distribution of educational 
attainment across countries within Europe, and between Europe and the US.  
   
 
1.3. Financing and quality 
 
We now investigate how Europe and other countries have done in terms of financing 
in the different types of education. Due to variations in the principles of reporting resource 
investments across countries, there are some difficulties in interpreting the cross-country 
variation in expenditures. Nevertheless, the figures we present contains some useful 
information, in particular changes over time are informative. Further, with the aid of these 
data, we will discuss whether individual countries primarily target education at the primary, 
secondary, or tertiary level. 
Table 1.4 presents total expenditure as a fraction of GDP along with expenditure per 
student as a fraction of GDP per capita for the EU14. These numbers are reported at two 
points in time, in 1991 and 2001. It is noteworthy that expenditures increased in the US over 
the ten years cov.ered by these data. In Europe, on the other hand, resource inputs have 
actually decreased over the same time period. 
By normalizing the total expenditure data with respect to the relative size of the 
student population we obtain the last two columns reported in Table 1.4 In the US, 
expenditure per student, relative to GDP per capita, did not change between 1991 and 2001. 
We record a minor decline in the European countries. For some individual countries the 
decline is rather radical, however. In particular, in the Nordic countries and in the UK 
expenditure per student has declined substantially. The most radical decline can be observed 
in Sweden, a country that was the most ambitious in 1991 and went back to the European 
average in 2001. 
In Table 1.5 we look at the allocation of the overall education budget at the various 
levels. The first number in each country/year cell reports the allocation of expenditure; the 
second number (given in italics) is the enrolment share; and the third number (given in bold 
face) is the ratio of expenditure and enrolment shares. In all countries investment per student 
is increasing with the educational level, but the allocation across levels differ markedly 
between the US and Europe: the European countries allocate more resources per student (for   12 
given level of overall expenditures) to the secondary level while the US favours the tertiary 
level (see the bold face numbers). With respect to the changes over time in the allocation of 
expenditures per student, there are no major changes in Europe. In the US, however, there 
appears to have been a redirection of investment per student from the primary and secondary 
levels towards the pre-primary level. 
Table 1.6 reports the share of total educational expenditure that comes from private 
sources. The main message of the table is well known and was already discussed in our 
general introduction: the private share of total expenditure is far greater in the US than in 
Europe. The EU average is some 20-percentage points lower than in the US and the private 
share of expenditure for no single European country surpasses that of the US.  
Figure 1.2 presents long-run expenditure patterns. The reported numbers pertain to 
public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP. The solid line shows public 
expenditure for the US. The dashed line labelled “EU 6” reports the population weighted 
average for six EU countries (Austria, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
UK) where such data are available starting in 1970, while the line labelled “EU total” pertains 
to the EU-15 countries (excluding Luxembourg). As shown by the figure, public expenditure 
has been fairly similar in the US and Europe over the past thirty years. But remember that the 
US have a much higher share of private expenditure in overall expenditure, so in terms of 
total expenditure the US appears to be more ambitious than the EU-15 as a whole.  
 
 
1.4. Returns to education: unemployment, wages, mobility 
 
1.4.1. Wage returns to education 
 
How does the Europe compare to the United States when it comes to the wage returns 
associated with education? Table 1.7 provides some information on this question by reporting 
relative earnings by educational attainment, gender and country. The earnings of upper-
secondary graduates are normalized to 100. For most countries, earnings are gross of 
individual income taxes and reported on an annual or monthly basis. Thus, relative earnings 
will capture hours as well as wage variation across educational categories. 
  The main message conveyed by Table 1.7 is well-known: the earnings distributions of 
the European countries are in general much more compressed than in the United States. The 
main exception from this rule is Portugal where earnings inequality appears to be on par with   13 
the US. We also see from the table that vocational tertiary education (type B) has a lower pay-
off than general tertiary education (type A). Interestingly, the relative earnings of type B 
graduates are very similar in the US and in the EU. The relative earnings for those with less 
than university education are not too different in the EU and the US either. It is primarily at 
the top end of the earnings distribution where Europe and the US differ. In the relative sense, 
individuals with the highest educational level are paid much more in the US than in Europe.  
  Of course, gross earnings are not the sole determinants of the return to higher 
education. Taxes, employment probabilities, as well as study grants and subsidized student 
loans are also of some importance. The OECD (2004) has calculated returns that take taxes 
and employment probabilities into account for a small sub-set of the countries in Table 1.7.
6 
In Table 1.8 we reproduce some of these estimates. The numbers in the table refer to the 
internal (private) rate of return associated with proceeding from upper-secondary to tertiary 
education. They are presented for tertiary education as a whole (there is thus no distinction 
between type A and B programs). Further, the calculations are conducted for an individual 
who proceeds to tertiary education at the normal time immediately upon completion of upper-
secondary education.  
The returns reported in Table 1.8 are fairly similar across countries. The EU average 
return is slightly lower than the US counterpart for males; for females, however,  the EU 
average return exceeds that of the US.
7 Presumably, it is the adjustment for differences in 
employment probabilities that makes the male returns in the EU countries more similar to the 
US. counterparts. Adjusting for taxes should have increased the spread between Europe and 
the US, since European tax systems tend to be more progressive that the American one. The 
low return for American females is slightly surprising, but it may reflect the fact that they 
proceed to tertiary type B education to a greater extent than American males. 
 
1.4.2. Employment and unemployment 
 
Education has a strong impact on the relative economic performance of individuals in 
the labour market. We review some well know facts here. First, Table 1.9 describes the 
employment rate by education group in 14 European countries, and their average, vis-à-vis 
                                                 
6 It is not clear whether the rate of returns calculation take the availability of subsidized study grants and loans 
into account.  
7 One should probably be slightly careful here since the UK is much more influential in the EU average in Table 
1.8 than in Table 1.7. But this cannot be the entire story; compare, for instance, the estimated returns in Sweden 
and Finland with that of the US.   14 
employment rates in the United States and Canada. The employment rate is the fraction of the 
population in working age actually contributing to production. It is therefore a useful index of 
the ability of an economy in mobilizing its human resources in production.  The comparison 
of the EU average with US and Canada shows that differences in employment rates (by 
education and in aggregate) are not very large among males, while they a re much larger 
among females and reach 7 percentage points all educational level together: the EU clearly 
lags behind (both the US and Canada) in terms of female employment rates. 
Two regularities characterize the relationship between employment rates and 
schooling. First, in each country, higher education is associated with higher employment rates 
for both men and women. In some cases the differences are very pronounced (see for instance 
Italy or Belgium for female employment rates). Second, the gap between women’s 
employment rates and male rates decreases as educational attainments grow. In the group with 
lower secondary education the average women employment rate in Europe, 2002, was 49%, 
26% lower than for males (75%). For the group with tertiary education such difference was 
only 8% (83% employment rate for women vis-à-vis 91% for men). The higher participation 
of women and the higher levels of education in the North American country explain most of 
the overall differences in employment rates with the EU. 
As usual the average EU values mask large differences between “southern” European 
countries (such as Spain and Italy) exhibiting very low employment rates for women (44-
46%) and “northern” European countries (such as Finland or Denmark) boasting very large 
participation rates (72-79%), in fact above those of US and Canada. These differences across 
EU countries, however, are much more pronounced when we look at the groups with low 
schooling than when we consider those with high schooling (especially tertiary education). 
Table 1.10 presents a similar picture, using unemployment ratios (unemployed persons 
as percentage of the population in working age) across educational groups and countries. 
Again, the aggregate unemployment ratio for Europe as a whole is significantly larger than for 
the US or Canada only for the female group.  The unemployment ratio is also inversely 
related, in each country, to the level of education of a group. Increased education is likely to 
make the skills of a worker more valuable to production (increasing their employment rate) 
and may also increase the efficiency of the matching process (highly educated workers are 
more mobile and have a broader range of search) decreasing the unemployment rate. 
   15 
1.4.3. Geographical mobility 
 
Geographical mobility has two dimensions. The first one is the mobility between 
residential areas or between regions within countries. The second one is mobility between 
countries. Both are relevant for our analysis. We first investigate residential mobility within 
countries and present summary statistics in Tables 1.11 and 1.12, based on computation of the 
ECHP in 15 European countries between 1995 and 2001
8.  
Table 1.11 reports substantial heterogeneity between European countries: high 
mobility countries are Denmark, the Netherlands, France, the UK, Finland, Germany, Sweden 
and Luxembourg, with 20% or more of individuals having moved from one dwelling to 
another. Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Austria and Greece all report a mobility rate below 
12%. Table 1.11 also reports the frequency of reasons for move, conditional on mobility, 
country by country. Job-related reason given mobility in the last three years is higher in 
Denmark, the UK, Finland and France, is lowest in Ireland, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and 
Italy. This ranking is similar to the overall mobility ranking, but one exception, Germany, 
which has a relatively low job-mobility rate in this table. 
Restricting the sample to heads of households (to identify the level of education) in the 
labour force, table 1.12 reports that on average, 14.5% of individuals have moved from one 
place to another in the last three years (any reason). It also indicates a substantial 
heterogeneity across education levels. Among individuals with primary education, this rate is 
11.2%, while it reaches 15.4% for those with secondary education and 20.5% for those with 
tertiary education. The fraction of heads of households reporting geographical mobility in the 
last three years with the main reason being related to job is on average 8.3%, but it is merely 
5.5% for workers with primary education, 8.0 for workers with secondary education and 
11.4% for workers with tertiary education. 
These few figures raise a couple of interesting points. First, overall, mobility and 
notably job-related mobility is pretty low in Europe. Second, mobility outside the residential 
area is even lower. Third, there are significant cross-country differences: the UK, Finland, 
Denmark and France having relatively high job mobility rate while countries in Southern 
Europe and Germany are lagging behind. Finally,  less educated individuals are the less 
mobile workers, even though they are most affected by unemployment. We will come back on 
the links between education and mobility in Section 4.  
                                                 
8 See Section 4 for a definition of mobility in the ECHP.   16 
  We now investigate the second facet, mobility between states or countries. Table 1.13 
summarizes some statistics on long-run mobility of labour into the European Union 
(immigration from outside) and within it (and here by within we shall mean between 
countries). As way of comparison, the Table also reports the measures relative to immigration 
into the US and to mobility of US workers across states within the country.  We capture long-
run immigration into the EU (US) as the percentage of the labour force in the EU (US) that is 
born outside it. Similarly we capture the extent of internal mobility as the percentage of 
people in the labour force working in a country of the EU (state of the US) and born in a 
different EU country (US state).  
The data, based on US Census and European Labour Force Data compare the very 
early nineties (1990 in the US and 1992 in the EU) with the year 2000. Two facts emerge 
clearly at a first glance to the data. First, the US had a much larger share of foreign-born 
immigrant workers than the EU already at the beginning of the considered period (1990) and 
increased such lead by attracting more foreign-born workers during the nineties. By year 2000 
one worker in eight was foreign born in the US while only one in 20 in the EU was born 
outside the Union. Second the degree of internal mobility of US citizens is more than ten 
times larger than the internal mobility of EU citizens between different countries of the 
Union. Less than 3% of the labour force in Europe works in a country different from the 
country of birth, while in the US more than 35% of the labour force moved out of the state of 
birth to work in a different one. The comparison is somehow forced since US states are more 
homogenous than EU countries, but the difference is still strikingly large. As a matter of fact, 
the degree of cross-country mobility has not changed at all between 1992 (Maastricht Treaty) 
and 2000, after nearly a decade of potential (de jure) freedom of movement of workers in the 
Union. This trend may appear as a source of concern. 
These statistics, which we will develop in greater detail in section 6, illustrate a 
substantially smaller capacity of the EU to attract and absorb foreign workers, as well as to 
promote mobility within its boundaries when compared to the US. Our work will address the 
issue of between country (between state) mobility and skills in Section 6. 
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In this chapter we examine what the schooling systems across Europe have produced. 
We focus primarily on primary and secondary schooling and thus the analysis presumably has 
more implications for inequality than growth. Important questions asked in this chapter are: 
What do the European countries get for their resource investments, i.e., what skills  are 
provided by these schooling systems? How have these general skills evolved over time? What 
is the implication of the evolution of skills for wage inequality? Throughout we use the US as 
a benchmark and present data for a selection of European countries. The actual selection of 
European countries is mostly determined by the availability of data. As a measure of skills in 
the adult population we use data from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS); see 
OECD and Statistics Canada (1995). The IALS data impose the major restriction on the 
number of European countries included.
9  
We start by analysing skills in the oldest cohort and then proceed to successively 
younger cohorts. Section 2.2 examines basic skills brought to the labour market by successive 
cohorts born from 1935 until 1970. In section 2.3, we look at skills for those still in schools. 
Section 2.4 examines the consequences of educational such choices on wage inequality across 
countries. Section 2.5 offers concluding remarks.  
 
 
2.2. Schooling and skills by cohort: a long-run perspective 
 
We begin by describing the evolution of years of schooling and skills across cohorts 
within countries. To provide more details on the evolution of general skills, we utilize data 
from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS). The great virtue of the IALS data is that 
it provides an internationally comparable measure of skills in the adult population.  
 
                                                 
9 For instance, Spain did not participate in the survey and France elected to opt out of the survey.   18 
2.2.1. Data description 
 
The IALS data were collected during in 1994, 1996, and 1998.
10 The IALS test 
consisted of three domains: prose, document, and quantitative literacy. It is mainly a test of 
basic skills. It is thus primarily designed to detect variations in skills at the lower end of the 
skill distribution; it is presumably less apt to fully detect variations in skill at the top end of 
the distribution.  
Table 2.1 reports a basic set of statistics obtained using these data with different 
samples. The measure of skills used is the IALS score obtained by averaging over the three 
domains. The first two columns show the mean and the standard deviation (SD) for the target 
populations (aged 16-65). The country obtaining the highest score on this literacy test is 
Sweden, while Poland has the lowest score. The US is slightly above average and has the 
highest variance in skills. The average score in the US target population is almost identical to 
the EU average reported in the table. That average skills are so similar in the US compared to 
the EU is perhaps surprising given the large attainment differences in T able 1.3. To some 
extent this lack of a difference is driven by the fact that EU countries that did not participate 
in the IALS tend to be those with low levels of human capital (e.g. Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal). But this is not the entire story as can be seen by comparing EU countries with 
similar educational attainment as in the US. The European countries do better on a 
comparison of basic literacy skills than they do when examining formal attainment.  
  We decided to exclude immigrants from the analysis that follow, as it is not clear if 
they went to school in the host country. The columns headed “Natives” report the mean and 
standard deviation in skills when immigrants are excluded.
11 The final three columns reports 
summary measures of skills for the sample that comes closest to our analysis sample. The 
sample is restricted to those aged 25-64 to eliminate those who have not yet finished their 
educational careers from the data. As can be seen, this sample restriction has a minor effect on 
                                                 
10 The data for Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland (French and German-speaking 
regions), and the United States were collected in 1994. Data for the Flemish community in Belgium and Great 
Britain were collected in 1996, and data for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Norway 
in 1998. The target populations were individuals aged 16-65 and the sample sizes were around 3,000 per 
country. A potential drawback of these data is thus that the samples are small. Small sample error is therefore 
likely to be an issue, in particular at the cohort level. 
11 Natives are defined as those who responded “yes” to the question of whether they were born in the country of 
the interview. This sample restriction has a big effect on the reported mean and variance in the US – the mean 
increases, and the standard deviation falls, substantially. The European numbers are only affected to a minor 
extent. This mainly has to do with the immigrant population being much greater in the US, but a greater fraction 
of sample non-response to the question on nativity is probably also an issue. With only those reporting that they 
were born in the country in question included in the sample, the sample size is reduced by 22 percent in the US. 
but only by 5 percent in Europe.   19 
measured mean skills, although it is slightly surprising to see that mean skills increases in the 
US. In the final analysis sample, the variation in skills is comparable for the US and Europe 
and the average native-born American perform slightly better on the test than the average 
native-born European.    
 
2.2.2. Schooling and skills by cohort 
 
The IALS also report educational attainment, as measured by years of schooling. In 
this Section, we will thus use both measures; still we will focus on test scores as they provide 
a better measurement of the quality of the education than years of schooling.  
Figure 2.1 shows years of schooling by cohort for the Anglo-Saxon countries along 
with the EU average.
12 It conveys a similar message as Table 1.3. The educational expansion 
in the US preceded that of the EU. For the cohorts observed in the data there is in fact little 
increase in the US; the increase amounts 0.5 years from the cohort born in 1935 to the cohort 
born in 1970. For Europe, on the other hand, there is a substantial rise in attainment for 
successive cohorts. For the time period spanned by these cohorts the increase is 2.9 years. 
Note that the deceleration in growth rate of human capital in the US has been observed by 
others, e.g., DeLong et al. (2003).
13  
How is the increase in attainment translated into skills? Figure 2.2 examines this 
question by showing the evolution of skills (as measured by the sum of the scores in all three 
domains of the IALS) by cohort.
14 In looking at these estimates one should bear in mind that 
skill depreciation will affect the slope of these relationship. However, we do not expect the 
rate of skill depreciation to vary substantially across countries so this problem should not bias 
the cross-country comparison.
15  
  There are a couple of interesting patterns in Figure 2.2. First, starting out from a much 
lower level in the 1935 cohort, the skills in the average European country have actually 
surpassed the skills in the US for the 1970 cohort. Second, skills are actually declining for 
those born during the 1960s in the US (this decline is statistically significant). Similarly, in 
the UK there is no increase in skills for those born after 1950. For those born in the 1960s, the 
                                                 
12 To avoid the variability due to small samples we have fitted a smoothing linear spline with knots in 1950 and 
1960 to the raw cohort data.  
13 The evolution of years of schooling for the US, according to the IALS is not quite consistent with the figures 
reported in DeLong et al. (2003). For the cohorts born before 1950, years of schooling is higher in the IALS than 
in the census data used by DeLong et al.  
14 Again, we have smoothed the data by fitting a spline to the cohort data. 
15 Moreover, Nathanelsson (2003) shows that skill depreciation is a minor issue using IALS panel data for 
Sweden collected in 1994 and 1998.   20 
rate of increase in skills thus appears to be much lower in the Anglo-Saxon countries than in 
the average European country. This in particularly interesting given that it is in Anglo-Saxon 
countries that we have observed the greatest surge in wage inequality during the 1980s; we 
return to this issue in Section 2.4. 
   Figures 2.3 and 2.4 report years of schooling and skills by cohort for four continental 
European countries. Looking at Figure 2.3 we see that educational attainment is virtually 
identical in the Netherlands and Switzerland to start off with, but then grows at a faster rate in 
the Netherlands. The bilateral comparison between Belgium and Germany has an analogous 
feature. Educational attainment is very similar through the cohort born in 1950. But while 
years of schooling continued to grow in Belgium, this development was halted in Germany 
for those born in the 1950s. Again, we look at how the attainment differences are translated 
into skill differences in Figure 2.4. Comparing Figures 2.3 and 2.4 it seems that the increase 
in schooling has been translated into skill increases to a greater extent in Belgium than in the 
Netherlands.  
Next we turn to the Nordic countries. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 report the evolution of years 
of schooling and skills for Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. These countries start out 
at fairly similar levels in the 1935 cohort. But then educational attainment almost seems to 
diverge among the Nordic countries. The country showing the most exceptional growth in 
attainment is Finland: It starts off having the lowest attainment level, but over the 35 years 
spanned by these birth cohorts, attainment in Finland surpasses the remaining three countries. 
If we instead look at the evolution of literacy skills, there seems to be convergence rather than 
divergence among the Nordic countries. The country ranking is fairly different when it comes 
to skills rather than attainment. In the skills dimension, Sweden manages to keep its early 
advantage throughout the period despite slipping down the ranking when it comes to 
investment in formal schooling. Skills are growing at the fastest rate in Finland, which largely 
mirrors the increase in educational attainment. 
  Finally, we consider four countries from Southern and Eastern Europe. Figure 2.7 
shows years of schooling by cohort for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, and Poland, while 
Figure 2.8 shows cohort skills for these countries. The development of formal schooling is 
similar in the three Eastern European countries. Educational attainment actually falls for the 
cohorts born during the 1960s, perhaps as a result of poor incentives to invest in schooling. In 
Italy, on the other hand, educational attainment increases precipitously starting from a very 
low level for the cohort born in the mid 1930s.   21 
The evolution of cohort skills to some extent mirrors the development in educational 
attainment. The skill increase levels off in Hungary and Poland for those born in the 1960s. 
This does not appear to happen in the Czech Republic, however, where the test score 
increases throughout the period. Indeed, the skill evolution in the Czech Republic is roughly 
comparable to the development in the Netherlands, despite the fact that attainment evolves 
rather differently in these two countries. 
  Looking at Figures 2.1 through 2.8 it is clear that there is fairly close match between 
educational attainment and skills as measured by the test in the IALS. Still for some countries 
during some time periods they deviate from one another. To give a more systematic account 
of these differences, we estimate the relationship between skills and educational attainment 
using the cohort data for all countries. 
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where  ic s  denotes skills in country i and cohort c and  ic e  years of education. We include 
country fixed effects ( i a ), time-period fixed effects (e.g.,  s 50 a  equals unity for the cohorts 
born during the 1950s), and allow the “effect” of schooling on skills to vary by years of 
schooling.
16 The break-points where the skills/schooling gradient  may change slope are 
somewhat arbitrarily set 8, 10, and 12 years of education (thus, e.g.,  ) 8 ( 8 ‡ = ‡ ic e e I d ). We 
think of the time variation in the deviation between actual skills and the prediction obtained 
from the regression equation as a measure of the time variation in the quality of the education 
provided by the schooling system of individual countries. 
  Table 2.2 reports the annual changes in residual skills relative to the standard 
deviation within country. Let us take a concrete example to illustrate what the table shows. 
According to Figures 2.1 and 2.2, skills are improving substantially in the UK between the 
cohorts born 1935 and 1950. At the same time, the average years of schooling rises. However, 
the increase in years of schooling is not sufficient to “justify” the substantial increase in skills. 
Hence, we have a positive coefficient during 1935-50 for the UK. The opposite is happening 
during the 1950s. Then there are no improvements in measured skills despite the fact that 
                                                 
16 There are several arguments for estimating a non-linear relationship between formal attainment and skills. For 
one thing the IALS was not primarily designed to pick up skill variations at the top end of the skills distribution. 
Thus one should expect the “effect” of an additional year of schooling on measured skills to be lower for higher 
levels of formal attainment.      22 
there is similar growth in educational attainment as during the earlier time period. Thus there 
is a negative coefficient during 1950-60.     
  According to Table 2.2, almost half of the countries saw an increase in residual skills 
for the cohorts born during the 1940s (and earlier). This may reflect an increase in the 
ambition of educational authorities, such that they expanded the resources invested per 
student at each level of attainment. The table also shows that the EU as a whole did worse 
than expected for the cohorts born during the 1950s. The negative coefficient for the United 
States during the 1960s may also indicate that the quality of the education provided to 
children born during this decade has deteriorated. In passing note that this also implies that 
skills deteriorated within educational groups in the US. Indeed, for the US, the measured 
skills for those born in the 1960s are lower for the university-educated as well as for those 




2.3. The skills among those still in school 
 
We now focus on the most recent cohorts and investigate the skills of children still in 
school. We look at mean student performance (Section 2.4.1), the variation in student/teacher 
ratios (Section 2.4.2) as well as the variance in student achievement (Section 2.4.3) 
 
2.3.1. Mean student performance 
 
The first column of Table 2.3 gives a snap-shot picture of mean performance by 
reporting a sub-set of the latest PISA results. The tests in PISA are taken at age 15 in math, 
science, and reading literacy. We report the scores in Reading Literacy and Math according to 
PISA 2003 along with estimated changes in reading literacy and math since 1991 and 1995 
respectively. The data for the earlier time points are taken from the Reading Literacy Study 
and the TIMSS (these two studies tested students at age 14).
17 The top performers in the PISA 
study are the students in Finland. This is true for all three domains tested by PISA; indeed, 
country rankings are rather similar across the three domains. The EU as a whole does as well 
as US students in reading but better in math.  
                                                 
17 TIMSS is short for Third International Math and Science Study.  Beaton et al. (1996) report results for TIMSS 
while the results for the Reading Literacy Study are contained in Elley (1992).   23 
The last two columns attempt to examine the changes in performance during the 
1990s. Rather than presenting the changes in the actual scores we present the changes of the 
rank order of countries.
18 It seems that students in Ireland, and the Netherlands improved 
substantially in reading, while students in France and Hungary moved down the rank order. In 
mathematics the big improvers are the UK and Denmark while losses are recorded in Austria 
and Hungary. 
An obvious observation is that it is difficult to make strong inference about within-
country changes in performance, because PISA and TIMSS are different studies. Further, 
differences in the cross-country variation in the age of testing may have a substantial impact 
on estimated changes in the rank-order. In the TIMSS, however, there are attempts to look at 
the trends in achievement for a small sub-set of countries. According to these estimates, there 
were significant losses in math achievement in Belgium, Sweden, and Norway while students 
in the US improved significantly. For reading literacy, there are also some trends estimates 
pertaining to 10 year-olds. According to the International Reading Literacy Study, there is a 
significant reduction of the reading performance of Swedish students.
19 
 
2.3.2. Student/teacher ratios 
 
The next question we raise is what accounts for the variation in student performance 
over time. The most natural place  to start looking for an answer to this question is by 
examining the variation in resources, in general, and the variation in class size in particular. 
Table 2.4 shows the number of students per teacher – the student/teacher ratio – in 1992 and 
2002.  The most useful information in Table 2.5 pertains to the changes over the 1990s.
20 
Since the early 1990s, the number of students per teacher has been reduced in the US while it 
appears to have been constant in Europe. There is a good deal of variation behind this 
constant average. Some countries have expanded a lot (i.e. reduced student/teacher ratios): the 
reduction of the number of students per teacher is roughly 25 percent in Ireland and the 
Netherlands. Other countries have moved in the opposite direction: for instance, in Austria 
and Norway the student/teacher ratio increased by 27 and 21 percent respectively.   
                                                 
18 The reason for focusing on the rank order is that the scores are relative in nature; the scores are set such that 
the average student among all participating countries gets a score of 500. Therefore, the scoring depends on 
which countries participated in the study. 
19 There is also a significant gain for Hungarian students. But it is difficult to place much emphasis on this gain 
given that the average age at testing increased by almost half a year.  
20 This is one of the cases where the cross-sectional variation is probably not informative. Differing reporting 
principles presumably drive the difference between e.g. Portugal (9.3) and the UK (17.6) to a large extent.    24 
  The interesting question is, of course, whether and how much students gain by being 
in a smaller class. This is one of the most controversial issues in the economics of education. 
The disagreement is so profound that not even the quantitative reviews of the literature are in 
agreement. Some reviews (e.g., Hedges, et al. 1994 and Krueger, 2003) find positive impacts 
of smaller classes on student outcomes, while others (most prominently, Hanushek, 1997) 
find no beneficial effects of smaller classes. 
Our reading of the voluminous literature on class size is that the students gain by 
reductions in class size; the gains are particularly apparent for disadvantaged students. We 
come to this conclusion by placing more weight on studies that are based on an experimental 
or quasi-experimental design (e.g., Angrist and Lavy, 1999, and Krueger, 1999), that is, 
studies that have a credible source of variation to identify the causal effects. On this reading 
of the literature, US students should have gained from the resource development during the 
1990s.  
Is there any support for the conclusion that students benefit from reductions in class 
size in the data presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4? There is some support when it comes to 
reading literacy. A regression of the change in the rank order across countries on the change 
in the log student/teacher ratio produces a coefficient with the expected (negative) sign with a 
t-ratio of 1.64.
21 Of course, one should not place too much emphasis on this estimate, given 
that there are only 12 observations. Moreover, we find no systematic relationship between 





A potentially important policy concern is the variation in skills across students and 
schools. The individual variation in skill during adolescence will eventually contribute to the 
observed variation in market outcomes. The between-school variation in student performance 
is related to issues concerning segregation and equality of opportunity. With a high share of 
the overall variance being explicable by the schools that students attend, this may signal 
variations in the quality of schooling that the students get. 
Table 2.5 reports various dimensions of cross-sectional inequality among students and 
how these have evolved over time. The variance measures are derived from the Math test in 
                                                 
21 If we use the actual change in performance (with an adjustment of the means such that the scores are 
comparable), the coefficient has a t-ratio of 1.97.   25 
PISA since this is the only test where the between-school variance is reported in OECD 
(2004b). The development of cross-sectional inequality is obtained by comparing the PISA 
results to those obtained in TIMSS 1995. The total variation across students appears to be 
similar across all countries. In all countries, apart from Ireland, the variation has risen but the 
increases seem to be rather minor (apart from possibly Belgium, France, and Portugal). The 
variation across students has increased more in Europe than in the US.  
There is considerably more variation between schools. The between-school variance is 
particularly low in the Nordic countries. It is considerably higher in continental Europe and 
the Eastern European countries. The US is in between these two extremes. Interestingly, the 
between school variance seems to move in opposite directions when the US is compared to 
Europe. In the US, the share of the variance that can be attributed to schools has declined 
since 1995, while in Europe it has increased on average. The opposite changes in the between 
school variance begs the question of why this has occurred. According to OECD (2004a), 
decision-making in most European countries became more decentralized between 1998 and 
2003. Thus, decentralization of authority to the school level in one potential explanation; 




2.4. Implications for wage inequality  
 
At this stage, it is of course tempting to try to relate the changes in skills (described in 
section 2.2) to the changes in the wage distribution. Can the supply of skills account for the 
variation in wage inequality observed across countries? By now, there is a fairly substantial 
literature revolving around this issue.
22 It is well known that the greatest increases in wage 
inequality during the 1980s were observed in the US and the UK (e.g. Katz and Autor, 1999). 
In the 1980s, cohorts born during the 1960s entered the labour market. It is interesting to note 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Gottschalk and Joyce, 1998, Blau and Kahn, 2001, Devroye and Freeman, 2002, Acemoglu, 2003, 
and Leuven et al., 2004. One strand of the literature (Blau and Kahn, 2001, Devroye and Freeman, 2002, and 
Leuven et al., 2004) uses the spread in the IALS test score to examine if the (cross-sectional) variance of skills 
can account for the (cross-sectional) variation in wage inequality. Another strand of the literature (e.g., 
Gottschalk and Joyce, 1998, and Acemoglu, 2003) examines whether changes in the relative supply of, e.g., 
educated labour can account for the changes in wage inequality across countries. In Gottschalk and Joyce (1998) 
the answer is affirmative: they conclude that changes in relative supplies can explain much of the changes in 
returns to skills (education and age).  
   26 
that the US and the UK are among the countries with the weakest increases in skills. Indeed, 
the US stands out as the country with the most marked decrease in the inflow of skills.  
Skill dispersion will affect wage dispersion for two reasons. First, there is the obvious 
direct effect: for given price of skills, countries with high skill dispersion will have more 
wage dispersion. Second, there is an indirect effect working through the price of skills: 
increases in the net supply of skills will lower the price of skills. The papers by Blau and 
Kahn (2001) and Devroye and Freeman (2002) look only at the direct effect. The evidence 
suggests that the direct effect of skill dispersion on wage dispersion may be fairly small. 
Devroye and Freeman (2002) present a simple variance decomposition exercise that suggests 
that only a small part of the cross-country differences in wage inequality is driven by 
differences in skill dispersion (given the US price of skills). They therefore conclude that the 
differences in wage inequality between the US and European countries are mainly driven by 
different wage setting institutions. Similar evidence is reported by Blau and Kahn (2001). In 
contrast to Devroye and Freeman (2002), however, they allow for different effects of skills at 
different parts of the wage distribution. An interesting aspect of their results is that the 
contribution of measured characteristics (including skills) to wages is higher at the lower end 
of the wage distribution. Comparing two extreme countries when it comes to wage inequality 
– the US and Sweden – they find that differences in age, schooling, and skills account for 26 
percent of the 50-10 log wage differential between the US. The paper by Leuven et al. (2004) 
is interesting as it attempts to include the indirect effect as well – the effect of the net supply 
of skills on the price of skills. Applying the methodology of Katz and Murphy (1992), they 
find much stronger effects of cross-country differences in skills. They find that about one 
third of the variation across countries in the relative wages of skill groups can be attributed to 
the net supply of skill groups. Their analysis does an even better job in explaining differences 
in relative wages in the lower parts of the wage distribution, where differences in skills 
account for about 60 percent of the variation. Taken at face value, their estimates then suggest 
that the relative supply of skills has a rather big impact on relative wages, in particular at the 
lower end of the wage distribution.    
Coming back to the initial question, what should we expect about the evolution of 
wages, given the evolutions of the supply of skills shown in Figures 2.1-2.8? Our final 
purpose in this section is to examine this question. In particular we will demonstrate that the 
variation in skills and the quality of education has some importance on the labour market. We 
do that by running earnings regression at the cohort level. In particular, we estimate versions 
of the following simple regression using IALS data   27 
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ic y  is the average male earnings quintile rank for cohort c in country i,  i a  ( c a ) is a 
country (cohort) fixed effect, s denotes skills, e years of education, and  ) ( i ic pop pop  is the 
relative size of the cohort population. Notice that the quintile rank ranges from 1 to 5 and that 
the inclusion of the cohort fixed effects capture the age/earnings profile flexibly. We include 
relative cohort size in order to capture labour supply effects on earnings. 
Table 2.6 presents the results. We begin with specifications that exclude skills; see 
columns 1, 3 and 5. The estimates suggest a “healthy” return to schooling. An increase of 
years of schooling by one year moves the cohort up in the earnings distribution by two 
percentile ranks. However, controlling for skills, schooling has no impact (and in some 
specifications the impact is even negative and significant). A standard deviation increase in 
the IALS score (c.f. Table 2.2) yields an increase of roughly 20 percentile ranks. Controlling 
for skills, we also find evidence suggesting that the relative size of the cohort has a negative 
effect on the earnings rank. The bottom line of these estimates is that what matters for relative 
wages is the quality of schooling that the education system produces. Increases in attainment 
without a concomitant increase in skills have little value on the labour market. In short, what 
schools produce, and changes in the quality of the education provided, feed onto labour 
market outcomes.      
 
 
2.5. Concluding remarks 
 
1.  US educational expansion much preceded the European one: there was a substantial 
gap in attainment some 40 years ago. 
2.  Some of this gap has now been closed, but there still exists a marked difference in 
attainment, particularly at the tertiary level; see section 1.2. 
3.  Despite the gap in attainment, Europe appears to have closed the gap in terms of basic 
skills.  The basic skills that individuals bring to the labour market have grown at a 
faster rate in Europe. In the latest cohort in our data (born in 1970) skills in the 
average EU country has surpassed that of the US.   28 
4.  According to the latest PISA results European (lower secondary) students do as well 
(reading) or slightly better (math) than their American counterparts. It is difficult to 
get an idea about how student performance has changed during the 1990s, but the 
available data suggest that there have been no major changes in the position of Europe 
relative to the US. 
5.  Looking at the resource data it seems that the US have invested more heavily in 
education during the 1990s. For instance, student/teacher ratios at the lower secondary 
level have been reduced in the US but have stayed largely constant in Europe. 
6.  Moreover, there is evidence suggesting an increase in heterogeneity of outcomes in 
Europe. In particular, the between-school variance in outcomes appears to have 
increased in Europe while it has been reduced in the US. 
7.  Finally, we documented that the basic skills that individuals bring to the market are 
important determinants of their for labour earnings. Moreover, the variation in skills 
across countries can account for a substantial fraction of the variation in wage 
inequality across countries, in particular inequality at the lower end of the wage 
distribution. Thus the quality of the skills provided by the education systems has 
important repercussions on the labour market.   29 





Various labour market institutions (minimum wage, collective wage bargaining, 
employment protection, passive and active labour market policies) are known to have a large 
impact on unemployment, with various interpretations on their relative impact. Layard and 
Nickell (1999) argue in their handbook survey that unions and unemployment compensation 
have the most adverse effects, while the impact of the other components of institutions is not 
that evident, and can even be ambiguous. Labour market institutions also have a large impact 
on worker’s incentives and effort (Ichino and Riphan 2004) and on the fluidity of labour 
markets, notably regional mobility and labour reallocation (see Bertola and Ichino, 1995 and 
Bertola and Rogerson 1997). 
In this section, we focus on the direct or indirect effects of both institutions and market 
imperfections on workers’ supply of skills. We notably focus on the way labour market 
institutions affect the nature of education and more generally the type of skills. Later on, in 
Section 5, we will investigate another dimension of the interaction of institutions and 
education, in examining the general theme of over-qualification and skill mismatch.  




3.2.1. Perfect financial markets 
 
In this part, we develop the common theoretical framework to analyze the nature of 
investments in skills, to draw implications in the next part. The concept of human capital has 
been widely used in the last 40-50 years, since pioneering works by T.W. Schultz, Gary 
Becker and Jacob Mincer. Human capital typically refers to a set of knowledge, skills and 
know-how sharing three characteristics. First, they are costly to acquire, both because of 
direct financial cost and because of time and effort. Second, they increase potential earnings 
through the life-cycle: like a financial investment, their return is differed to the future. Finally, 
they are embedded into an individual: skills cannot be sold or transferred from one individual 
to another: only their service can be rented.   30 
Note that human capital is similar to physical capital in the first two characteristics, 
but differs in the third one. Despite this difference, Becker (1964) established in the context of 
perfect markets, notably financial markets, that the internal rate of return on education, 
defined as the discount rate equalizing costs and returns on investments, had to be equal to the 
interest rate. This means that individuals should invest into education and possibly borrow to 
finance their investment, up to a point where the rate of returns on education is no longer 
larger than the interest rate.  
All individuals stop studying at one point or another, suggesting decreasing returns to 
years of schooling after some point. Under this assumption of decreasing returns, the first 
implication of human capital theory is that the higher the rate of interest, the lower the chosen 
number of years of education. Alternatively, the higher the return on education at a given 
interest rate, the higher the number of years of schooling. Figure 3.1 illustrates: i denotes the 
interest rate, s the number of years of schooling and s* the chosen level of schooling. 
A second implication of this analysis is that decentralization of education choices to 
the market is efficient: individuals chose optimal investments when they pay for education. Of 
course, in reality, there are several m arket imperfections, discussed below, leading to 
drastically different policy conclusions. The general consensus of economists is indeed that 
education should not be entirely financed by households or individuals. There is another 
consensus that education  should not be entirely free, as many free-goods tend to be over-
consumed. Where to draw the line between public and private funding is actually difficult and 
beyond the scope of this report. Among other things, it importantly depends on the magnitude 
of market imperfections we intend to describe now. 
 
3.2.2. Financial imperfections 
 
First, what happens in the presence of financial imperfections, such as borrowing 
constraints? One can easily reinterpret Becker’s results as follows. The internal rate of return 
on education has to be equal to the interest rate faced by borrowing individuals, i.e. a number 
typically larger than the riskless interest rate. If an individual has no access at all to financial 
markets, one can replace the interest rate by the (risk-neutral) individual’s rate of pure time 
preference, a typically very high rate.  
Still under the assumption of decreasing marginal returns to education, differences in 
the level of education across individuals can be due to differences in the access to financial 
markets: the higher the interest rate faced by an individual, the lower the investment in   31 
education he/she will afford. Figure 3.2 illustrates the schooling choices made by two 
individuals: individuals 1 has a poor access to capital markets and chooses a low level of 
schooling, while individual 2 has a good access to capital markets and chooses a higher level 
of schooling. Note that, in the total absence of capital markets, individual 1 would be 
interpreted as an impatient individual, while individual 2 would be interpreted has more 
patient.  
This analysis is mostly static, but Benabou (2000, 2005) has very well summarized the 
dynamic trade-off in a world of imperfect information, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. On the one 
hand, less redistribution leads, dynamically, to a less efficient transmission of human capital 
across generations, and thus more inequality as poorer families remain unskilled. This is the 
downward sloping curve 1 (in blue), which depends heavily on the failure of financial 
markets. On the other hand, median voters would normally tend to choose more redistribution 
as inequality increases which is the upward sloping part in curve 2 (in red). Unfortunately, 
there is also a downward sloping part to that curve: more inequality distorts democratic 
decisions through lobbying or influence, resulting into less redistribution when there is more 
inequality. The outcome is a multiplicity of equilibria, where the European case (more 
redistribution, less inequality) may be represented by the first intersection to the left between 
the two curves, and the US case can be represented by the third intersection with the opposite 
characteristics (more inequality, less redistribution). 
 
3.2.3. Life-cycle and on-the-job investments  
 
Ben-Porath (1967) has analyzed human capital decisions in a dynamic context and 
shown that the optimal time allocated to learning should decrease monotonically with age. 
Full-time education is optimal in the beginning of individual’s life, part-time learning, 
meaning being trained part-time and working the rest of the time, is optimal afterwards, and 
no learning at all should be optimal as the retirement age is getting closer and closer, as 
returns to learning eventually become null. Blinder and Weiss (1976) have extended the 
analysis to labour supply decisions: hours supplied and time spent to learn are two control 
variables of individuals: the same pattern of human capital investments emerge. 
It is implicit in the analysis described above that the nature of initial education and, 
say,  on-carreer  learning is similar: they apply to any job held, without any distinction. 
However, as noted earlier on by Becker (1964), on-the-job skills should be usefully separated 
in two broad categories: skills that are useful in any job, that can be called general human   32 
capital, and skills that are specific to a job, which are called specific human capital. One can 
then easily extend the distinction to “sector-specific” skills or “occupation specific skills”.  
A drastic difference between general and specific skills is that purely general skills are 
theoretically paid by employees: they accept a lower wage today in order to be more 
productive and hence more paid tomorrow. The reason is that general skills raise productivity 
in all possible jobs: it is therefore possible for a worker evolving in a perfect labour market, to 
obtain a wage increase as soon as he/she becomes more productive. In contrast, specific skills 
cannot be transferred to other jobs: they simply generate a surplus or quasi-rent that can be 
shared between the employer and the employee. In other words, depending on the relative 
bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis employers, the cost of specific skills is shared between 
the bargaining partners.  
 
3.2.4. Labour market frictions 
 
In terms of returns to education, factors leading to wage compression may reduce the 
propensity to invest in all types of skills. In addition, in imperfect labour markets, private 
returns to education are increased by the existence of longer spells of unemployment and 
lower job durations for the less skilled workers. Thus, private incentives to schooling are 
increased. See for instance Charlot (2003) for the distinction between wage return and return 
to employability.  
In terms of on-the-job skills, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a and b) have shown that to 
a large extent, employers tend to pay for general human capital. Their interpretation is that 
one must relax the assumption of frictionless labour market: indeed, this assumption implies 
that employers are unable to appropriate the return on general skills. In fact, in the presence of 
market frictions such as search frictions, workers incur a loss when they leave their employer, 
even if they were able to find a job elsewhere, in the same occupation with the same general 
skills. Search frictions imply that it will take some time and some resources to the worker 
before being employed again. Frictions thus create a specificity of the employer-employee 
relationship, in the sense developed by Caballero and Hammour (1998). Interestingly, specific 
skills and search frictions have similar features: they create the specificity of relations, a 
surplus of the relationship and lead to a natural solution to share the surplus, bargaining over 
the surplus. 
Wasmer (2002) has investigated  the relation between another market imperfection, 
employment protection and the type of skills chosen by individuals. When employees are   33 
protected by layoff costs, they anticipate a higher duration in the current job: being fired is 
simply too costly for employers to react to small shock, and they thus prefer to retain workers 
even temporarily unproductive. In partial equilibrium, this raises the relative return to specific 
skills with respect to general skills, as workers obtain a reward to their skills over a longer 
time horizon. This mix of highly-specific skills and long-duration jobs has several 
implications: it is conducive to low turnover in the labour market (as workers with specific 
skills have no incentive to quit and lose their skills) ; it makes  the cost of displacement 
extremely high (as workers having over-invested in specific skills and under-invested in 
general skills require huge re-training). Interestingly, ceteris paribus, employers tend to prefer 
workers with specific skills and low mobility, as long as they remain productive, because such 
workers are attached to the firm and have low outside options. On the other hand, workers 
with too specific skills are more likely to demand more employment protection (precisely 
because their outside options are typically low) and are more likely to unionize (as their only 
option to improve wages is through bargaining over the surplus, not by raising outside 
options).  
 
3.2.5. Conclusion of the theory part  
 
This brief review of the theoretical literature brings a few points worth emphasizing, 
and that are useful in the next sections and for the policy conclusion. 
 
1.  Human capital is costly to acquire but raise individual perspectives (wages, 
employability, careers). 
2.  Individual incentives to learn decrease over time. 
3.  Financial market imperfections lead to under-investment in human capital. 
4.  In the absence of labour market imperfections, employees pay for general skills and 
the costs of specific skills are shared. 
5.  With labour market imperfections, employers are partly willing to finance on-the-job 
general skills. 
6.  Employment protection raises the return to specific skills.  
7.  Investing in specific skills rather than in general skills raises the individual cost of 
displacement. 
   34 
A contrario, we have not made any statement on whether education and more 
generally on-the-job training should be publicly or privately financed. Pure gratuity is 
probably conducive to waste, while fully private funding is probably conducive to inequality 
and inefficiency in the presence of market imperfections and externality.  
 
 
3.3. Application of theory to the measurement of specific skills in an Enlarged Europe 
 
3.3.1. Labour reallocation in Europe 
 
Kumar and Kruger (2003 and 2004) have developed the view that in Europe, the 
education system provides a relatively more specialized curriculum, as compared to the US. 
They argue that this is a source a growth-differential between the two areas, as the US are 
able to cope with new technologies in a more reactive way. Wasmer (2002) makes a similar 
point related to on-the-job skills: as institutions in the labour market tend to raise the relative 
returns of specific skills, workers over-invest in such skills. They are thus very productive on-
the-job, but reallocation of labour is more costly, individually and in terms of aggregate 
welfare. An implication is that, in a stable macroeconomic environment, the European model 
with specific skills is rather efficient. In periods of turbulence, when large aggregate and 
reallocative shocks occur, the European model with specific skills may have troubles because 
of its lower ability to deal with rapid changes. The picture presented by Kumar and Kruger 
and Wasmer is highly consistent with Blanchard and Wolfers’s (2000) view that shocks 
interact with institutions. 
We now present evidence of the large labour reallocation Europe has faced or is 
currently facing, both in the Eastern and Western part. We first present empirical evidence 
that workers in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) were and still are 
concentrated in agriculture and industry. Table 3.1 shows how specific countries (Eastern 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) compare to various OECD countries. Here, 
OECD countries are ranked per quantiles of the income per capita distribution.
23 CEEC’s and 
East Germany still have a very large industry compared to the richest OECD countries. The 
situation is somehow different from the previous enlargements to Southern Europe, where the 
share of agriculture was dominant, and only Poland can be compared to Southern Europe in 
                                                 
23 The bottom third corresponds broadly speaking to Southern European Countries such as Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, and Ireland, the fourth of the ‘Cohesion Fund Countries’.   35 
terms of the sectoral composition of employment. See Wasmer (2005) for a longer discussion 
of these issues. 
Let us now focus on two selected Eastern European countries, Poland, and Estonia, 
and investigate the effect of such macroeconomic shocks (the transition to the market 
economy in the early 1990’s and the Enlargement in the late 1990’s). Both countries have 
formally joined the European Union in 2004, but the process was initiated years before, first 
in the early 1990’s when  the negotiation for adhesion started with the definition of the so-
called Copenhagen criteria, and second, when an Accession Partnership was adopted and 
published in the Official Journal of European Communities in March 1998, after the 
Luxembourg European Council had adopted the agenda of the Enlargement process. 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 give a good illustration of what can be meant by obsolescence of 
specific skills. Right after the fall of Berlin Wall and the conversion of Poland to market 
economy, the inflow of early-retirement peaked drastically, around 160 000 workers, while 
the subsequent, steady-state inflows is around 40 000 workers a year. In the years preceding 
the Enlargement, Poland has still a massive recourse to early-retirement allowances: Figure 
3.5 indicates that the stock of workers under such scheme is around 800 000, for a stock of 
unemployed workers of more than 3 millions, which in 2001 represented almost 20% of the 
labour force. In Estonia, given a very active labour market in which job creations exceed 
considerably job destructions, the job separations started to increase after 1997, as well as the 
sum of hiring and separations (a measure of labour reallocation). The point we are making 
here is the twofold: first, the Enlargement, as well as any large transition shock, is associated 
with more labour turnover. And second, labour being not infinitely mobile across sectors, in 
some cases labour turnover implies an increase in the inflows into early inactivity. This is an 
indication that the nature and specificity of skills matter a lot for individual characteristics, 
and even more so in periods of reallocation of labour. 
 
3.3.2. Measurement of specific skills  
 
We have discussed above the importance for any theoretical analysis of labour 
markets to take into consideration the existence of specific skills in the cross-section of labour 
market participants: their existence makes labour adjustment more costly, and slower. A 
natural question, at this stage, is the empirical relevance of such theoretical ideas at the micro 
level.    36 
The most direct evidence can be obtained by a careful investigation of returns to 
seniority. In an older paper, Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) had provocatively demonstrated 
that Japanese and American workers deeply diverged in terms of number of jobs occupied 
throughout their career. For instance, in the late 70's, they showed that in the US, 15% of male 
workers aged 40-49 had more than 20 years of tenure, while this was the case of 31% of 
Japanese workers. At the age 65, US workers had occupied in average slightly more than 10 
jobs, while the average Japanese workers had occupied only four jobs. Perhaps as a cause, 
perhaps as a consequence, they found that, in large firms, returns to tenure were 7% a year 
(with a quadratic term of -0.03%) in Japan, and only 1.2% a year in the US (with an identical 
quadratic coefficient), controlling for total experience, schooling and several interaction 
terms. This has been a much controversial result: subsequent studies for the US oscillated 
between larger and significant returns to tenure (Topel 1991, Kletzer 1989, see also Kletzer's 
survey 1998 based on US displaced workers) and zero returns (Abraham and Farber 1987, 
Altonji and Shakotko 1987), while for Japan, Clark and Ogawa (1992) indicated that strong 
returns to tenure were less true in the mid 1980's, due to changes in the demographic structure 
of Japan. In France, Lefranc (2003) found evidence of large wage losses after displacement, 
but not as large as in the US. Interestingly, he argues that wages losses in France are a loss of 
accumulated human capital while in the US this is mostly due to downgrading of occupation. 
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) investigated the content of firms' sponsored training and 
argue that it is mostly general in the US.  
There is also a large literature on workers’ displacement, attempting to precisely 
investigate the wage loss incurred by workers a few quarters after they were displaced from 
their previous job.
24 Bender et al. (2002) for instance measured the wage profile of workers 
before and after plant closure in Germany and France by carrying out standard wage 
regressions with a full set of dummy variables covering the wage of movers before and after 
displacement. The comparison group in all the regressions is the group of stayers on the job. 
Contrary to US studies, they do not find important wage losses after displacement. Lamo et al. 
(2005) extend the approach in Bender et al. (2002) by allowing for different wage profiles for 
workers with different educational attainment. The key idea is to interact the “before move” 
and “after move” dummies with the degree of specificity of skills, such as measured by the 
ISCED-1997 classification. 
 
                                                 
24 See the compendium of papers included in Kuhn (2001) for a recent study of the issue in different countries.    37 
3.3.3. Am application to two accession countries, Poland and Estonia 
 
We borrow from Lamo et al. (2005) and simplify the presentation of their results. In 
what follows, we attempt to measure the degree of specificity of skills in an economy in 
investigating the wage profile of workers having moved from one job to another (movers 
throughout this section). Bender et al.’s (2002) method is applied to two countries having 
faced the large reallocation episodes discussed above: Poland and Estonia. The main data 
sources are the Polish and Estonian labour force surveys. These are quarterly surveys to a 
large extent homogenized with the LFS carried out in the EU-15. The longitudinal nature of 
the survey allows observing individuals for a maximum of four quarters within a 1.5 years 
period.
25 The period of analysis is 1997-2003 covering to a great extent the anticipation of the 
reallocation shock imposed by the EU Enlargement. Our data set does not allow 
distinguishing voluntary from involuntary mobility. Thus, we do not have  a priori 
expectations on the wage consequences of mobility. However, our theoretical discussion 
suggests that movers with more specific skills should benefit less (or suffer more) from 
mobility. We distinguish 4 educational categories: tertiary, secondary vocational, secondary 
general and less than secondary. If skill specificity is an important limitation to mobility we 
should observe workers holding a vocational qualification to suffer higher wage losses (or 
lower wage gains) than similar workers with more general human capital (secondary general). 
This will be our main hypothesis to be tested. 
Table 3.2 presents the main results from the wage regressions in Poland and Estonia. 
The wage regressions pool information for movers and stayers, and include a full set of 
covariates typically used in this type of analysis. Four dummy variables take value 1 for 
movers at different moments in time before and after mobility. Our coefficients of interest are 
these wage profiles for movers with general secondary education and secondary vocational 
(thus, the interaction terms between the dummy variables of mobility and the educational 
dummies). Results for Estonia confirm the predictions of our theoretical insights. Wages of 
movers with secondary general educations before and after mobility are on average 8 percent 
lower than wages of stayers. Therefore, there is no difference before and after mobility for 
movers with general education. Instead, wages of movers with a vocational degree are 4 
percent lower than wages of stayers before mobility, i.e. they are in jobs with better paid than 
movers with general skills, although they are less paid than stayers. Now, the important 
                                                 
25 For a longer discussion of the main characteristics of the Polish LFS see Section 5 in this report.   38 
difference is that the gap after the move is large: wages decrease by 7 percent compared to 
stayers in the first quarters after move to reach a -10 percent one year after mobility. These 
sizable differences between both types of workers suggest that human capital specificity can 
be an important limitation in periods of rapid structural change.  
The evidence for Poland, although pointing towards a similar direction, is less clear-
cut. In this case, movers with secondary general education benefit from mobility. The 7 
percent gap in wages with respect to stayers before mobility is reduced to -2 in the immediate 
quarters after mobility. This wage gain is somewhat reduced a year after mobility, but not 
enough to reach the level preceding the job change. Instead, the wages of movers with 
secondary vocational education do not vary significantly before and after mobility. The 
massive recourse to early-retirement in Poland may explain why we see smaller differences 
between workers of different education among those who remained in the labour force. 






1.  In the European macroeconomic context of the Enlargement and more generally 
volatility of demand, one can expect large workers’ reallocation flows 
2.  Education must provide skills to ease transition between sectors 
3.  In an ageing Europe, such transitions may be costly, especially since labour market 
institutions, notably employment protection, do not encourage the acquisition of 
general skills.   39 





The purpose of this Section is to investigate the determinants of geographical mobility 
in Europe and in particular to assess the role of education. In Section 1.4, we already explored 
preliminary links between education and mobility and showed that more educated workers are 
more mobile. If unemployment in Europe is partly due to a lack of mobility of workers as 
suggested by many (e.g., Bertola and Ichino, 1995), a natural question to ask here is what is 
the role of human capital in determining mobility, and more precisely, why is the impact of 
education of mobility so large and common in all countries?  
In theory, education may affect the migration decision for two reasons: it may raise 
gross returns to mobility; and it may reduce the costs to mobility. The first effect is rather 
obvious: education has an effect on earnings. Suppose workers receive job offers in a log-
normal wage distribution. Workers with a higher level of education have access to 
proportionally better paid jobs than uneducated workers. Some of these job offers imply a 
geographical move. If mobility costs are independent of education, educated workers will 
therefore be more likely to move. 
The second mechanism is usually disregarded, but is not necessarily less important. 
Higher education is associated with general skills, adaptability of individuals and, in the case 
of higher education, some experience of studying in another city or region. Many studies 
report that, conditional on many observable characteristics, the migration probability 
increases with previous mobility experience (e.g., Axelsson and Westerlund, 1998). 
Individuals with higher education are more likely to have studied elsewhere, they were 
confronted with classmates from other sub-regions or areas, raising the ability to exchange 
and communicate. Overall, higher education may reduce psychological costs to mobility. 
The effect of education on both costs and returns produce the same observable effects 
as the ones displayed in Tables 1.11 and 1.12: education and mobility are positively 
associated. This Section will first provide multivariate analysis of the links between mobility 
and education with no strong claims on causality. We then make a rough attempt to 
disentangle the two effects (costs vs. returns). If we find that education seems to reduce   40 
mobility cost, the general increase in educational attainment in Europe may be beneficial to 
geographical mobility. 
One could argue that it is difficult, both empirically and theoretically to dissociate 
costs from returns.
26 This is true, and we try to make modest claims about how to disentangle 
the two aspects. Nevertheless, the effect of education on returns and costs is important in 
normative terms. If education affects mobility positively because of higher wages, education 
should be privately financed, or at least not more publicly financed. If however education 
reduces mobility costs and is not internalised by students, or it acts through an external effect 
(e.g., if my mate is mobile, I am mobile too), then there is an additional rationale for the large 
recent increase in general education that is not always present in labour market analysis. 
 
 
4.2. Data: ECHP and geographical mobility 
 
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a household survey collected 
from all EU-15 countries that includes detailed information about individual and household 
characteristics. We will use this survey here and in Section 5 on over-education and 
mismatch. The longitudinal nature of the ECHP allows following individuals over time 
throughout the seven years covered in the survey (1994-2001). Moreover, the data also 
includes supplementary information at the country level such as PPP exchange rates, CPI 
national deflators and aggregate population information. Throughout this chapter we use the 
cross-sectional weights provided by the ECHP. Education is defined as a categorical variable 
(primary, secondary or tertiary) in descriptive tables, and in years of schooling in regression 
analysis. See the Appendix to Sections 4 and 5 for details.  
Defining mobility with ECHP is relatively straightforward. The household files 
contain information of the year of the move into the current dwelling (left-truncated in 1979). 
For recent moves, the month of the move is also declared in most cases. Knowing the year 
and month of the interview, one can easily estimate the number of months elapsed since the 
last move for all household members and thus define a ‘recent mobility variable’. For all 15 
countries in the ECHP and for all years but 1994 (due to lack of reliability), we construct two 
variables defining a recent episode of mobility if the household has moved within 12 and 36 
                                                 
26 For instance, in a compensating wage differential approach, wages may reflect moving costs. Here, we have in 
mind a take-it-or-leave-it model of wage offers where firms face an elastic supply of labour and thus have ex-
post the monopoly power.   41 
months preceding the interview. We also know the main reason for the move for 13 of the 15 
countries of the ECHP (Luxembourg and Sweden being the exceptions). The reasons fall into 
three categories: mainly job-related, mainly house-related, or personal reasons. The last 
possibility corresponds to marriage or divorce or death of a relative, while the second one 
corresponds to a situation in which the current dwelling is inappropriate. Drawing the line 
between these two possibilities is not necessarily easy, but house-related mobility is typically 
associated with either the dwelling being too small or too expensive. We finally know 
whether the move was within the city/area, from outside the city/area or from another country. 




4.3. More descriptive statistics on mobility 
 
Here we present additional descriptive statistics on mobility for the sample of heads of 
households (reference person) in the active population. In the survey, the reason for mobility 
can be due to any person in the household. To relate the decision of moving to personal 
characteristics, the best we can do is to select the reference person, presumably the one for 
which the reason for move applies most.  The head of household could not be defined for 
Luxembourg as the PID (personal identification number) of the reference person is missing; 
further this information is missing for Finland in 1997.  
In what follows, all statistics are computed using survey weights. Tables 4.1 to 4.3 
report summary statistics on the relation between mobility rates and various variables related 
to the skill level and employment status of the head of household. Here we focus on mobility 
for any reason and refine the analysis later on. Table 4.1 indicates that mobility rates for the 
unemployed are substantially greater than for employed workers: the mobility rate of the 
unemployment in the last 36 months is 3.5 percentage points above the rate for the employed 
workers (21.3% compared with 17.8%). Table 4.2 reports mobility rates by occupation. The 
relatively more skilled occupations (professionals, technicians) and service workers tend to 
                                                 
27 There are now many studies on mobility based on ECHP. Two recent works, Barcelo (2002), and Tatsiramos 
(2004), use a definition of geographical mobility similar to the one used here, in that it is not based on the change 
in the macro-region of residence to define mobility. The main reason is that, in several countries, macro-regions 
(which are a group of regions, corresponding to the geographical level NUTS1) are so large that geographical 
mobility would be strongly underestimated.   42 
have higher mobility rates than less skilled occupations and occupations specific to industry 
or agriculture.
28  
Figure 4.1 reports the measured mobility rate of heads of households for a job-related 
reason, outside the area/city in which they lived. For all countries, this mobility rate is higher, 
the higher the level of education. On average in Europe, this rate is 2.1% for workers with 
tertiary education, 0.8% for workers with secondary education, and 0.4% for workers with 
primary education. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 examine mobility outside the residential area/city. 
Table 4.3 shows that the UK, Denmark and Finland exhibit the highest mobility rates outside 
the (previous) area of residence. Other countries, notably Belgium and Southern European 
countries, have low or very low mobility outside the current residential area. France and 
Germany are in intermediate positions in this table. The last column in table 4.3 restricts 
mobility to job-related moves. This roughly corresponds to the observations to the right side 
in Figure 4.1, except that in this table, international mobility is excluded while it was included 
in Figure 4.1. Finally, going back to our initial question, Table 4.4 shows that the mobility 
rate outside the area is more than 3 times higher for workers with higher education (4.4% of 
households have experienced a move outside the area in the last 3 years) than for workers 





We now present a simple model of migration. For simplicity we abstract from 
complex intra-household decisions and treat households and individuals interchangeably. The 
presentation draws on Axelsson and Westerlund (1998) with some adaptations.  Typical 
migration models go as follows: each household i has access to J possible places indexed by j. 
Households derive random utility Uij from being located in j and chose the optimal location j* 
as:  
 
j* = Armax (Uij) 
 
                                                 
28 Other unreported statistics indicates that self-employed and workers in family enterprises are much less mobile 
than the regular employees, themselves less mobiles than workers in training and apprenticeship. There is clearly 
an age effect here, as younger workers are at the same time more likely to be geographically mobile and more 
likely to be in a training or apprenticeship status. We did not find any clear trend in the data: mobility rates 
simply show a peak in 1997 and 1998 and subsequently decline.   43 
Now introduce time variability. Denote by l=j*(t-1) the optimal location last period. 
At time t, if  j*(t) differs from  l, the household moves. One can thus estimate a migration 
model such as:  
 
M=1 (or 0)     if M*=Wg+w>0 (or=0)       (4.1) 
 
where W is a vector of households characteristics, g a vector of coefficients, and w a random 
error term, assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance  (sw)
2. This 
approach implicitly focuses on returns to migration and ignores costs: the fact that education 
and mobility are positively correlated in the cross-section is taken as an indication that returns 
to migration are higher, the higher the level of human capital.  
To disentangle returns and costs to education, one can adapt the model as follows: 
 
j*(t) = Armax (Uij -Cilj)              (4.2) 
 
where now, the optimal location depends on the current location and Cilj is the cost for 
household i to move from place l to place j, with Cill=0.  
Estimation of equation (4.1) is however not going to help, as the determinants of the 
returns to moving W are now the determinants of net gains from migration, thus still mixing 
up costs and gross returns. We need to adapt the existing empirical strategies to attempt to 
decompose the effects of education on costs and returns to mobility. Here, we will propose 
two alternative strategies. A first one can be thought of as a reduced-form empirical strategy. 
The second one is a more structural approach. 
 
 
4.5. First strategy: comparing job-related mobility and mobility for other reasons 
 
Here we exploit an interesting feature of the ECHP: individuals report the main reason 
for having moved in the current dwelling. As discussed above, the reason can be either 
primarily job-related, house-related or for personal reasons. The main idea in our empirical 
strategy is as follows. The effect of human capital on returns to mobility is presumably 
stronger for job-related moves than for moves induced by other reasons. Denote again by 
Wg  the determinants of mobility with Wg=Rgr-Cgc with R a set of variables affecting returns   44 
to mobility, and X a set of variables affecting costs to mobility. Estimating a multinomial logit 
model of migration, where the categorical variable takes values 0 if no recent move, 1 if job-
related move, 2 if house-related move and 3 for personal reasons, one has an estimate of g per 
type of mobility. We use the mobility rate in the last three years instead on the last year to 
obtain more mobility events and thus have a better identification of parameters of interest. 
A possible identifying assumption, denoted by (Ho), is that the coefficient of the 
variable education on returns to mobility (one coefficient of the array gr) is zero for house-
related moves or personal reasons. In this case, we would obtain an estimate of the cost-effect 
of education (which is the corresponding coefficient of the gc). Nevertheless, this is a rather 
strong assumption. A refinement of the method is to run a higher-level multinomial logit 
model, making use of the distance of the move; individuals indeed declare whether the 
previous location was in the same area/city or outside. One can then create a categorical 
variable taking the following values (0 if no recent move, 11 if job-related move in the same 
area, 12 if job-related move to another area, 21 if house-related move to the same area, 22 if 
house-related move to another area, 31 if personal reason move to the same area and 32 if 
personal reason move to another area. One would expect the effect of education to be more 
important for house-related moves for a move outside the city, the same for moves motivated 
by a personal reason. 
We restrict the analysis to a sample of active individuals who are the reference person 
in the household. A missing variable is attributed to the categorical variables when the reason 
for move or its origin is missing. We use data covering the time period 1995 to 2001 for 13 
countries (Sweden and Luxembourg excluded because of data availability) and obtain a 
partition of the sample as described in Table 4.5. Missing observations represent 9%, no 
mobility 79%. The remainder is mobility mostly due to house-related moves, mostly in the 
same area. In contrast, job-related moves tend to be marginally more outside the area (0.83%) 
than within the area (0.67%). 
Table 4.6 reports the results of the three-level multinomial logit where individual 
clustering is taken into account in the computation of the variance-covariance matrix. We 
present the relative risk ratios. As is clear, whatever the specification retained (with or without 
industry and occupation effects, with or without control for household total net real income or 
unemployment status), the effect of education is positive and significant for all types of 
moves. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient on education is larger for job-related mobility (8% in 
the first specification), but it remains positive and significant for house-related and moves out   45 
of personal reasons (3.5% and 2.0% respectively). Under assumption (Ho) made above, this 
would mean that mobility costs depend negatively on the level of education.  
Table 4.7 decomposes the multinomial analysis further using the information on the 
distance of the move. In the top table, we present the estimated coefficients both in level and 
in their exponential form, In the benchmark specification, one can observe that the coefficient 
of education in columns “Outside the area” is between two and three times larger than in 
columns “same area”. The ratio is even about 4 for moves for personal reason. A similar 
finding emerges from alternative specifications in the bottom of the table. This means that, 
whatever the reason for the move, a higher level of education implies that individuals are two 
to three times more mobile outside the area than within the area, everything else controlled 
for. Since psychological mobility costs are presumably larger when distance of the residential 
change is larger, we take these results as an additional indication that mobility costs are 
significantly reduced by education.  
We also explored the determinants of mobility for Germany, France, the UK and Italy. 
We don’t report the results, but for job-related moves the results are consistent with those in 
Table 4.7: the marginal impact of an additional year of education on the probability of moving 
outside the current residential area is larger than for moves within the current residential area. 
On the other hand, the coefficient on education is not larger for “big” moves in Germany and 




4.6. Second strategy: estimating the income gain from migration 
 
The migration decision specified in equation (4.1) is a reduced-form approach, where 
the explanatory  variables are personal characteristics. A more structural approach would 
incorporate the income change due to migration. In our case, this would be very useful, 
because the effect of education net of income change would be good measure of the cost-
reducing effect of education. Of course, the income change from migration is only observed 
for those having moved, a typical selection problem analogous to the problem of estimating 
wage equations when the wage of non-participants is not observed.  
To deal with the problem, a second equation  -- an income change equation  -- is 
typically estimated. Suppose income is determined by 
   46 
Y= Xb+aM + Zd +e                (4.3) 
 
where X are observable characteristics affecting income, while Z is a set of time-independent 
variables such as education, and b and d are vectors of coefficients. The stochastic component 
e is assumed to be normally distributed variable with zero mean and variance  (se)
2. The 
correlation between the two error terms e and w is given by r.  
The method is the following: in a first step, equation (4.1) is estimated. In a second 
stage, equation (4.2) is estimated. In this second step, the correlation between e and w is taken 
into account by adding the variable  Inv.Mills =  f(Wg) / F(Wg) if  M=1 and 
f(Wg) / (1-F(Wg)) if  M=0. The estimated coefficient on this variable delivers the product 
rse.
29  
One thus obtains E(Y|M=1), E(Y|M=0) and their difference is thus the expected gain 
from migration, imputed notably to households for which no migration was observed. See the 
Appendix for the computation of these variables. Denote by  
 
DYE,imp = E(Y|M=1) - E(Y|M=0)            (4.4) 
 
the imputed, expected gain from migration. One can thus in a third stage re-estimate a 
migration equation similar to (4.1), but with this variable as an additional explanatory 
variable. The effect of education, given the inclusion of this variable, is thus the effect of 
education net of the effect of the potential gain from migration. It is thus the effect on the 
cost.   
In order to see why it is important to estimate the income equation for stayers and 
movers separately in this two-stage analysis, one can simply report gross statistics on the 
yearly income growth of household real income (PPP adjusted). It is on average 2.4 percent a 
year over the sample of 13 EU countries. Movers for job-related reasons have on average a 
6.7% income growth. Movers for a job-related reason who moved outside the area further 
experience on average a 8.3% income growth. 
We report in Table 4.8 the first stage (a probit equation for mobility) in the first 
column and the semi-structural mobility equation in the second column where the imputed 
income growth is added as a regressor. We also report the income model, corrected for 
                                                 
29  Identification will come from housing tenure and “rent is a financial burden” variables in the mobility 
equation, and different functional forms (potential exp. vs. age dummies) in the income and mobility equations.   47 
selection, for stayers and movers, respectively, in columns 3 and 4.
30 A few interesting results 
emerge. First, in the income growth equations, the product rse is positive and significant, 
contrary to Axelsson and Westerlund (1998) who find it to be insignificant. The main reason 
is that we estimated the income model in levels, while they estimate an income growth model. 
The impact of education on income is large, and larger, though marginally, for movers. Other 
variables playing the dominant role in this equation are family status and family size. Second, 
the imputed income growth variable has a large and significant coefficient in the mobility 
equation. Finally, the coefficient of education is about 0.033 in the reduced-form probit, and 
is not much smaller in the semi-structural approach: it falls to 0.030. We also undertook the 
same analysis by country for Germany, France, the UK and Italy, in retaining the same 





1.  Geographical mobility is positively associated with the level of education 
unconditionally as well as conditional on other characteristics. 
2.  The effect of education is larger for job-related moves and for long-distance moves 
(outside the area of residence) 
3.  The results suggest that mobility costs, notably psychological costs, are reduced by 
higher levels of education.  
                                                 
30 We also tried four different specifications, including additional variables: unemployment status and 
occupation and industry dummies but do not report these results, as they are very similar.   48 






Every year, the European economy generates a large number of high school and 
college graduates that start searching for their first job. Regardless the search efforts by the 
newly incorporated to the labour market, the transition from school to work is often slow and 
associated  with long spells of unemployment.
31 But at the same time, companies usually 
claim that their posted vacancies cannot be filled-in by the numerous jobseekers. This failure 
of the market to match unemployed individuals and vacancies can often be attributed to 
information asymmetries and high costs associated to mobility, but it is also often a sign that 
the jobseekers do not have the qualifications demanded by the firms. Even when young 
workers finally obtain a job, it is often the case that their qualifications are not necessarily 
related to the job contents. Sometimes workers find themselves over-qualified for the job. 
Alternatively, their qualifications acquired at school might be sufficient for the job, although 
the contents of their educational background might not be much related to the skills required 
by the job.  
A recent empirical literature mainly focused in European countries studies the 
determinants and causes of the mismatches between the formal education of individuals and 
the educational requirements of their jobs.  Following Freeman’s (1976) seminal book this 
literature identifies workers as over or under educated and studies the consequences of these 
types of mismatches for wages and other labour market outcomes. One limitation in this 
literature is the lack of comparability of methods and data, which hinges cross-country 
comparisons. Groot and van den Brink (2000) present a meta-analysis of previous studies on 
the effects of over-education on wages, but their focus is on laying out cross-country 
regularities rather than identifying idiosyncratic features. Moreover, while looking at 
educational mismatches is interesting in itself and from a policy perspective, these 
mismatches might not necessarily imply an inefficient allocation of resources. Workers 
identified as over-educated might well be properly matched if their productivity is lower due 
to unobserved characteristics such as inner ability with respect to other workers with the same 
educational level. Similarly, under-educated workers might compensate this lack of education 
                                                 
31 For a survey of the issue and recent international comparisons see OECD (1999).   49 
with other forms of human capital such as firm specific training and be the best suited for 
their jobs. 
There are two main perspectives in the interpretation of skill and educational 
mismatch. According to some views skill mismatch is a temporary phenomenon at the 
individual level. This phenomenon might be related to inefficiencies in the functioning of the 
labour market due to lack of perfect information and mobility (Jovanovic, 1979), or might 
instead reflect a desire from the part of workers to acquire skills that complement their 
qualification at early stages of their career (Sicherman and Galor, 1990). Over time, workers 
are expected to improve the matches either by mobility within or outside the firm. Instead, if 
formal education is used as a screening device by employers (Spence, 1973) skill mismatch 
can become a permanent phenomenon. Recently, Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Dolado et 
al. (2004) have shown that mismatch can be a long-lasting phenomenon in matching models 
with jobs and worker heterogeneity, where high skilled workers can compete with low skilled 
workers for low skilled jobs. These structural mismatches can be attributed to supply forces 
such as rapid educational upgrading of the labour force, or demand forces such as skilled bias 
technological change. In both cases they imply a rapid change in the demand or supply of 
skills that cannot be easily matched by the other side of the market. 
This chapter presents an overview of the labour market causes and consequences of 
skill and educational mismatch in selected European countries. When the data allows, it goes 
beyond previous definitions of over-education by concentrating on the broader concept of 
skills rather than formal education. The chapter is divided in two parts. First, we study the 
causes and consequences of skill mismatch in the EU-15 using recent data from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). The data allow us to characterize the phenomenon of 
skill mismatch and over-qualification on a consistent basis across countries and time, based 
on workers self-assessments on the relationship between their skills and those required by 
their jobs. After presenting a short overview of the phenomenon of skill mismatch in the EU-
15 economies, the analysis concentrates on the five largest EU-15 countries.  
The second part complements the analysis by focusing on Poland, a country that like 
nine others of the new enlarged Europe has recently gone through a process of structural 
change and transition to a market economy while its educational system was tailored to the 
needs of a regulated economy. Over/under education (or education mismatch) in these 
countries has not been studied, and it is a potentially relevant phenomenon. 
Unfortunately, the definition of educational mismatch available for Poland is not 
directly comparable to the definition used for the other EU countries. The data source used for   50 
the analysis is the Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS) for the period 1997-2003, which 
allows us to look at formal education mismatches (both, under and over education) but does 
not allow to directly characterizing the broader phenomenon of skill mismatch. This partially 
prevents us from comparing measures and trends of education mismatch in Poland and the 
other large countries of the European Union. Therefore, the second part of this chapter offers 
new empirical evidence of the labour market consequences of over/under education in Poland, 
and when possible draws some tentative lines of comparison with the other EU countries.   
 
 
Part A. Skill mismatch and over-qualification in the EU-15 
 
Our analysis starts characterizing the phenomenon of skill mismatch and over-
qualification. We start with a fact-finding section where we analyse the main personal and 
firm characteristics associated to skill mismatch. Thus, we relate several measures of skill 
mismatch to a set of personal characteristics including education, previous unemployment 
experience, potential experience in the labour market and tenure on the job and firm 
characteristics such sector of operation. Next, we analyse the consequences of over-
qualification and skill mismatch for the determination of wages. Our augmented Mincerian 
regressions single out the types of skill mismatch that are penalized by the market. 
 
 
5.2. The data 
 
As in Section 4, we use the ECHP. We concentrate the analysis on the five largest 
countries of the EU-15; namely, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, but we will 
present summary statistics for all EU-15 countries in an attempt to provide a full picture of the 
skill mismatch phenomenon
32. Hourly wages net of taxes are calculated from the ECHP. 
Hourly wages are derived by dividing the monthly net wage provided by the questionnaire by 
monthly hours worked. In order to facilitate cross-country comparisons we use the PPP 
exchange rates provided with the ECHP to convert wages into 2001 PPP units and then 
deflate them by using the National Consumer Price Indices. More details on the ECHP data 
can be found in the Appendix and in Peracchi (2002). 
                                                 
32 Sweden and the Netherlands are excluded from the sample since questions on skill mismatch are not available.   51 
Over-qualified individuals can be identified in the ECHP as those individuals 
answering affirmatively the following question: 
 
•  Do you feel that you have skills or qualifications to do a more demanding job than the 
one you have now? 
 
Unfortunately, this question is only formulated in the common independent questionnaire of 
the ECHP. This limits data availability in the cases of Germany and the UK to the first three 
waves (1994-1997).  Some aspects are worth noting regarding the formulation of the question 
above. First note that the question refers to skills or qualifications rather than educational 
levels. In this respect the information provided will be more ample than in previous studies 
that focused on over-education. For instance, an experienced individual with the right 
educational level for a given job might feel over-qualified when she compares herself with a 
younger worker with the same educational attainment employed for the same job. One 
drawback of this measure is that it does not allow us to distinguish by how much the 
phenomenon of over-qualification occurs. As an illustration think about two individuals 
working as a waiter, but one holding a high school degree and another with a collage graduate 
certificate. It is very likely that in this case both individuals feel over-qualified for the job, but 
we will not be able to distinguish by how much each of them exceeds the required educational 
level of a waiter with the right education for the job. 
A second question in the ECHP questionnaire allows us to go a bit further in the 
classification of skill and educational mismatch: 
 
•  Have you had formal training or education that has given you skills needed for your 
present type of work? 
 
Crossing the information contained in both questions we can construct four types of 
individual classes according to their type of match: 
 
•  Type 1. “Non-over-qualified and well matched” (NOWM), if non-over-qualified and 
education and training is suited for their job. 
•  Type 2. "Non-over-qualified and mismatched" (NOBM), if non-over-qualified but 
education and training is not suited for their job.   52 
•  Type 3. "Over-qualified but correctly matched" (OWM), if over-qualified but 
education and training are suited for their job. 
•  Type 4. "Over-qualified and mismatched" (OBM), if over-qualified and education and 
training are not suited for job. 
 
An example can help to illustrate the differences between the four types of individuals. 
An individual with a PhD in mathematics working as a university professor will be classified 
as NOWM. Instead, if this individual is employed as a research assistant she will probably 
classify herself as OWM, since she has the right training to do the job but would be suitable 
for a more qualified set of tasks. Imagine instead that she is appointed as the CEO of a 
multinational firm. In this case, her formal qualification would not be well suited for the job 
although she is certainly not over-qualified (NOBM). Finally, if she worked as an electrician 
she would certainly feel over-qualified and with an education not suited for the job (OBM). It 
is important to note that strictly speaking only workers in category 1 are properly matched. 
OWM, although having the training demanded by the job could be assigned to more 
demanding tasks according to their qualifications. Thus, we label them as “correctly matched” 
in the sense that their formal training is directly related to their job, although their actual 
(either formal or acquired on the job) qualifications would allow them to do a more 
demanding job. 
   Table 5.1 presents the results from the cross-tabulations of type of match pooling all 
countries and years where information is available. We restrict the sample throughout the 
chapter to full time employees in the working age (15-64) population. The total number of 
workers in the sample is 279,655. According to these tabulations about 54 percent of the 
population considers to have skills for a more demanding job than the one they hold at the 
moment of the interview. Among the four categories described above, OWM workers are the 
most common, accounting for 33 percent of the total number of employees. Instead, the 
number of workers correctly matched (NOWM) is the lowest among the four categories (21.2 
percent).    
Summary statistics (not presented in the text) of the three categories of skill mismatch 
and their relationship with personal characteristics for each country (pooling all the years 
available) revealed that although cross-country differences are apparent, there are some 
common features in the incidence of skill mismatch across countries. With the exception of a 
slightly larger incidence of NOWM among female workers, there are no large differences 
across gender in the incidence of the three types of skill mismatch. A similar pattern emerges   53 
regarding marital status.
33 As expected, the incidence of NOWM increases with age. The 
other side of this pattern is a higher incidence of over-qualification among younger workers, 
with OBM exhibiting a mode in the [16,25) age bracket and OWM being more concentrated 
in the next age category [25,35). NOWM are less common within individuals holding a 
tertiary degree in all countries, while NOBM is more common within labour market 
participants holding a primary degree. Interestingly, the incidence of over-qualification within 
educational groups differs significantly depending on the nature of the skill match. While 
OWM is more common among individuals with tertiary diploma OBM is more concentrated 
on the other tier of the skill distribution. Regarding the evolution of each category of 
mismatch with tenure on the firm an interesting pattern emerges. While OBM diminishes with 
tenure, NOBM and OWM appear as relatively permanent phenomena, without a clear 
relationship with tenure on the job.  
Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of the different categories of  skill match during the 
period of analysis for the European average. During the 7 years of study, the incidence of skill 
mismatch has remained relatively stable with a mild decline of OWM coupled with a raise of 
properly matched individuals. In spite of the common features across countries mentioned, 
there are important cross-country differences in the incidence of the different categories of 
skill mismatch. Figure 5.2 shows the incidence of the four types of match in the thirteen 
European countries for which information is available. In all countries with the exception of 
Portugal, Italy and Greece the modal category is OWM, involving almost 50 percent of the 
employees in Germany, Belgium, Finland and the UK. In southern Europe, there is instead a 
relatively higher incidence of mismatch, either coupled with over-qualification in the cases of 
Italy and Greece or in the form of pure mismatch in the cases of Portugal and France. These 
differences across countries can be attributed to a large number of factors. They could be 
caused by the design and efficiency of the different educational systems in providing the skills 
demanded by the market. Alternatively, they might be related to the interplay of institutions, 
educational choices and the functioning of the labour market in matching the supply and 
demand of skills. 
Regarding the later, firing costs are expected to reduce labour flows with ambiguous 
effects on average employment, but unambiguous effects regarding efficiency, since they 
prevent workers to be employed where more needed at each point in time.
34 Moreover, they 
are expected to play a significant role in segmenting the labour market, by insulating insiders 
                                                 
33 Note that the survey started in 1995 in Austria and Finland.  
34 See Bertola (1999) and the references therein for a detailed analysis.   54 
from employment fluctuations at the cost of a lower (higher) employment (unemployment) 
rate of outsiders (typically younger and female workers). Bertola et al (2005) find support for 
this hypothesis using a time varying indicator of Employment protection legislation (EPL) for 
a panel of 17 OECD countries, showing that more stringent EPL the higher the relative 
unemployment rate of younger workers with respect to adults. It might be argued then that in 
countries where reallocation of labour is costly and finding a first job is difficult due to the 
presence of employment protection the incidence of skill mismatched might be larger. At the 
same time, mismatched individuals will remain for longer spells on the job due to stringent 
firing restrictions. This presumption seems to be supported by the data. Figure 5.3 shows the 
rank correlations between the different categories of skill match and a ranking of EPL.
35 In 
line with the previous arguments, we find that there is a positive association between skill 
mismatch and the stringency of EPL. However, there are not significant differences between 
the different categories of skill mismatch regardless whether individuals are over-qualified for 
their jobs or not (NOBM and OBM). 
 
 
5.3. Who is over-qualified or mismatched?  
 
In this section we examine the individual and job characteristics most typically 
associated with the different categories of skill mismatch outlined in the previous section for 
the largest countries in the EU-15. The analysis is divided into two parts. In the first part we 
follow most of the literature on over-education and study the personal characteristics 
associated with over-qualification regardless of the matching status of the individual. A probit 
model is estimated, where the dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual declares to be 
over-qualified. Control variables include personal (gender, marital status, size of household, 
years of education, potential experience and a set of previous unemployment experience 
dummies) and job (tenure, 10 industry and 10 occupational dummies) related characteristics. 
In the second part of this section w e differentiate between the four categories of matching 
outlined above and estimate multinomial logit models of the different categories of skill 
mismatch. Before turning to the results, some clarifications must be in place regarding the 
construction of some of the covariates included in the analysis. The number of years of 
education is not directly observable from the ECHP and therefore was (see the Appendix 
                                                 
35 The EPL ranking is constructed by averaging the OECD (2004) index of employment protection for the period 
1994-2001.   55 
A4.1). Another important variable for the analysis is tenure on the job. This information is 
reported in the survey as a continuous variable top coded at 15. In order to deal with this top 
coding we have constructed 4 categories of tenure as reported in the appendix. Regarding 
previous unemployment experience we include three dummy variables in the analysis, which 
take value 1 if the individual was ever unemployed in the last 5 years (unemp), more than 
once within the last 5 years (nunemp) and for more than 1 year within the last 5 years 
(ltunemp). 
Table 5.2 presents marginal effects of the expected changes in the predicted 
probability of over-qualification evaluated at the mean of the covariates as a function of 
personal and job characteristics. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the individual 
level.
36 Columns 1 to 5 present the results for each individual country while Column 6 pools 
the information for all countries and years. A definition of the variables is presented in Table 
A5.4 in the Appendix. Some common features across countries stand out. Regarding personal 
characteristics, male workers tend to consider themselves over-qualified in greater proportion 
than female workers holding other characteristics constant such as years of education. With 
the sole exception of Germany, where the effect is positive but not statistically significant at 
standard levels, over-qualification increases with years of schooling. According to the average 
across countries, 10 additional years of education increase the probability of being over-
qualified in 0.21. On the contrary, the probability of being over-qualified declines with labour 
market experience in all countries. This result goes in line with a transitory interpretation of 
the incidence of over-qualification. There are also some important differences across 
countries. We find further evidence of over-qualification being a temporary phenomenon in 
Italy and Spain, where workers with tenure exceeding 10 years have a significantly lower 
probability of being over-qualified. This is not the case in the rest of countries, where we do 
not find a significant difference in the incidence of over-qualification for workers with 
difference seniority on the job. On the other hand, in Germany and the UK we find a positive 
association between over-qualification and having experienced an unemployment spell during 
the last five years, suggesting that some workers might be willing to accept a job for which 
they are over-qualified to avoid unemployment. This last finding deserves further exploration, 
for instance by looking at the transitions from unemployment to work and their relationship 
with over-qualification. Lastly, note that the country dummies are all highly significant at 
standard confidence levels in column 6, suggesting that cross-country differences remain after 
                                                 
36 Assuming that the individual heterogeneity is random and estimating the probit model by random effects 
yielded qualitatively similar results, which are therefore not reported.   56 
controlling for a wide set of personal and job characteristics. According to this set of 
dummies, the likelihood of being overeducated is lower in Southern Europe, being highest in 
the UK and lowest in Italy. 
Having analysed the determinants of over-qualification, we go one step further by 
studying the four categories of skill match outlined in the previous section. Table 5.3 presents 
results for multinomial logit regressions on the determinants of skill mismatch. The reference 
group are those individuals not over-qualified and well matched (NOWM). The first three 
columns present the coefficients, and should guide us regarding the sign of the effects, while 
the last three columns present the relative risk ratios, which help interpreting the effects of the 
covariates in the odds of being in each category with respect to the reference group. To 
simplify the presentation of the results, we include only the specifications polling all countries 
and years and including country and year dummies. Separate specifications for the 5 largest 
EU-15 countries are available u pon request. The main differences between countries with 
respect to the pooled country results will be commented in the text. 
The multinomial logit regressions confirm the higher incidence of over-qualification 
among male workers. However, no important gender differences are found between NOWM 
and NOBM. An interesting difference between the two classes of over-qualified workers 
emerges. While the incidence of correctly matched over-qualified (OWM) workers increases 
with respect to comparison group (NOWM) with years of education, OBM are more 
concentrated than NOWM among individuals with a lower educational background. This is 
consistent with a higher concentration of OBM workers than NOWM in elementary 
occupations such as clerks, service and trade workers and plant and machine operators, as 
observed by the occupational dummies included in the regressions (not shown in the text), 
and a lower concentration in more demanding occupations such as professionals and associate 
technicians. 
The lower association between over-qualification and experience is maintained in the 
multinomial framework, and no substantial differences are observed between both types of 
over-qualified individuals. Surprisingly, experience increases the probability of being NOBM 
with respect to the reference group. This somewhat counter-intuitive result is maintained in 
Germany, France and Italy, while in Spain the expected pattern of lower likelihood of non 
over-qualification and mismatch with an increase in experience is observed. More than 10 
years of tenure reduces the probability of being mismatched regardless of the over-
qualification status (for NOBM and OBM), but it is only for the latter group that we observe a 
clear pattern of declining incidence with increasing tenure with respect to the reference group.   57 
This pattern is common across countries, and it is only in the Spanish case that more than 10 
years of experience reduces the likelihood of being OWM with respect to NOWM. Having an 
unemployment spell, or experiencing long term unemployment in the recent past increases the 
likelihood of being mismatched and over-qualified with respect to the baseline category, 
although these effects are not always statistically significant at the country level. As observed 
in the case of the simple probit estimates of the extent of over-education, country differences 
remain important after controlling for compositional effects. Interestingly, the lower 
likelihood of being over-qualified in Southern Europe noted above is explained by a 
difference incidence of over-qualification in the absence of skill mismatch (OWM). 
The multinomial logit analysis uncovered important differences among the four 
classes of workers. We have performed Hausman type tests of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) hypotheses maintained by the multinomial logit. In most cases, the test did 
not reject the null of independence of alternative hypothesis. Similarly, we have tested 
whether we can pool the different categories for the aggregate and country models using 
standard Wald tests, and for all pair of combinations of outcome categories the null of equal 
coefficients was rejected. This evidence thus suggests that different categories of over-
qualified workers differ significantly, depending on whether they are properly matched or not.  
 
 
5.4. Over-qualification, skills mismatch and wages 
 
Having established the main characteristics of the different classes of mismatched 
workers we move next to the analysis of the consequences of skill mismatch and over-
qualification. In this section, we investigate the link between over-qualification, skill 
mismatch and wages. Although the previous analysis suggested that different types of over-
qualified workers might actually have a very different behaviour, we start this section by 
estimating standard Mincer regressions augmented to include a dummy variable for over-
qualification and in a second stage we differentiate between the different types of mismatched 
workers. A similar approach was first developed by Duncan and Hoffman (1981), who 
extended the Mincerian earnings regressions to include measures of over-education and 
under-education, thus establishing a first link between the supply side of the labour market 
and the demand side (ignored in the standard Mincer regressions).  
This first set of regressions has the virtue of being to some extent comparable to the 
analysis of Poland carried out in the second part of this chapter. Table 5.4 presents the results   58 
of augmented Mincer regressions including an over-qualification dummy
37. The first 5 
columns present the results for each of the countries separately and Column 6 presents the 
results pooling all countries. The other covariates included in the regression (not shown in the 
table) presented the expected signs, wages increasing with education, tenure and experience 
(albeit at a decreasing rate), and falling for singles and female workers as well as for those 
individuals who experienced an unemployment spell in the recent past or suffered a long term 
unemployment spell within the previous 5 years. In line with the rest of the literature, over-
qualified workers have a wage penalty with respect to properly matched employees according 
to Column 6. However, the magnitude of the effect is relatively small (1 % lower wages). 
Moreover, the pooled results hide important differences across countries, since it is only in 
Spain where the wage penalty of over-qualified workers is negative and statistically 
significant. 
Our second set of regressions extends the approach in the over-education literature by 
allowing distinguishing between the three different types of skill mismatch defined above. 
Are these differences translated in wage differentials among these three groups of workers 
and between mismatched and correctly matched individuals? Table 5.5 presents OLS standard 
Mincer regressions augmented to include three dummy variables that capture each of our 
mismatch categories of workers (NOWM is the reference group). The first 5 columns present 
the results for each of the countries separately and Column 6 presents the results pooling all 
countries.  
Both categories of mismatched workers present a negative return in all countries. The 
effect is large, suggesting that on average NOBM and OBM workers earn about 11 percent 
less that properly matched individuals. Interestingly, with the exception of the Spanish case 
where being over-qualified and mismatched carries an extra negative premium with respect to 
being mismatched and correctly qualified, there are not substantial differences between the 
negative returns of NOBM and OBM. Hence, we can conclude that once the individual is 
mismatch there is no additional wage penalty from being over-qualified. If instead the 
individual has the skills required for the job (well matched) but is over-qualified (OWM), a 
wage penalty is found only in the cases of Spain and Italy. This fact together with the highest 
negative wage penalty for OBM workers in Spain is consistent with the view that the current 
expansion of tertiary education in this country has not been sufficiently accommodated by an 
increase in the demand for skilled jobs (Dolando, Jansen and Jimeno, 2004). However, it 
                                                 
37 To eliminate the possible impact of wage outliers we drop the 1
st and 99
th percentiles from the hourly wage 
distribution in all the wage regressions   59 
should be noted that even if significant the magnitude of the wage penalty from being OWM 
is about one third of the wage penalty in case of being badly matched (OBM) in all countries. 
Thus, we can conclude that in the five EU countries studied it is to a large extent skill 
mismatch what drives the wage penalty on wages and not over-qualification 
 
 
Part B. Education mismatch in a transition economy: the case of Poland 
 
In this part we measure education mismatch in Poland using data from the Polish 
Labour Force Survey over the period 1997-1003. Next, we analyse its consequences in the 
determination of wages. And finally, we study the nature of this mismatch, focusing on 
whether it is as transitory phenomenon at the individual’s level related to inefficiencies of the 
labour market or a more structural or long lasting one. 
Imposed by the nature of our data, we follow the strand of the literature that uses the 
so called data-based indexes of over/under education. This strand looks at the actual 
distribution of worker’s educational attainment by type of occupation to define the (estimated) 
adequate level of education per occupation.  Indexes of over/under education are based on 
measures of the deviations between the actual and adequate education levels.  The two 
indexes used are the following: 
 
•  A mean based index that takes as adequate education per occupation one standard 
deviation mean-centred interval. It classifies as under/over educated those workers whose 
schooling is under/over the limits of this interval (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989). 
 
•  A mode based index, according to which the adequate education for each occupation is 
represented by the mode of the distribution; any deviation from above/below the mode 
will be taken as over/under education (Mendes de Oliveira et al, 2000). Occupations for 
which less than 60% of the observations had an education level at the mode were dropped 
from the sample. 
 
The main arguments in favour of data-based indexes, put forward by their supporters, 
are that 1) they do not suffer from subjectivity, when compared with measures based on the 
worker’s own evaluation, and 2) they are much simpler (and often more accurate) that indexes 
based on exogenously designed criteria, which define the required (adequate) educational   60 
level for each occupation relying on occupational classifications of job analysts, for example 
information on general educational development (GED) from the US Dictionary of 
Occupational Tittles. The problem with this sort of information is that its transformation into 
equivalent schooling can be very complicated and arbitrary. Additionally, these job 
classifications are costly and not frequently update. 
The main drawbacks of the data-based indices that we are going to use here, are that 
different data-based indexes deliver usually different results and their accuracy heavily relies 
on how disaggregate is the available data on occupations. We think that these two problems 
are minor in the case of our study, because, first, the PLFS data provides data on a three digits 
classification of occupations, adding to 122 occupations. And second, we use 2 alternative 
data-based indexes of over/under education and the results turn out to be quite robust to the 
choice of the index. Additionally, it should be kept in mind that data-based measures are 
based on realized matches that involve labour demand and supply, being therefore inadequate 





The PLFS is a household survey that collects detailed information on individual 
characteristics. It started in 1992 as a full panel survey and, due to the large attrition; its 
structure was changed into a rotating panel in 1993. It uses the rotation scheme 2-(2)-2, in 
which each person is surveyed for two consecutive quarters, excluded for other two quarters, 
and then included again two more quarters to be excluded definitively afterwards. Therefore, 
the maximum number of observations available per individual  is 4.
38  The overall sampling 
fraction is 0.14% of private households and includes all the members of each surveyed 
household older than 15.  
The variables definitions are quite harmonized with the European Labour Force 
Survey; the PLFS follows the international classifications of employment status and of 
occupations. Information on wages is far from ideal as, apparently, people are quite reluctant 
to disclose this information. Another peculiarity about wages is that, in fact, the PLFS does 
not collect information on wages but on monthly net remuneration, although for simplicity we 
will refer to the monthly net remuneration as wages. Years of education are not available as 
                                                 
38 Each quarter, 25% of the sample is interviewed for the first time, 50% were already interviewed in the 
previous quarter, and the other 25% participated one year ago.   61 
such, but the levels of education are disaggregated into 7 categories and we have assigned to 
then the years of education according to the current education system in Poland. 
We restrict the sample to full-time employees in the working age (15-65) population, 
including all activities but agriculture
39. Additionally, we exclude observations with wage 
values in the 1st and 99th percentiles of the wage distribution.  All the analysis has been done 
for the two set of over/under education indexes. 
Table 5.6 displays the percentage of the sample that is over and under educated over 
time according to the two indexes. Over education shows in both cases a clear trend upward 
while under education has decreased during the sample period.  
Estimations on the probability of being over/under overeducated showed that it is 
more likely that a worker is over educated if is male and has high levels of education. While 
tenure, potential experience out of the job, having attended some training recently, and 
working in the public sector all have negative effects on the probability of being 




5.6. Returns to over/under education  
 
We estimate two specifications for wages that have been used in this literature, to 
examine the returns to over/under education. Firstly, a specification called the augmented 
Mincer equation where a dummy on over/under education is included among the covariates. 
This allows us to directly compare workers that have similar features but suffer education 
mismatch. Table 5.7 shows that, according to the two indexes of education mismatch, on 
average, the wage of overeducated workers is around 8.5% lower than the one of similar 
workers adequately matched, while in the case of under education wages are between 10-14% 
higher. This result contrasts with the evidence presented in Table 5.4, where wage penalties in 
the largest EU-15 countries for over-qualified individuals were found to be negative but small 
and not always different from zero, except in the case of Spain. Although measures of over-
education and over-qualification refer to slightly different concept the comparison of both sets 
of results suggests a greater penalty of educational mismatch in Poland than in the EU-15 
countries. 
                                                 
39  We re-did  all the analysis in this chapter with a sample including agriculture: results did not change 
substantially. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in the full sample, agricultures is under-represented because 
the PLFS sample under represents rural areas, and because we have dropped self-employed workers. 
40 Probit analysis results available upon request   62 
Secondly, we estimate the following equation:  
 
Ln(W) = aXit + ßYAEit + ?YOEit+ dYUEit + eit                  (5.1) 
 
where Ln(W) is the  log of monthly real wages (remuneration) net of taxes. X are personal 
and job characteristics, YAE are the number of years of education that are adequate for the 
performed job, and YOE and YUE are measures of years of over and under education 
respectively. Thus, in this specification, years of education are decomposed as: YAE + YOE-
YUE. 
Then, ? and d measure the return to an additional year of over/under education with 
respect to the co-workers who are adequately educated for the job.  ?-ß measures the return to 
an additional year of over education with respect to workers with the same level of education 
who are not mismatched (have a job that requires their level of education) and   ß+d is the 
wage differential due to a year of under education with respect to workers with the same 
education, but who are well matched. A relatively large number of papers has followed this 
approach for several countries and periods. Hartog (2000) surveys this literature and 
concludes that the returns to required schooling are higher than the returns to actual schooling. 
Typically, returns to over-education are positive but lower than returns to required education 
while returns to under-education are negative but again lower than the returns to actual 
education, such that undereducated workers earn more than workers performing similar jobs 
with lower educational attainment but less than workers with their educational level who are 
allocated to a more demanding task. 
Table 5.8 is an extract of the estimation results of equation (2). It shows the 
coefficients of the over/under education variables. Results are also as expected for the 
covariates in vector X: wages are higher for males and married individuals and for those 
working for the private sector. They are lower for disable and for those with vocational 
education. Wages, on average, increase with age and tenure. Regarding the indicators of 
over/under education, these are the main findings:  
 
•  There is a positive return to an additional year of over education with respect to co-
workers who are adequately educated for the job (positive ? ) 
•  d is around -0.034 according to the mode criteria and also negative but quite low in the 
case of the  mean-based index.   63 
•  ?-ß is negative in all the cases, around (-0.04 with the mode criteria and -0.06 with the 
mean one).  
•  ß+d is positive in every case (0.057 from the mean and 0.04 from the mode criteria 
respectively) 
In sum: our results to a great extent show that Poland is not a different case with 
regards to returns to over/under education than other economies. Workers that are 
overeducated for their occupation earn more that their co-workers but less than workers with 
similar education who work in occupations that require their level of education (i.e. are 
adequately matched). On the other hand, undereducated workers earn less that their co-
workers but more than workers with similar education who are well matched.  
 
 
5.7. Nature of education mismatch in Poland  
 
We will try now to disentangle whether over/under education in Poland is a transitory 
situation at the individual’s level while the worker finds a better match (new occupation, 
promotion, etc.) or whether it is a more long-lasting phenomenon in response to rapid change 
in the demand or supply of workers’ education that cannot be easily matched in the market. 
Despite the data limitation, one can attempt to investigate whether over-education is not a 
proxy for more general mismatch, as part A showed for Western Europe. One test is to see 
whether overeducated workers eventually change occupation or sector when searching for a 
better match. This would additionally inform us about whether education mismatch is more a 
transitory or a permanent situation for individuals.  
For that, we estimate probit models, where the dependent variable takes value 1 if the 
worker changes occupation. The control variables include a dummy for over a nd under 
education together with personal (gender, marital status, education, experience, disability, 
head of household, etc.) and job related characteristics (tenure, on the job training, and 
whether the employer belongs to the private or the public sector). Columns 1 and 2 in Table 
5.9 display marginal effects of the expected changes in the predicted probability of changing 
occupation evaluated at the mean of the covariates. Standard errors are robust to clustering at 
the individual level.   These results confirm that workers with education that differs from the 
adequate one to perform their job are more likely to change occupation, suggesting that 
educational mismatch in Poland is coupled with skill mismatch.    64 
We study a bit deeper the occupational mobility of over/under educated workers in 
Poland to see whether (in the case of overeducated) it respond to career mobility. If this were 
the case, overeducated workers will be so only transitorily, and will eventually move to 
occupations that require higher levels of education. To test for this hypothesis we run a 
similar probit where now the dependent variable takes value 1 if the movement is into a more 
demanding occupation in terms of adequate education to perform that occupation. Estimation 
results, summarized in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.9, deliver positive and significant 
estimates of the marginal effects for the over education dummy, while in the case of under 
education the estimates are not significant or even negative, which indeed confirm the 
hypothesis of career mobility.  
These results suggest that over-education is associated with mismatch in Poland and 
can be thought as a transitory phenomenon at the individual’s level.  
 
 
5.8. Overall Conclusions. 
 
1.  There are important differences across countries in the incidence and consequences of 
educational and skill mismatch. While some of these differences seem to be related to 
the interplay of institutions and educational choices the issue deserves further study. 
2.  Wage penalties in the largest EU-15 countries for over-qualified individuals were 
found to be small and not always different from zero except perhaps Spain. In Poland, 
the wage of overeducated workers is around 8.5% lower than the one of similar 
workers, while undereducated workers earn between 10 and 14% more. 
3.  The analysis of the EU-15 sample shows that it is important to distinguish between 
different categories of over-qualified individuals. A more crucial variable than over-
education seems to be whether individuals are properly matched in terms of their 
formal qualifications. The wage penalty is in fact primarily related to skill mismatch, 
and there is in general no additional wage penalty from being over-qualified. 
4.  Our results on Poland indicate that over-education is associated with greater 
occupational mobility. This suggests that as in the EU-15, over-education is a proxy 
for skill mismatch. It is also evidence of a transitory situation at the individual’s level, 
probably rooted on matching frictions due to imperfect information and mobility.   65 





There is a shared feeling that in the current macroeconomic context and last decade 
in particular, Europe has performed economically less well than the US. Many European 
governments, especially in large countries of the Union, would love to display figures similar 
to the US for several objective indicators such as growth of GDP, unemployment, labour 
market participation and even wage growth. This Section aims at developing a set of 
additional indicators, linked to labour mobility and international migration, that reinforce this 
perception. Indeed, we will compare the European Union to the United States considering the 
last as a more integrated, less regulated and more dynamic economy, at least since the 
nineties.  By assessing the  degree of (im)mobility of Europeans and the ability of the 
European Union to attract foreign workers and, in particular, the most skilled and talented 
among them vis-à-vis the experience of the Unites States, we hope to help policy makers 
realize to a greater extent the emergency to undertake several reforms. Here, our focus will 
be, mostly, on highly educated workers.  
A growing phenomenon of the nineties, namely the increasing international 
mobility of highly skilled professionals, scientists and engineers, provided the EU with an 
excellent opportunity to attract “brains” from the rest of the world. Unluckily the evidence 
that we survey shows that most of this potential flow has been missed by EU countries and 
rather captured by the US. Second, we will argue that even within the EU, mobility of highly 
skilled workers across its countries has been very small.  While in the US highly educated 
and talented people move to the states and cities where their reward (and productivity) is 
higher, in the EU they are still, to a very large extent, confined to their country of birth. In an 
empirical analysis of US states during the decades between 1970 and 2000, we find that the 
presence of highly skewed wages and, more importantly, of large investments in R&D, 
attracted a large inflow of highly educated workers, both from other US states, and 
internationally.  
Finally, although preliminarily, we attempt to quantify the impact of highly 
educated workers on technological and scientific progress measured as innovation. The 
impact of applied technological progress is likely to affect the future growth rates of income   66 
per capita, as discoveries and technological improvements get transferred on total factor 
productivity. We try,  therefore, to capture such “dynamic effect” of highly educated and 
talented workers on the rate of scientific and technological innovation of a country, measured 
by its rate of patented innovation. Patents are acknowledge to be an imperfect, still very 
useful, index of innovation
41 and their use has shed light on the process and the determinants 
of innovation, across countries and over time. We find that highly skilled workers, especially 
those attracted from abroad (who are, arguably, particularly talented) have had a very 
significant impact on innovation even controlling for R&D spending and institutional 
features of US states. European countries that are loosing many highly educated 
professionals to the US, not attracting many of them from the rest of the world and not 
spending enough in R&D may be accumulating a lag in innovative potentials in science and 
technology which could leave them behind in productivity growth.  
This Section is organized as follows. First, we analyse the patterns of attraction of 
foreign-born workers (Section 6.2) and internal mobility (Section 6.3) of native workers, for 
Europe and the US, focusing on their skill composition. We then document the “brain drain” 
from EU to the US arguing that it is large and it involves very productive and highly 
educated European workers (Section 6.4). In an attempt to substantiate the claims that high 
wage compensation for talented people (in science and technology) attracts these brains we 
use cross-state evidence in the US that supports the claim that states with higher median 
wage, higher wage dispersion and higher R&D spending attract more highly educated 
workers, especially foreign born (Section 6.5). Finally Section 6.6 uses data for US states to 
estimate the impact of highly educated workers on the rate of innovation of an economy, 
after controlling for R&D resources and institutional features. 
 
 
                                                 
41 See among others Griliches (1994) and Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002).   67 
6.2. International Mobility of Workers 
 
6.2.1. Immigration into the EU and the USA  
 
In recent decades (notably during the eighties and the nineties), the US has regained 
its role as the primary destination for a large number of migrants
42, mainly from Asia and 
Latin America. During the same period the European Union has emerged as the destination 
of choice for those seeking better economic alternatives from Eastern Europe and North 
Africa. Both economies had therefore experienced a rising inflow of foreigners and it is 
useful to compare the magnitudes (in levels and flows) of foreign-born workers of the two 
economies.  Tables 6.1 and 6.2 contain some summary statistics that capture the presence of 
foreign-born people in the population and labour force of the US and EU at the beginning 
and end of the nineties. Due to limited availability of comparable data we consider 1992 as 
the earliest year for European data and 1999 as the latest year. This choice allows us to use 
accurate and detailed statistics from the European Labour Force Survey
43. Table 6.1 reports 
the aggregate values of foreign-born residents for the EU-12, EU-15 and for the five largest 
economies within the EU (Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain).  Our analysis considers 
the totality of EU countries as one large economy to be compared to the US. We define, 
therefore, “foreign-born” those workers who were born in a country outside EU-15
44 and 
work in one of its countries
45. Similarly, workers born in a EU country but working in a 
different one are considered, as “internally mobile” comparable to US workers born in a state 
and working in a different one.  Table 6.2 reports aggregate values for the US economy and 
for each of its five largest states (which happens to be those that also attract the largest 
percentage of immigrants). These data are obtained from the US Census of Population held 
in 1990 and 2000
46. For the EU-12 as a whole, the presence of immigrant workers (born 
                                                 
42 The percentage of foreign-born residents in the US. at the peak of the era of mass-migrations from Europe, in 
1910, was  equal to 14% of the population. As of  year 2004  such percentage was still unmatched as the 
percentage of migrants was only slightly above 13% f the population. 
43 We are very grateful to Adriana Kugler and Joshua Angrist for providing their dataset covering information on 
nationality, country of birth, sex, working status, education and country of residence for a representative sample 
of the EU-15 labour force (from the European Labour Force Survey). The data used here are the same used in 
Angrist and Kugler (2003) and are described in detail in that article. 
44 For Italy and Germany data on nationality, rather than country of birth, have to be used to compute 
immigrants. See Munz (2004) for details.  
45 Both the US census and EU survey attempt to reach all people present on the territory, including illegal aliens. 
It is likely, however, that illegal immigrants are somewhat under-estimated. Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) try 
to assess the extent of under-estimation for US immigrants.  
46 The statistics are based on our calculations using data from the Integrated Public Use Micro data Samples 
(Minnesota Population Center, IPUMS, http://www.ipums.org.)     68 
outside EU-15) increased from 4.1% of the labour force in 1992 to 4.9% in 1999. The 
corresponding percentages for the US were 9.3% in 1990 and 12.4% in 2000. Even if the EU 
were to attract immigrants at the rates the US experienced in recent decades (which, as we 
document below, was much higher than its current rate of attraction of immigrants) it would 
still take thirty years to reach the level of immigrant presence currently found in the US. 
If we calculate the rate of growth of the foreign-born population during the nineties, 
that turns out to be faster in the US (+0.45% a year) than in Europe (+0.14% a year), thereby 
increasing the gap between the presence of foreign-born workers in the two economies.  The 
European Union is still very far from attracting and integrating the number of immigrants 
that the US economy has. In Table 6.1 we also show data for the five largest economies in 
the EU and compare them with the five largest US states (whose data, for 1990 and 2000, are 
reported in Table 6.2). Two facts emerge with striking evidence from a comparison of the 
two tables. First, the US economy attracts more foreign born on average, and its largest state 
economies are the main attractors of foreigners. California and New York, the largest poles 
of attraction for immigrants, have a percentage of foreign born in the year 2000 two to three 
times the average US percentage. Contrastingly, some large European economies (such as 
Italy and Spain) are still hardly affected by immigration, while even France, the major 
attractor of immigrants among large economies, had a percentage of foreign born in 1999 
only 3 percentage points higher than the EU-15 average. Second, no large country in Europe 
experienced an increase in the share of foreign-born larger than 1.1% of the total labour force 
during the period 1992-1999, while no large US state experienced an increase in the foreign 
labour force smaller than 4% in the period 1990-2000. Even in terms of inflows, large US 
states experienced much more  immigration than any large European country during the 
nineties. 
 
6.2.2. Internal mobility: EU versus USA 
 
Let us now consider another crucial aspect of mobility, namely “internal” mobility. 
Here, by internal, we mean, contrary to Section 4 devoted to within-country mobility, within 
EU (resp. US), i.e. between-countries (resp. between states). The fact that Americans or 
Europeans are potentially fully mobile within the boundaries of the US or the EU has 
important consequences on the efficiency of their skill allocation as well as on the impact of 
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foreign skills on these economies. If the native labour force is very mobile (as turns out to be 
the case for Americans) this is a sign that people move in search of their best opportunity 
(best match between skill  and job). Moreover, high internal mobility allows the diffusion 
(over time) of the positive (or negative effects) of local shocks such as immigration from 
outside.  Mobility of labour, as pointed out by Mundell (1961) in his analysis of optimal 
currency areas, can be a way to arbitrage away asymmetric shocks. The present section 
measures the extent of internal mobility of the population and labour force within the US and 
EU. 
Table 6.3 shows two measures of long-run mobility across countries in Europe and 
then details it for the five largest countries. The values presented in the first, third and fifth 
columns of Table 6.3 are the percentages of individuals in the labour force who reside in one 
of the EU-12 country that is different from their EU-12 country of birth. The second, fourth 
and sixth columns report the percentage of individuals in the population of EU-12 states born 
in a different EU-12 state. The percentages are similar for population and labour force and 
they increase by a modest 0.3% in seven years, from 2.2% in 1992 to 2.5% in 1999.  France, 
which attracted the largest share of EU citizens born in a different country, had a mere 3.5% 
of non-French Europeans in 1999.  Italy and Spain confirm their small power of attraction 
even for EU citizens, counting less then 1% of foreign Europeans among their residents. The 
contrast between the EU and the US economies is stunning. Table 6.4 shows that in the 
average US state one third (30-33%) of the labour force and population in the year 2000 was 
made up of individuals born in a different state. This percentage decreased somewhat from 
35% in 1990, although the decreased “out of state” presence was probably offset by the 
increased share of immigrants. Some US states are “open” labour markets to an extent 
positively alien to EU countries. For instance more than half of Florida’s population in the 
year 2000 was born outside the state. As reference we also consider geographical units larger 
than states in the US, namely the nine census regions
47 and measure mobility as the 
percentage of people residing in a region and born in a different one. This percentage was 
26% in the year 2000 (25% in year 1990), somewhat lower than for states (as regions are 
much larger units) but still ten times larger than for EU countries.  
These measures of long-run mobility across countries in the EU complement the 
figures reported in Section 4.4 on mobility within EU countries. They together provide 
evidence of highly segmented labour markets for the EU.  
                                                 
47 Each Census region is a group of states, the nine regions are: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North 
Central, West North Central, East Atlantic, east South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific.   70 
6. 3. Skill distribution of Foreign-Born people 
 
6.3.1. The V-shaped distribution of skills among Foreign-Born 
 
Table 6.5 reports the composition of foreign-born across education groups. 
Considering the first two rows, we can see that, both in the early nineties and at the end of 
the nineties, the “central” skill group of high school graduates is under-represented among 
immigrants, while the two extreme groups (high school dropouts and college graduates) are 
over-represented both in the US and Europe. Considering the US in the year 2000, the 
average share of foreign-born residents was 12.4% of the labour force overall, but as many as 
26% of high school dropouts and 12.5% of college graduates were foreign born, while only 
8.6% of high-school graduates were foreign born
48. The corresponding numbers for Europe 
(EU-12) in 1999 were 5.1% of foreigners in the group of high school dropouts, 3.5% in the 
group of high school graduates and 5.3% in the group of college graduates.  Apparently, 
Europe was drawing relatively more immigrants in the same two skill groups as the US (low 
and high schooling, with a lower percentage of intermediate schooling levels).  
Before showing, however, how the composition of the group of high-skilled workers 
differs between Europe and the US, three qualifications should already dampen the “good 
news” for the European economy. First, between 1990 and 2000 the growth of high skilled 
(college educated) migrants was faster in the US than in Europe. The share of college-
educated foreigners grew 3.1 percentage points in the US (in line with the 3.1% increase of 
the overall foreign born share in the labour force) while in Europe it only grew by 0.4% 
(against a 0.8% growth of the share of foreign born overall).  Second while the foreign labour 
force of all the large US states reproduce the “V”-shaped skill distribution (low in the middle 
skills and higher at the extremes), Germany, the largest EU economy, clearly attracts mostly 
low skilled workers with a significant under-representation of both medium and high skilled 
workers. Third, while highly educated foreign born workers in the US come from all over the 
world including developed countries (Europe) and fast growing countries such as China and 
India (more on this below) highly educated foreign born in Europe are mainly from Africa. 
 
                                                 
48 Interestingly, most of the literature on the impact of foreign-born in the US has concentrated on the effect of 
unskilled foreign born, e.g. Borjas (1987), (1999), (2003), Borjas et al. (1997)  Card (1990), (2001), Card and 
DiNardo (2000). The effect of highly educated foreign-born on the US economy has never been seriously 
measured.   71 
6.3.2. Internal mobility of native skills 
 
In Section 4, we showed evidence that in Europe within-country mobility of more 
educated workers was greater than of less educated workers: professionals move where their 
best opportunities are; further their cost of moving about should be smaller as they can afford 
the appurtenances of travel (cell-phones, laptops, video-conferencing devices, etc.). The 
same is true in the US. In 2000, 43% of college graduates worked in a state different from 
their state of birth, versus 32% of high school graduates and 20% of high school dropouts. 
Highly skilled workers in the US are very much a “national” (as opposed to local) resource 
for the economy.  
Interestingly, what was true within EU-countries is no longer true if we consider 
between country (within E) mobility. It happens that college educated workers are less 
mobile than the average worker across countries, while low skilled (high school dropouts) 
turn out to be the most mobile of all workers across countries, with 2.7% of them living in a 
country different from the country of birth. This percentage is only 2.2% for college 
graduates and 1.7% for high school graduates. We will come back on this important point in 
Section 7 and provide notably some interpretations.  
 
 
6.4. “Talents”  
 
6.4.1. Measures of foreign-born “Talents” in the US and EU. 
 
We now focus our attention on the international mobility of brains. Let us first 
emphasize that for advanced economies human talent may very well be one of the most 
important factors for growth and development. As scientific and technological progress is the 
recognized “engine of growth”
49 in economies at the technological frontier (such as the US 
and Europe), creative minds in the fields of science, engineering and technology  have an 
incomparable role in advancing economic development and well-being
50.   
Anecdotal evidence shows that many of the great inventions of the twentieth century 
(such as the first controlled nuclear reaction achieved by Enrico Fermi, the first form of 
                                                 
49 This was recognized by economists since Solow (1956) and re-emphasized by the literature on endogenous 
growth that has followed Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). 
50 We will attempt in sub-section 6 to quantify the impact of talents on innovation.   72 
plastic produced by Leo Baekeland, the first microprocessor built by Federico Faggin) were 
the products of foreign-born (European in the cases mentioned above) talent working in the 
US. This emphasizes the fact that even attracting very few extraordinary talents may have a 
relevant scientific (and later economic) impact. Let us turn, however, to more “objective” 
measures of foreign-born talent.  In Figure 6.1 we report the percentage of foreign-born 
individuals in each of six “skill” groups in the US in the year 2000 (solid black line). While 
the first three groups are those reported in Table 6.6 (high school dropouts, high school 
graduates and college graduates), the last three groups try to identify workers with 
progressively higher “skills” and talent. The fourth group identifies workers with a Masters 
or a Ph.D. degree, the fifth group identifies those with a Masters or Ph.D. working in science, 
management or engineering, and the last group are the US based Nobel laureates in natural 
sciences during the preceding decade.  Strikingly, both in 1990 (not reported) and 2000, the 
foreign born are increasingly represented the higher is the quality of the skill group. While 
12.5% of college graduates were foreign-born, 15.3% of the Masters-Ph.D.s and 20.1% of 
the M asters-PhDs working in science-management-engineering were of foreign origin. 
Finally a stunning 26% (one out of four) of the Nobel laureates in the sciences that worked in 
the US (in the decade 1990-2000) were foreign-born
51. The dashed line in Figure 6.1 
represents the percentage of foreign-born in each group for the year 2000, were they 
distributed homogeneously across skills. While clearly the size of skill groups decreases as 
we move to the right, their relevance to economic productivity and growth (and even more to 
technological and scientific growth) increases dramatically. The US has attracted, and 
continues to attract, a disproportionate fraction of the very highly educated, and among them, 
the very best brains seem to be even more over-represented
52.  
Figure 6.2 shows the same graph for Europe. While we could not find the overall 
share of those with a Masters or a Ph.D. born outside the EU-12, we could construct, from 
national data reported in European Commission (2003), the share of foreign born among the 
individuals with doctoral degrees operating in the fields of science or engineering.  We then 
calculated the percentage of EU-based, foreign-born Nobel laureates in the sciences. Figure 
6.2 summarizes these percentages, including those of the first three groups (high school 
dropouts, high school graduates and college graduates). It is clear from the graph that the “V” 
shape of the distribution disappears: among the college-educated foreign-born workers, the 
                                                 
51 The data for Nobel laureates, their place of birth and their affiliation were found at the official website of the 
Nobel Foundation: http://nobelprize.org/nobel/ . 
52 We calculated the distribution of foreign-born by skills also for year 1990 and the shape is the same (at lower 
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European Union does not seem to attract the  “highest quality” ones. The percentage of 
foreign-born Ph.D. holders in science and technology is a paltry 4.1%, and no Nobel laureate 
(1990-2000) among those operating in the EU was of foreign origin. While this evidence is 
preliminary at best it seems to reveal that Europe, in spite of attracting a respectable share of 
college-educated immigrants, is not able to select the most talented ones among them. To the 
contrary, some recent studies (Saint Paul 2004, EEAG 2003, Becker et al. 2004) have argued 
that the EU is loosing some of its best talent to the US.  
 
6.4.2. US and EU: Brain losses or Brain Exchange? 
 
So far we have established that, while the EU12 and the US both seem to have the 
ability to attract foreign-born college graduates in higher proportion than the average foreign-
born, the United States seem to have the ability to attract, among them, the most educated 
(those with post-graduate degrees), and, simply put, the most talented (those who end up 
making major contributions to science). We discuss here two other measures of the ability of 
the EU and the US to attract high quality college graduates from the rest of the world. First, 
considering two large countries, sources of large brain drain to the rest of the world, such as 
China and India, and roughly equidistant to Europe and the US (possibly closer to Europe) 
we see the relative ability of EU and US to attract college graduate from each of them. India 
and China are interesting cases because these large and growing countries have a growing 
segment of the population that is highly educated and looks for opportunities abroad. Second 
we analyse the ability of each of the two regions (the US and EU) to attract college graduates 
from the other. Since the quality of undergraduate college education is high both in the US 
and the EU, the ability to attract graduates from the competing economy is certainly a sign 
that the general potential to attract talented graduates is strong.  
Given that the EU-12 and the US are of comparable size in terms of labour f orce 
(see Table 6.1 and 6.2), a simple measure of the number of college graduates from China and 
India who moved to each economy during the nineties is a good measure of the relative 
ability to attract brains.  The total number of Chinese college graduates in the EU was a 
minuscule 6,126 in year 1992 and grew to 30,675. For Indian college graduates the 
corresponding figures were 84,733 and 77,371. The overwhelming majority of these college 
graduates from either country worked in the U.K. We observe, therefore, an inflow of 
Chinese college graduates of 24,569 units and an outflow of Indian graduates of 7,362 units 
during the period 1992-1999. These numbers seem very small, and they hardly represent a   74 
sizeable brain drain. In 1999 Indian and Chinese contributed less than 0.3% of the college 
graduates working in Europe. Very different picture emerges for the US. During the nineties 
the Chinese college graduates working in the US grew by 222,903 units (from 247,242 in 
1990 to 470,145 in 2000), and Indian graduates grew by an even more starling 329,032 units 
(from 255,916 in 1990 to 584,948 in 2000). These inflows are an order of magnitude larger 
than those towards Europe. In year 2000 Chinese and Indian college graduates made close to 
3% of the overall population of US College graduates.  
As for the direct exchange of graduates between Europe and the US let us also 
present the absolute numbers. In 1992 the number of US-born college graduates working in 
Europe (EU-12) was 72,330 units, while in 1999 it was 94,700.  Conversely college 
graduates born in the EU-12 and working in the US were 460,000 in 1990 and 643,700 in 
2000. These are values five to six times larger than their American counterparts. There can 
be no doubt that these flows reveal a brain drain from Europe to the US and not a brain-
exchange.  During the nineties Europe had a net outflow of 176,300 graduates flocking to the 
US, while only 22,470 US college graduates left the US to work in Europe. In the year 2000 
almost 2% of all college graduates working in the US were born in a country of the EU-12. 
In Europe less than 0.02% of college graduates in the year 1999 were from the US. Overall, 
Europe clearly lost the competition to attract international brains and had a substantial 
outflow of its own “brains” to the US.  
 
6.4.3. Quality of Highly Skilled Foreign-Born in the US 
 
It is extremely difficult to measure the contribution of talent to the economic well-
being and development of a country. As suggested in the previous section attracting some 
extremely talented individuals may have a very large reward, even if their number is small, 
because the externalities of major scientific innovations are enormous. We postpone to 
section 6.6 an attempt to quantify the contributions of highly educated foreign-born to 
innovation. Our goal in this section, using data on wages and personal characteristics of the 
highly educated, is to give an idea of the unobserved quality of highly educated foreign-born 
workers in the US, especially those coming from the European Union and other developed 
(or fast growing) economies. Adopting the assumption that wages reflect productivity, we 
select groups of progressively more educated workers in the US labour force and, after 
controlling for observable characteristics of individuals (age, sex, race, marital status), we 
estimate the wage premium for people born in selected foreign countries using a “Mincerian”   75 
regression. We consider some specific locations as potential places of origin of “talented” 
professionals, namely the EU15 countries and Canada, as well as China and India, two large 
countries, as we saw, that experienced a significant siphoning of talent to the United States. 
The reference group is always US born workers with the same observable characteristics. 
The natural interpretation of the wage premium for (say) a European born professionals is 
that it measures the average (unobserved) quality of a European relative to the average 
(unobserved) quality of a US born person in the considered group.  
Table 6.6 reports the estimated coefficients for four different definitions of highly 
skilled workers and for four groups of foreign-born individuals. The groups considered are 
increasingly selective as we move to the right of Table 6.6. First we consider college-
graduates, then holders of a post-graduate degree, then the interesting sub-group of young 
holders of a post-graduate degree (less than 45 years of age) and finally people with a 
graduate degree working in science, engineering or management. The coefficients (obtained 
from an individual Mincerian regression on individuals from the 2000 1% IPUMS sample) 
measure the wage premium for an individual born in a foreign economy relative to a US-born 
worker with the same observable characteristics, in the specific skill group. For instance, if 
we consider the first column, we see that a EU-born college graduate earns a 17% higher 
weekly wage (19% higher yearly wage) than a US-born college graduate with the same 
experience, race, sex and marital status.  Our interpretation is that the productivity (quality) 
of the EU-born college-educated working in the US in 2000 was 17-19% higher than that of 
the average US-born college graduate. Consistent with our previous evidence, we interpret 
this as yet another indication that the US draws Europeans from the high end of the quality 
distribution, so that they end up being among the most skilled workers in the US.  
Moving down the column we observe that Canadian-born college-graduates are also 
19-22% more productive than US College graduates. The college graduates attracted from 
India and China are respectively 8% and 5% more productive than US-born ones (and the 
difference is significant)
53.  Moving to the other columns we can observe that the wage 
premium for EU-born is also between 16 and 19 per cent for holders of a graduate degree 
(column 3 and 4) or for young holders of a graduate degree (column 5 and 6) or for holders 
of a graduate degree working in science, engineering or management. Similarly for 
Canadian-born the wage premium fluctuates between 17 and 22 per cent depending on the 
                                                 
53 Notice that the sign and magnitude of the coefficients on the country of birth vary depending on the country. 
In general Latin American and African countries have slightly negative coefficients while other Asian countries 
have close to 0. Our main interest is to show that the US attracts high quality talent from Europe as well as from 
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skill group, and for Indians it seems to increase from 7% to 12-16% as we move to more 
highly skilled groups (column 3 -4 and then 7 -8) and as we consider younger workers 
(column 5 and 6). Finally Chinese-born workers seem to be of slightly better quality than US 
born in the groups of college-graduate and post-graduate degree holders. All in all, not only 
does the US economy seem able to attract a disproportionate number of highly skilled 
foreigners, but also, especially from the European Union, those people appear to be highly 




6.5. What Attracts Talents? Some evidence using the US state data 
 
    Highly educated workers (with a Master or a Ph.D. degree) earn wages in the top of 
the wage distribution. They are disproportionately employed in scientific, engineering, 
managerial professions and often in highly technological sectors. They are also better 
informed about the best opportunities in their profession, wherever they arise in the world. In 
presence of high international mobility the US labour market has at least two characteristics 
that would make it attractive to highly educated workers vis-à-vis Europe. First, its higher 
wages at the top end of the distribution imply better compensation for very high skills. 
Second, larger private and public R&D spending implies more (and better paid) opportunities 
in research as well as in highly technological sectors. In order to test whether these two 
factors affect mobility of highly educated and in particular attract highly educated from 
abroad we use data on US states.  
    We use decennial census data on 50 US states over three decades (1970-2000). 
Controlling for a fixed state effect, a time effect and the initial endowment of highly educated 
workers in a state, we analyze whether the immigration during each decade depended on the 
initial value of median wage, initial wage dispersion and initial stock of R&D in that state. 
The idea is that, other things equal, a state with higher median wage, larger wage dispersion 
(measure as the percentage wage difference between median and top 90
th percentile) and 
larger real spending in R&D would be more attractive to highly educated workers. The 
regression results for the group of college-educated and Masters-Ph.D. educated US born and 
Foreign-born are reported in Table 6.7. Interestingly for both groups of highly skilled 
foreign-born the stock of R&D, median wage and wage dispersion are all (at  least 
marginally) significant and economically important. R&D is also very important to attract   77 
US born while wage dispersion has a very imprecisely estimated effect. Doubling R&D a 
state would attract 22% more Ph.D.’s born in the US plus 4% of foreign-born PhD’s. 
Increasing the wage dispersion between median and top 90
th percentile by 20% would also 
attract extra foreign-born Ph.D.’s in amount equal to 4% of initial PhD’s.  
    We performed few robustness checks of this regression (excluding some decades 
such as the 90’s and some important states such as California) and the results are robust and 
do not seem driven by a particular decade or state. Even within the US, for given institutions 
and policies, states that, due to their industry composition, technological choices and local 
incentives have more dispersed wage distribution and higher R&D investments attract a 
larger flow of highly educated workers from inside and outside of the country. 
 
 
6. 6.  “Impact” of foreign-born talents on innovation 
 
The wage p remium paid to foreign-born talents (especially European born) 
estimated in section 5 is a measure of their exceptional contribution to production. There is a 
sense, however, in which highly educated workers may have a much larger dynamic impact 
on productivity as they often engage in research and innovative activities and contribute to 
technological, scientific progress which, in turn, is the driver of economic growth. These 
social benefits may not be fully appropriated in their wages so that the overall impact of 
foreign-born talent is larger than captured by the private returns. As a final exercise, we try to 
quantify the impact of highly educated, and of foreign-born among them, on innovation. 
Following previous work in this field (Branstetter 2001, Pakes and Griliches 1980, 
Peri 2005) we use patent count as measure of innovative output of a US state. Patents are 
awarded to innovation which shows originality, non-trivial characteristics and potentially 
profitable application. In spite of all the caveats (see Griliches 1994) this is the best measure 
of innovative output we have. We can think of Inventions produced by research conducted in 
different US states as the result of an innovation process that benefits from R&D spending 
and from the quantity and quality of “brains” employed in this process. We use patents 
granted in a decade as measure of innovation generated in a US state. In order to better 
capture the “quality” of innovation, we weight patents by the average yearly citations 
received during the first 3 years after their publication. The number of citations is an 
indicator of the relevance of a patent, so the weights adjust for the importance of patents. We   78 
control for state and decade fixed effect and we include the stock of R&D at the beginning of 
the decade and the number of Ph.D. in the state as main determinant of the innovation output.  
The results of the regressions, reported in Table 6.8 and run on 50 US states for the 
1970-2000 decennial data, measure the importance of highly educated workers in innovation, 
once we control for institutional effects (state effects) secular trends (time effects) and R&D 
inputs. Specification 1 and 2 estimate the overall effect of PhD’s on innovation and show that 
even controlling for R&D spending increasing the Ph.D.’s working in the state by 1% 
increases its innovation rate by 0.14-0.16%.  We then try to decompose this contribution 
between the contribution of US and foreign-born PhD’s. As the two “inputs” to innovation 
are highly correlated the precision of the estimate deteriorates, however consistently foreign-
born Ph.D. have a larger and more precisely estimated impact. This is remarkable in 
particular as they are, on average, only 20% of total US PhD’s. Either because they are 
disproportionately employed in R&D or because they are highly talented, the contribution of 
foreign-born Ph.D.’s to US innovation seems very important. Ultimately and in the long run 





1.  The EU as a whole is not promoting an adequate degree of internal mobility of highly 
educated workers; it is loosing many of them (among the very best) to the US and it is 
not competing effectively with the US in attracting brains from the rest of the world. 
2.  There seem to be evidence that the contribution of highly skilled Europeans and 
foreign-born in general, to the US economy in static terms (wages) and in dynamic 
terms (innovation) is important and beneficial to that country. 
3.  We find mild evidence of a role of wage dispersion and strong evidence of the role of 
R&D spending. This suggests that the EU should emphasize R&D and high 
technology, reward merit rather than insider status and attract talented foreigners even 
without dramatically altering its overall wage distribution. 
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Section 7.  Policy implications 
 
 
Drawing from the conclusions of the first six sections, this part examines a few 
policy implications. The main message of Sections 1 and 2 is that education systems in 
Europe did a good job at supplying basic skills, suggesting that primary and secondary 
schooling function relatively well in Europe. In contrast, tertiary education is under-financed: 
as we saw in the general introduction, the share of GDP devoted to higher education is three 
times (less and 2 percentage points lower) smaller in Europe than in the US.  An obvious first 
recommendation is to reduce this gap.  
How should this objective be achieved? There are three possibilities. The first one is 
to reallocate public spending from secondary to tertiary education. This can be justified in 
some instances, for example as the size of younger cohorts is reduced over time. However, 
reducing public spending in a given sector, however desirable it might be, is always 
politically difficult, and it is unlikely that two full points of GDP will be transferred from one 
sector of education to another in the short-term. This may not even be desirable given the 
evidence that well-financed secondary education may be one reason that Europe has 
experienced less inequality than the US. A second option is to raise public deficits and public 
debt in order to reach the objective. This is as unrealistic and undesirable as the first option: 
European countries already face huge and increased tensions to finance social security (health 
and pensions), and are bound to a large extent by the Stability and Growth Pact. One can 
simply forget this option.  
We are thus left with the third option: let private money finance part of the 
education system. This can come partly from household money, by raising university fees to 
moderate amounts. To take the risk to propose an order of magnitude, 2000 euros per year of 
tertiary education, which is equal to a quarter of the price of a small car, does not seem 
unaffordable to most motorized students.  Such raise should be accompanied to more student 
loans and student grants made available to the poorest students. A double-dividend of such a 
reform would be to reduce the misallocation of students to study fields: pure gratuity of 
tertiary education encourages students to differ in the decisions to specialize, induces student 
to less than careful choice of majors, enhance the consumption of leisure, and reduces the 
effort and success rates especially in the first years. Some of these themes were addressed in 
Dornbusch et al. (2000). Private money may also come from firms and foundations. Chairs   80 
could be created, financed by endowments in order to avoid inference of the private sector 
into the nomination of professors. Donors from the private sector might finance university 
libraries, buildings and various other stocks. We think that a reason for why European 
universities cannot attract private money is cultural; another, sadly, is that the signal of 
quality they deliver is insufficient. We propose reforms at the tertiary level of education, 
notably providing more adaptability of institutions and better incentives to teachers and 
encourage a better financing by the private sector. Beyond the cultural change this involves, 
this will not happen in the absence of fiscal incentives, such as tax deductibility of private 
donations to universities. 
A difficult issue, left aside so far, is the extent to which students have to pay for 
education and the extent to which taxes must finance education. On one hand, 
Psacharopoulos (2005) argues that arguments in favour of public financing of education are 
often the expression of simple conservatism and are not always corroborated by formal 
analysis: he gives the example of human capital externalities, hard to detect in the data. 
Further, as noted in Gurgand (2005), free education can be anti-redistributive in the sense that 
families above the median in the income distribution use free education more than those 
below the median. On the other hand, Benabou (2005) shows that credit constraints could be 
an obstacle to investments in human capital and that redistribution through subsidies to 
human capital accumulation could alleviate this problem. He further notes that there is no 
obvious connection between growth and the type of equilibria (Europe with high 
redistribution, implying efficient transmission of human capital across generations and thus 
low inequality and the US, with less redistribution, more inefficiency in the transmission of 
human capital across generations and therefore more inequality), but that biased-technical 
change might lead the relatively egalitarian European scenario to disappear, as incentives for 
most-educated to opt out would increase. In other words, the European model may be at 
threat.  
This is why reforms of universities are also necessary. More autonomy and tougher 
evaluations, with financial rewards for excellence and financial cuts if needed, are a pre-
requisite to induce universities to offer better curriculum to students. In centralized system 
where responsibility is diluted, the minimum effort is the rule, and faculty often 
spontaneously attempt to deliver the same diplomas and the same courses year after year, 
regardless of the demand from the market. The magnitude of the mismatch problem revealed 
in Section 5 is certainly in relation with this inability of the suppliers of education to react in 
real time. An anecdote: until recently, a very respected and nice European professor of   81 
economics, at the latest stage of his career, distributed lecture notes where he referred to “a 
recent colloquium in Portugal, March 1968”. Another anecdote, this sentence was heard by a 
newly appointed full professor of economics: “Young colleague, please accept the advice of 
an old fellow. When you will write your lecture notes, you should write big, because over 
time, you vision will deteriorate”. In both cases, this was no joke. 
As illustrated in sections 1, 4 and particularly 6, sluggish movements of people and 
labour market frictions within the European Union may slow down the allocation of workers, 
skills and talent: labour supply can be inadequate because of geographical constraints. It is 
hard to evaluate the extent to which low mobility figures translates into inefficiencies specific 
to Europe, but there is certainly a shared perception that perfect mobility of workers in 
Europe and optimal allocation of their skills to tasks that maximize their productivity would 
dominate the current outcome, which current institutions in the labour market may prevent. 
In particular, we have discussed that labour market institutions, in general, tend to 
reduce mobility, both geographical and between jobs. This shapes the structure of 
investments, and notably generates more investments in skills that are specific to sectors and 
jobs. In a stable macroeconomic environment, this may be a desirable outcome for several 
reasons: notably, specialization implies efficiency on-the-job, and from the employers’ 
perspective, makes workers relatively attractive. On the other hand, in a world of increased 
turbulence, e.g. in the context of the European Enlargement, skills oriented toward mobility 
may become more important. In the absence of such general investments in human capital, 
skills mismatch is a likely outcome, which we detected in the data. 
Further, while mismatch should in principle generate additional mobility, we find 
instead low mobility rates in Europe. European style social insurance probably contributes to 
the lack of mobility, in that talents is not necessarily rewarded as it should be. Having said 
this, we could note that wage compression does not seem to impair mobility that much. 
Public and private R&D spending turns out to be more important for mobility than wage 
dispersion. Another dimension where action is needed is the low attractiveness of Europe to 
the most talented workers and researchers outside Europe. Although massive injections of 
both money and incentives in tertiary education would partly remedy in part this situation, all 
kinds of bureaucratic barriers, insider privileges, limited labour market competition and poor 
diffusion of information will still be major obstacles. Even removing these internal barriers it 
is not clear that highly educated and very talented workers would stay in Europe. Again, the 
compressed structure of wages (pre and post taxes) typical of EU countries (vis-à-vis the US)   82 
may not provide sufficiently large economic rewards to talent, although our regressions 
indicate that this is not a major factor. 
An important result is that the international mobility of European college-educated 
workers in Europe itself is lower than that of less educated workers. We think that one of the 
possible explanation for this phenomenon is the difficulty to harmonize the recognition of 
diplomas. As a last anecdote, we can cite the example of one of our PhD students in Belgium: 
he had to validate a bachelor degree (Maîtrise) obtained in University of Lille I, which is only 
100 km away from Brussels, in order to become teaching assistant at Free University of 
Brussels. He sent his file to the regional ministry of education, and obtained the following 
answer (see also the PDF in Appendix A.7): “ Sir, (…) I transmit your application to the 
competent instance. For your complete information, I draw your attention to the fact that 
(…)a decision has to be notified to you within four months and fourty days (sic). In the 
absence of notification after this delay, the case can be brought to the Conseil d’Etat, the 
silence of the administration being assimilated to a negative answer.” In this case, 
fortunately, the student however got his diploma validated and could obtain a salary for his 
teaching. But the tone of the letter and the mere fact that the validation of diploma was 
externalised to a regional administrative committee suggests the magnitude of informal 
barriers of all kinds.  
To conclude, we saw that education is relatively egalitarian in Europe, and does not 
seem to be reactive enough to the macroeconomic context. Although labour market 
institutions per se explain why mismatch and specific skill investments may arise, we think 
that an efficient margin for policy is to reform higher education and raise its various sources 
of financing. It is however not our suggestion to privatise the supply of education. There is no 
evidence that a private sector is more efficient or responsive than a public sector when the 
latter has motivated, well-paid employees, who have the right incentives. However, as usual, 
the inability to reform a public system and let it die from poverty is the best way to let the 
market offer an alternative, at the cost of sacrificing social justice and equality of opportunity.   83 
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Notes: The figure show smoothing splines with knots in 1950 and 1960 fitted to raw cohort data. EU is the population-
weighted average across the EU countries. UK = United Kingdom; IR = Ireland; US = United States. 
 
 
















Notes: The figure shows smoothing splines with knots in 1950 and 1960 fitted to raw cohort data. See notes to Fig. 2.1 for a 
description of the legends. 
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Notes: The figure shows smoothing splines with knots in 1950 and 1960 fitted to raw cohort data. BE = Belgium; DE = 
Germany; NL = the Netherlands; CH = Switzerland. 
 
 
















Notes: The figure shows a smoothing spline with knots in 1950 and 1960 fitted to raw cohort data. See Fig. 2.3 for a 
description of the legends.   96 

















Notes: The figures show a smoothing spline with knots in 1950 and 1960 fitted to raw cohort data. DK = Denmark; FI = 
Finland; NO = Norway; SE = Sweden. 
 
 
















Notes: The figure shows smoothing splines with knots in 1950 and 1960 fitted to raw cohort data. See Fig. 2.5 for a 
description of the legends.   97 


















Notes: The figure shows smoothing splines with knots in 1950 and 1960 fitted to raw cohort data. CZ = the Czech Republic; 
HU = Hungary; IT = Italy; PO = Poland. 
 
















Notes: The figure shows smoothing splines with knots in 1950 and 1960 fitted to raw cohort data. See Fig. 2.7 for a 
description of the legends. 
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Figure 3.3. Links between inequality of human capital and redistribution. 
Notes: Inequality: ?² = inequality in human capital (variance of log-normal).     
Redistribution: t  † 1 = degree of progressivity / equalization in fiscal (taxes + transfers) 
or education (school finance), or labor market (minimum wage, unions) policy. 
Source: Benabou (2000 and 2005). 
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Figure 3.4. Macroeconomic context during the transition to a market economy, Poland 
 
Source: Kwiatkowski et al. 
 
Figure 3.5. Macroeconomic context during the adhesion to the European Union, Poland 
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Figure 3.5. Hiring and separation rates. Estonia 1997-2002   102 
Figure 4.1. Mobility rate in the last three years, job-related reason & outside the 
area/city, by education (EU15 less Luxembourg and Sweden, 1995-2001) 
Mobility rate for job-related reason in the last 3 years 
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Notes: Weighted averages (using population shares in 2001) of 10 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Germany and the UK are excluded from the averages since data is only available for the period 1994-
1996 
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Figure 6.1.  
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Sources: U.S. census IPUMS data, 2000 plus website of the Nobel Foundation: http://nobelprize.org/nobel/ . 
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Sources: European LFS data, 1999,  plus website of the Nobel Foundation: http://nobelprize.org/nobel/ . 
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Table 1.1. Educational attainment: adult population (2002) 
























3A   
Type 
B 
Type A and 
advanced research 
programmes 
   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)    
Austria  x(2)  22  na  49  7  7  7  7  100  11,3 
Belgium   19  21  na  8  24  1  15  13  100  11,2 
Denmark   Na  20  x(2)  46  5  1  8  20  100  13,3 
Finland  x(2)  25  na  na  42  n  17  16  100  12,4 
France   17  18  27  3  10  n  12  12  100  10,9 
Germany  2  15  na  52  3  5  10  13  100  13,4 
Greece  37  10  2  2  25  5  6  13  100  10,5 
Ireland  21  18  na  na  23  12  10  16  100  12,7 
Italy   20  33  2  6  26  2  x(8)  10  100  9,4 
Netherlands  12  22  x(4)  24  13  5  3  22  100  13,5 
Portugal   67  13  x(5)  x(5)  11  x(5)  2  7  100  8,0 
Spain  32  26  na  6  11  na  7  17  100  10,3 
Sweden   8  10  na  x(5)  49  x(7)  15  18  100  12,4 
United Kingdom  Na  16  19  22  15  x(9)  8  19  100  12,7 
EU14  Na  20,1  na  na  14,1  na  na  14,2  100,0  11,6 
United States  5  8  x(5)  x(5)  49  x(5)  9  29  100  12,7 
Canada  6  12  a  x(5)  28  12  22  21  100  12,9 
Notes: x indicates that data are included in another column. The column reference is shown in brackets after x  e.g, x(2) means that data are included in column 2. EU14 refers to 
EU15 except Luxemburg. Source: OECD Education at a Glance 2004, Table A1.1 and authors' calculations.   107 
Table 1.2. Population that has attained tertiary education (2002) 
Percentage of the population which has attained tertiary-type B education or tertiary-type A and advanced research programmes, by  
age group 
 
Notes: for Italy, data in columns 2-5 are missing. One has assumed that the profile of columns 2-5 is the same as the profile of 
columns 7-10 and that half of students are in each broad category (type A and B). Assuming 0 in B and 10% in A does not change 
much EU averages. EU14 refers to EU15 except Luxemburg. Source: OECD Education at a Glance 2004, and authors' 
calculation.
   Tertiary-type B education  Tertiary-type A and advanced research programmes 
  25-64   25-34   35-44   45-54   55-64   25-64   25-34   35-44   45-54   55-64  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Austria  7  7  8  8  6  7  7  8  7  5 
Belgium  15  20  16  13  10  13  18  13  11  8 
Denmark   5  6  6  5  4  23  23  24  25  18 
Finland  17  19  21  16  12  16  21  17  14  11 
France   12  17  12  9  6  12  19  11  10  9 
Germany  10  8  11  11  10  13  13  15  14  11 
Greece  6  7  8  4  3  13  17  14  12  7 
Ireland  10  14  10  7  5  16  23  15  12  9 
Italy   5  6  6  5  4  5  6  6  5  4 
Netherlands  3  2  3  2  2  22  25  23  21  17 
Portugal   2  3  2  2  2  7  12  7  5  3 
Spain  7  12  7  4  2  17  25  18  13  8 
Sweden   15  17  18  14  10  18  22  16  17  16 
United Kingdom  8  8  9  8  7  19  23  18  18  13 
EU14  8,5  10,0  9,3  7,7  6,1  13,5  16,9  13,8  12,6  9,4 
United States   9  9  10  10  7  29  31  29  30  26 
Canada   22  25  23  21  16  21  26  20  20  16   108 
Table 1.3. Trends in the educational attainment of the population aged 25-64, 1960-2002. 
Country  Less than upper 
secondary (%) 
Upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-
tertiary (%) 
University (%)  Years of schooling 
  1960  1980  2002  1960  1980  2002  1960  1980  2002  1960  1980  2002 
Austria  58  45  22  39  50  63  3  6  14  9.7  10.9  12.5 
Belgium   84  60  39  8  25  33  8  15  28  7.9  9.7  11.3 
Czech Republic  na  na  12  na  na  76  na  Na  12  na  na  12.4 
Denmark  40  27  20  51  53  53  9  20  27  11.5  12.2  12.7 
Finland  84  56  25  8  26  42  9  19  33  7.9  10.3  12.3 
France  83  58  35  11  30  41  6  11  24  7.2  9.2  11.0 
Germany  62  31  17  33  54  60  5  15  23  9.4  12.0  13.1 
Greece  83  73  47  11  17  34  6  10  18  7.4  8.2  10.3 
Hungary  na  na  29  na  na  57  na  Na  14  na  na  11.5 
Ireland  86  73  40  10  21  35  3  6  25  7.3  8.4  11.2 
Italy  90  76  54  7  17  36  3  6  10  6.3  8.0  10.2 
Netherlands  87  64  34  7  23  42  6  14  24  8.3  10.2  12.1 
Norway  61  35  13  28  44  55  11  21  31  10.6  11.7  12.8 
Poland  na  na  18  na  na  70  na  na  12  na  na  11.9 
Portugal  94  90  80  4  5  11  2  5  9  6.5  6.8  7.8 
Spain  96  89  58  1  3  17  3  8  24  5.5  6.3  9.6 
Sweden  68  48  18  26  37  49  6  15  33  8.4  9.9  12.2 
Switzerland  44  28  15  48  57  59  8  15  25  10.8  12.1  13.2 
United Kingdom  54  40  16  38  47  57  8  14  27  10.0  10.9  12.4 
United States  48  24  13  44  57  49  8  19  38  10.2  11.7  12.8 
EU14  76  56  34  19  32  44  5  11  22  8.0  9.6  11.5 
Notes: EU14 refers to EU15 except Luxemburg. Values for 1960 and 1980 have been imputed using OECD (2004a), OECD 
labour force statistics 1995-2000, and De la Fuente and Domenech (2001). To link the different data sources we have used the 
1995 values reported in De la Fuente and Domenech (2001) and OECD labour force statistics on the educational attainment in the 
population for the year closest to 1995. Then we used the growth rates during 1960-1980 and 1980-95 reported in De la Fuente 
and Domenech (2001) to impute values for 1980 and 1960. Years of schooling have been calculated from the attainment data 
generated by this procedure. In general, we have used the mapping between years of schooling and attainment provided by De la 
Fuente and Domenech (2001). Years of schooling for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland come directly from OECD 
(2004a). Sources: OECD (2004a); OECD labour force statistics 1995-2000; and De la Fuente and Domenech (2001).   109 
 
Table 1.4. Total education expenditure as a fraction of GDP and expenditure per student as 
a fraction of GDP per capita, percent, 1991 and 2001 
Country  Total expenditure  Expenditure/student 
  1991  2001  1991  2001 
Austria  5.4*  5.8 (5.6*)  27*  27* 
Belgium   5.4*  6.4 (6.0*)  23  26 
Denmark  6.1  7.1  31  28 
Finland  6.6  5.8  32  24 
France  6.0  6.0  24  25 
Germany  5.4  5.3  29  25 
Greece  na  4.1  na  22 
Ireland  5.9  4.5  21  18 
Italy
a  5.1*  5.3 (4.9*)  26*  30* 
Netherlands  5.8  4.9  26  22 
Portugal  5.5*  5.9 (5.8*)  28*  28* 
Spain  5.6  4.9  22  24 
Sweden  6.8  6.5  38  26 
United Kingdom  5.3*  5.5 (4.7*)  28*  19* 
EU13   5.5  5.3  27  25 
United States  7.0  7.3  30  30 
Notes: 
a Data refer to 1992 rather than 1991. * Expenditure data are from public sources only. Total expenditure includes all levels 
from pre-primary to tertiary education. EU13 average is the population-weighted average for the 13 EU countries where data are 
available 1991 and 2001; the sizes of the populations in 2001 are used as weights; if only public expenditure is reported in one 
year we use public expenditure for the other year as well. Source: OECD (1993, 1995, 2004).  110 
Table 1.5. Expenditure and enrollment shares by level of education, percent, 1991 and 2001  
Expenditure (resp. enrollment) shares are reported in normal fonts (resp. italics), while bold face numbers are ratios 
of expenditures to enrollment. 
Country  Pre-primary  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary 
  1991  2001  1991  2001  1991  2001  1991  2001 
















































































































































Greece  na  na  na  29 
37 
0.78 
na  40 
37 
1.08 
Na  31 
26 
1.19 









































































Portugal  2 
4 
0.50 
na  42 
50 
0.84 
na  38 
40 
0.95 





























































































































a 1992 data are used in place of 1991 data. * Expenditure data are from public sources only. EU12 average is the 
population-weighted average for the 12 EU countries where data are available 1991 and 2001; the size of the populations in 2001 
are used as weights. Enrollment data for 2001 are based on full-time equivalents. In 2001, expenditures not allocated by level   111 
have been distributed to the remaining educational levels in proportion to their expenditure shares. In 2001, expenditure 
(enrollment) at the post-secondary, non-tertiary level, have been allocated to the secondary and tertiary level in proportion to the 




Table 1.6. Share of private expenditure in total expenditure, percent, 2001 
Austria  3.4 
Belgium   6.3 
Denmark  4.2 
Finland  1.7 
France  6.7 
Germany  18.9 
Greece  4.9 
Ireland  6.7 
Italy  7.5 
Netherlands  8.2 
Portugal  1.7 
Spain  12.2 
Sweden  3.1 
United Kingdom  14.5 
EU14  10.8 
United States  31.5 
Notes: EU average is the population-weighted average for the 14 EU15 countries where data are available; the sizes of the 
populations in 2001 are used as weights. Source: OECD (2004). 
 
Table 1.7 Relative earnings across countries 
By level of educational attainment and gender for 30- to 44-year-olds (upper secondary 
education = 100) 
  











Belgium   2002  Males  97  120  149  136 
     Females  83  124  185  146 
Denmark  2001  Males  83  109  135  128 
    Females  89  112  122  121 
Finland  2001  Males  89  125  180  155 
     Females  94  124  167  141 
France  2002  Males  86  132  173  157 
     Females  80  135  159  148 
Germany  2002  Males  87  113  152  137 
     Females  72  112  153  138 
Ireland  2000  Males  77  123  140  133 
     Females  61  126  155  144 
Italy  2000  Males  72  m  140  140 
      Females  80  m  132  132 
Netherlands  1997  Males  86  130  133  132 
     Females  73  136  154  152 
Portugal  1999  Males  57  155  194  185 
     Females  58  139  206  185 
Spain  2001  Males  82  97  135  122   112 
     Females  65  88  138  126 
Sweden  2001  Males  86  114  162  149 
    Females  85  109  137  126 
United Kingdom  2001  Males  67  126  162  151 
    Females  74  133  216  183 
United States  2002  Males  70  122  205  195 
     Females  67  122  191  182 
Canada  2001  Males  78  115  183  147 
      Females  65  120  179  145 
EU12     Males  80  120  154  143 
      Females  75  120  161  146 
Notes: The numbers generally pertain to earnings before tax. The earnings concept for Belgium is, however, tax-adjusted. The 
reference period is: a week for Ireland and the UK; a month for France, Germany, and Portugal; a year for the remaining 
countries. The EU12 average is a population-weighted average of EU15 countries reported here. Source: OECD (2004). 
 
Table 1.8. Private rates of return associated with tertiary education 
Country  Males  Females 
Denmark  6.7  6.1 
Finland  14.2  15.2 
Spain  9.2  8.5 
Sweden  8.8  7.3 
United Kingdom  11.2  13.7 
United States  11.0  7.9 
EU5   10.3  11.2 
Notes: Rates of return take taxes and employment probabilities into account. EU5 average is the population-weighted average of 
the five EU15 countries in the table. Source: OECD (2004).   113 
Table 1.9. Employment Rates and educational attainment (2002) 
Number of 25 to 64-year-olds in employment as a percentage of the population aged 25 to 64, by level of 
education attained and gender 







Upper Secondary  Tertiary education  All levels of 
education 
    
ISCED0/1  ISCED 2  ISCED 3A  ISCED 5B 
ISCED 5A and 
advanced research 
programmes (ISCED 6) 
 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Austria  Males  x(2)  65  77  86  91  80 
  Females  x(2)  48  66  81  85  64 
Belgium   Males  49  74  83  87  88  77 
  Females  25  45  65  79  82  57 
Denmark   Males  a  73  84  88  92  83 
  Females  a  52  71  86  84  74 
Finland  Males  x(2)  61  77  84  89  76 
  Females  x(2)  54  72  83  85  72 
France   Males  57  77  83  88  86  79 
  Females  43  56  71  80  80  64 
Germany  Males  54  65  63  84  88  77 
  Females  33  45  54  78  80  62 
Greece  Males  75  84  83  81  88  81 
  Females  36  42  45  73  76  47 
Ireland  Males  64  86  89  91  91  84 
  Females  30  47  63  80  84  60 
Italy   Males  52  79  82  x(5)  88  77 
  Females  18  39  61  x(5)  77  46 
Netherlands  Males  63  82  91  91  91  84 
  Females  35  50  74  80  82  64 
Portugal   Males  82  88  85  84  93  84 
  Females  60  77  80  78  90  67 
Spain  Males  69  86  83  88  87  81 
  Females  28  44  58  68  76  48 
Sweden   Males  67  80  83  85  89  83 
  Females  51  69  80  83  88  79 
United Kingdom  Males  a  59  88  88  90  82 
  Females  a  48  77  84  86  72 
EU14  Males  a  75  82  a  91  82 
  Females  a  49  66  a  83  62 
United States   Males  67  69  80  86  89  82 
  Females  39  49  68  77  79  69 
Canada   Males  55  72  82  86  86  81 
  Females  31  51  68  78  79  69 
Notes: x indicates that data are included in another column. x(2) means that data are included in column 2, etc… Source: OECD 
Education at a Glance 2004, Table A1.1 and authors' calculations. a: not applicable.  114 
 
Table 1.10. Unemployment ratio and educational attainment (2002) 
Number of 25 to 64-year-olds who are unemployed as a percentage of the population aged 25 to 64, by 
level of education attained and gender 


















   
    ISCED 3A    Type B 





    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Austria  Males  x(2)  5,9  1,5  2,6  1,0  2,2  3,2 
  Females  x(2)  2,9  2,7  1,5  1,0  2,4  2,5 
Belgium   Males  6,7  5,3  3,6  5,9  2,6  3,1  4,5 
  Females  4,5  6,0  4,8  4,6  2,8  3,9  4,6 
Denmark   Males  a  3,5  1,4  7,2  3,5  3,2  3,1 
  Females  a  4,6  2,9  4,7  2,5  4,8  3,2 
Finland  Males  x(2)  8,0  7,4  a  4,8  3,1  6,5 
  Females  x(2)  8,1  7,0  a  4,8  3,1  6,2 
France   Males  6,0  9,8  6,0  a  5,0  4,8  5,8 
  Females  5,4  9,4  6,0  a  3,9  4,8  6,4 
Germany  Males  17,7  12,8  5,4  5,2  3,9  3,6  7,4 
  Females  7,7  6,4  3,7  3,9  4,7  3,8  5,9 
Greece  Males  3,4  5,6  4,4  5,9  4,6  3,6  4,3 
  Females  3,9  8,8  7,8  12,6  8,4  7,0  6,6 
Ireland  Males  5,6  4,0  2,8  1,7  2,3  1,9  3,3 
  Females  1,7  2,5  2,0  2,3  1,4  1,1  1,9 
Italy   Males  4,8  5,2  4,1  6,6  x(6)  3,3  4,5 
  Females  3,2  6,1  5,6  10,5  x(6)  5,9  5,4 
Netherlands  Males  2,8  2,4  1,6  1,7  1,1  1,9  1,9 
  Females  2,1  2,2  2,1  2,7  1,7  2,0  2,1 
Portugal   Males  3,0  3,6  3,5  x(3)  4,5  1,8  3,1 
  Females  3,4  5,0  4,0  x(3)  2,8  4,8  3,8 
Spain  Males  6,5  6,5  5,0  a  4,7  4,7  5,8 
  Females  5,8  10,1  8,6  a  10,4  8,4  8,3 
Sweden   Males  3,8  4,5  4,5  x(5)  3,3  3,2  4,0 
  Females  4,4  3,9  3,3  x(5)  2,4  2,1  3,1 
United Kingdom  Males  a  6,8  3,1  x(7)  2,6  2,5  3,8 
  Females  a  3,2  2,4  x(7)  1,5  1,8  2,7 
EU14  Males  a  8  5  a  a  4  5 
  Females  a  7  5  a  a  5  5 
United States   Males  6,9  7,9  5,3  x(3)  3,8  2,8  4,7 
  Females  5,1  5,5  3,7  x(3)  2,5  2,1  3,3 
Canada   Males  7,8  8,6  5,8  5,9  5,4  4,5  5,9 
   Females  4,5  5,7  5,0  5,1  3,9  3,9  4,6 
Notes: x(2) means that data are included in column 2, etc... Source: OECD Education at a Glance 2004, Table A1.1 and authors' 
calculations ; a : not applicable.  115 
 
 
Table 1.11. Mobility experience in the last three years, 15-64 population, by reason and 
country 
# obs. 152902    Primary reason for move 
Country  Mobility Rate  Job related  House related  Personal reason  Total 
DK  0.237  0.1234  0.6219  0.2547  1 
NL  0.201  0.1217  0.4457  0.4325  1 
B  0.167  0.0659  0.6503  0.2838  1 
F  0.214  0.1625  0.5704  0.2671  1 
IRL  0.0647  0.056  0.6001  0.3438  1 
I  0.0871  0.0869  0.3815  0.5316  1 
EL  0.0752  0.0955  0.6744  0.2301  1 
E  0.105  0.0877  0.5521  0.3603  1 
P  0.101  0.0611  0.5953  0.3436  1 
A  0.010  0.0978  0.5622  0.34  1 
FIN  0.270  0.1534  0.5607  0.2859  1 
L  0.282  na  na  na  1 
D  0.206  0.0974  0.722  0.1806  1 
UK  0.2054  0.1631  0.5855  0.2514  1 
S  0.252  na  na  na  1 
Total  0.162  0.1153  0.5723  0.3125  1 
Notes: Sample 1995-2001, survey weights. Columns 2-4: repartition of the main reason for move, sum is 100%. The EU15 
average is computed without Luxembourg and Sweden. 
 
 
Table 1.12.  Mobility experience in the last three years, by education 
  Mobility rate, Any Reason  # obs. 
All  0.145  750168 
Primary  0.113  730422 
Secondary  0.154  730422 
Tertiary  0.205  730422 
  Mobility rate, Job-related Reason  # obs. 
All  0.083  58337 
Primary  0.055  57093 
Secondary  0.080  57093 
Tertiary  0.110  57093 
Notes: Samples. Any reason: all EU15 population 15-65, 1995-2001;  job-related reason: active population, 15-65 of head of 
households, EU15 less Luxembourg and Sweden, 1995-2001. Survey weights.   116 
 
Table 1.13. Summary of Internal Mobility and Immigration, USA and EU 1990-2000 
 
Table 2.1. Test scores in the adult population 
  Sample 




Natives & ages 25-64 
  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Sample 
(% of target) 
Mean  SD  Sample 
(% of target) 
Belgium   277  55  279  53  96  275  55  65 
Czech Republic  283  46  284  46  99  282  47  83 
Denmark  289  40  289  40  98  289  41  80 
Finland  288  48  289  47  98  285  47  78 
Germany  285  42  287  41  92  286  42  79 
Hungary   254  48  254  48  99  250  47  77 
Ireland  263  57  262  57  94  258  59  73 
Italy  244  60  244  61  97  238  62  81 
Netherlands  286  44  288  42  94  286  42  82 
Norway  294  45  296  42  93  295  42  73 
Poland  229  64  230  64  98  225  65  77 
Sweden  304  49  308  44  91  308  44  71 
Switzerland  271  57  285  39  75  283  40  65 
United Kingdom  267  62  270  58  95  270  59  80 
United States  272  65  284  55  78  287  55  63 
All Europe  266  54  268  52  95  266  52  79 
EU9   271  52  273  51  95  271  51  80 
Notes: Row headed All Europe reports the population-weighted average of all European (Western and Eastern) countries included 
in the table. Row headed EU9 reports the population-weighted average of the nine countries in the Western EU15. Columns 
headed “Sample” report the percent of the target population that remains after making the indicated sample exclusions. 
Year  Early 90’s  2000 



























from that of 
birth 
USA  124,772,500  9.3%  35.3%  138,733,660  12.4 %  35.6% 
EU12  154,007,000  4.1%  2.5%  160,780,000  4.9%  2.5% 
EU15  167,000,000  4.6%  2.2%  171,668,000  5.0%  2.6%   117 
 
Table 2.2. Changes in the “quality of education” (change in residual skills) 
Each cell reports the annual change in residual skills relative to the standard deviation within country.  
  Birth cohorts 
Country  1935-1950  1950-1960  1960-1970 






































































































Notes: Bold face numbers are significant at conventional levels (t-values in parentheses). “Residual skills” is estimated from a 
regression relating the cohort IALS score to a country fixed effect, a spline (with knots at 8, 10, and 12 years of education) in the 
cohort years of schooling, and two time period indicators equaling unity for cohorts born during the 1950s and 1960s respectively. 
EU9 and All Europe: see Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.3. Literacy test scores 
Country  PISA 2003  Change in rank order* 





Austria  491  506  NA  -4 
Belgium   507  529  NA  -2 
Czech Republic  489  516  NA  -3 
Denmark  492  514  -2  7 
Finland  543  544  0  NA 
France  496  511  -5  -1 
Germany  491  503  -2  0 
Greece  472  445  -1  -1 
Hungary   482  490  -6  -6 
Ireland  515  503  11  -3 
Italy  476  466  -3  NA 
Netherlands  513  538  8  3 
Norway  500  495  5  0 
Poland  497  490  NA  NA 
Portugal  478  466  -4  1 
Spain  485  485  3  1 
Sweden  514  509  0  1 
Switzerland  499  527  -3  -1 
United Kingdom
a  517  532  NA  9 
United States  495  483  -2  -1 
EU14  494  501  -1  2 
All Europe  494  501  -1  1 
Notes: 
a Score refers to England. The 2003 score has been predicted using the PISA 2000 results on all three domains. * In 
calculating the change in rank order we have first ordered the countries from best to worst among the tabulated countries 
participating at both time points and then calculated the change from the base year to the last year. Positive numbers thus reflect 
improvements in the rank order. EU14 and All Europe: see Table 2.1. Sources: Elley (1992), OECD (2004b), and Beaton et al. 
(1996). 
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Table 2.4. Student/Teacher ratios in lowe r secondary schools, 2002 and 1992. 
Country  2002  1992  Relative change (%) 
Austria  9.8  7.7  27.3 
Belgium*   13.1  13.7  -4.4 
Czech Republic  14.4  17.0  -15.3 
Denmark*  10.9  10.9  0.0 
Finland*  15.8  19.0  -16.8 
France*  19.4  20.4  -4.9 
Germany  15.7  14.6  7.5 
Greece  9.3  NA  NA 
Hungary   10.7  11.6  -7.8 
Ireland*  19.5  25.6  -23.8 
Italy  9.9  9.0  10.0 
Netherlands*  17.0  23.6  -28.0 
Norway  10.3  8.5  21.2 
Poland  14.1  NA  NA 
Portugal  9.3  NA  NA 
Spain  13.7  17.6  -22.2 
Sweden  12.2  10.6  15.1 
Switzerland  NA  NA  NA 
United Kingdom  17.6  15.9  10.7 
United States  15.5  16.8  -7.7 
EU9   14.9  15.5  0.8 
All Europe  15.3  14.6  0.4 
Notes: * Numbers refer to the primary level. EU9 and All Europe: see Table 2.1. Source: OECD (2004a) and OECD (1995). 
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Table 2.5. Variations in Math skills across students and the share of the variance attributable to 
schools 
  Variation across students 
(Coefficient of variation, percent) 











Austria  18.4  1.3  55.5  22.5 
Belgium*   20.8  4.5  56.9  20.9 
Czech Republic  18.6  1.9  50.5  28.5 
Denmark  17.8  1.0  13.1  7.1 
Finland  15.4  NA  3.9  NA 
France  18.0  3.9  NA  NA 
Germany  20.4  2.7  56.4  9.4 
Greece  21.1  2.9  68.1  54.1 
Hungary   19.1  1.8  66.0  49.0 
Ireland  17.0  -0.7  13.4  -31.6 
Italy  20.5  NA  56.8  NA 
Netherlands  17.2  0.8  54.5  3.5 
Norway  18.6  1.9  6.5  0.5 
Poland  18.4  NA  12.0  NA 
Portugal  18.9  4.8  30.3  14.3 
Spain  18.1  3.2  17.2  1.2 
Sweden  18.6  2.2  10.9  -0.1 
Switzerland  18.7  2.5  36.4  -2.6 
United States  19.7  1.5  27.1  -3.9 
EU13  19.2  2.9  45.5  7.6 
European average  19.7  2.5  41.7  9.4 
Notes: * The measures of the variation in TIMSS pertain to the Flemish community in Belgium. EU13 and All Europe: see Table 
2.1. Population-weighted averages. Sources: OECD (2004b) and Beaton et al (1996). 
 
 
Table 2.6. Earnings regressions, pooled country/cohort data. 
  All countries  EU 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












IALS score  --  .013 
(.002) 
--  .020 
(.002) 
--  .017 
(.002) 












Weighted by country size  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
# observations  540  540  540  540  324  324 
R-squared  .835  .846  .879  .907  .823  .850 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include country and cohort fixed effects. Columns headed EU report 
population-weighted estimates for the nine EU15 countries included in the data.  
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Table 3.1. Sectoral composition of employment, OECD and Eastern Europe 
  Agriculture (%)  Industry (%)  Service (%) 
OECD  (top third, 1991)  5.5  29.8  64.7 
OECD  (mid. third, 1991)  5.8  30.4  63.9 
OECD  (bottom third, 1991)  17.9  29.5  52.6 
East Germany (1989)  10  44.1  45.9 
Czechoslovakia    11.6  46.8  41.6 
Hungary  17.5  36.1  46.4 
Poland    27.2  36.3  36.4 
Source: Boeri (2002), Roland (2001).       
 
 
Table 3.2. Human capital specificity and mobility in Poland and Estonia  
  Estonia  Poland 
  Dep var: Log hourly wages 
More than one year before move (bm_2)  0.09  -0.03 
  (3.31)**  (3.15)** 
Less than one year before move (bm_1)  0.03  -0.05 
  (1.61)  (6.11)** 
Less than one year after move (am_1)  0.13  0.03 
  (6.77)**  (3.51)** 
More than one year after move (am_2)  0.14  0.01 
  (6.50)**  (1.67) 
Education dummies   Yes (unreported)  Yes (unreported) 
Secgen*bm_2  -0.08  -0.06 
  (2.27)*  (1.85) 
Secgen*bm_1  -0.06  -0.07 
  (2.78)**  (2.76)** 
Secgen*am_1  -0.09  -0.02 
  (3.92)**  (0.73) 
Secgen*am_2  -0.08  -0.05 
  (3.11)**  (2.02)* 
Secvoc*bm_2  -0.04  -0.02 
  (0.95)  (1.24) 
Secvoc*bm_1  -0.04  -0.01 
  (1.58)  (0.81) 
Secvoc*am_1  -0.07  0.00 
  (2.62)**  (0.14) 
Secvoc*am_2  -0.10  0.02 
  (3.14)**  (1.14) 
Tertiary*(am, bm, etc…)  Yes (unreported)  Yes (unreported) 
Number of observations  64577  254842 
R-squared  0.32  0.29 
Notes: z -statistics (in absolute value) in parentheses. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.  Random effects 
regressions. The regressions include a full set of time and geographical (county) dummies, a male dummy, age, tenure and their 
squares. 
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Table 4.1. Mobility rate in the last year and in the last three years, any reason, active 15-64 
population, head of households, by unemployment status 
  Mobility rate  # obs. 
Last year     
Employed  0.065  218765 
Unemployed  0.086  15369 
Last three years     
Employed  0.178  218765 
Unemployed  0.213  15369 
Notes: EU15 less Luxembourg and Sweden, 1995-2001, survey weights. 
 
Table 4.2. Mobility rate in the last year, any reason, occupied 15-64 population, head of 
households, by occupation 
Grouped occupation  Mobility rate 
Legislators, senior officials and managers  0.058 
Professionals  0.079 
Technicians and associate professionals  0.078 
Clerks  0.065 
Service workers, shop and market sale workers  0.071 
Skilled agricultural and fishery worker  0.022 
Craft and related trades workers  0.053 
Plant and machine operators, assemblers  0.060 
Elementary occupations  0.060 
Total  0.063 
 Notes: EU15 less Luxembourg and Sweden, 1995-2001, survey weights. 
   
Table 4.3. Mobility rate outside the area in the last three years, active 15-64 population, 
head of household, by country 
Country  Any reason  Job-related reason 
DK  0.054  0.020 
NL  0.029  0.010 
B  0.013  0.003 
F  0.042  0.025 
IRL  0.01  0.003 
I  0.011  0.005 
EL  0.008  0.006 
E  0.009  0.005 
P  0.007  0.001 
A  0.015  0.006 
FIN  0.058  0.024 
D  0.021  0.008 
UK  0.072  0.027 
Total  0.025  0.011 
Notes: EU15 less Luxembourg and Sweden, 1995-2001, survey weights. 
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Table 4.4. Mobility rate outside the area, active 15-64 population, head of household, by 
education level 
Education  Mobility rate 
Primary  0.014 
Secondary  0.023 
Tertiary  0.045 
Total  0.024 
Notes: EU15 less Luxembourg and Sweden, 1995-2001, survey weights 
 
Table 4.5. Mobility in the last three years, by reason and distance, heads of households 
  # obs.  Percent  Cum. 
0 No move  434,247  79.44  79.44 
11 Job-related move, same area  3,650  0.67  80.10 
12 Job-related move, other area  4,517  0.83  80.93 
21 House-related move, same area  32,072  5.87  86.80 
22 House-related move, other area  3,271  0.60  87.40 
31 Personal reason move, same are  19,547  3.58  90.97 
32 Personal reason move, other ar  3,401  0.62  91.59 
0 Missing  45,955  8.41  100.00 
Total  546,66  100.00   
Notes: EU15 less Luxembourg and Sweden, 1995-2001, survey weights. 
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Table 4.6. Multinomial models of mobility. 3 level-mlogit    
With and without control for unemployment status, with and without control for total net (PPP adjusted) household income and with occupation and industry 
dummies. Columns 1-3: first model ; columns 4-6: second model ; columns 7-9: third model ; columns 10-12: fourth model. Relative Risk Ratios. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  1  2  3  1  2  3    1  2  3  1  2  3 
Reason  Job  House  Perso  Job  House  Perso    Job  House  Perso   Job  House  Perso 
Sex  0.730  0.900  0.863  0.738  0.904  0.862    0.740  0.913  0.861  0.763  0.865  0.868 
  (0.042)** (0.026)**  (0.032)** (0.043)**  (0.026)** (0.032)**    (0.043)**  (0.026)** (0.032)**  (0.051)** (0.029)**  (0.037)** 
AgeD1  2.796  1.629  2.304  2.843  1.643  2.302    2.927  1.700  2.278  3.390  1.768  2.466 
  (0.228)** (0.092)**  (0.130)** (0.232)**  (0.093)** (0.130)**    (0.243)**  (0.097)** (0.130)**  (0.309)** (0.111)**  (0.155)** 
AgeD3  0.301  0.296  0.238  0.301  0.296  0.238    0.297  0.292  0.238  0.293  0.297  0.230 
  (0.016)** (0.008)**  (0.008)** (0.016)**  (0.008)** (0.008)**    (0.016)**  (0.007)** (0.008)**  (0.017)** (0.008)**  (0.008)** 
AgeD4  0.103  0.119  0.112  0.105  0.120  0.111    0.102  0.117  0.112  0.092  0.123  0.106 
  (0.012)** (0.006)**  (0.007)** (0.013)**  (0.006)** (0.007)**    (0.012)**  (0.006)** (0.007)**  (0.012)** (0.007)**  (0.008)** 
Educ  1.080  1.035  1.020  1.078  1.035  1.020    1.076  1.031  1.020  1.044  1.028  1.021 
  (0.005)** (0.003)**  (0.003)** (0.005)**  (0.003)** (0.003)**    (0.005)**  (0.003)** (0.003)**  (0.006)** (0.003)**  (0.004)** 
Burden  0.886  0.754  0.786  0.871  0.750  0.788    0.873  0.742  0.787  0.826  0.731  0.777 
  (0.027)** (0.011)**  (0.016)** (0.027)**  (0.011)** (0.016)**    (0.027)**  (0.011)** (0.016)**  (0.028)** (0.012)**  (0.017)** 
 
Unemp.        0.618  0.870  1.046             
        (0.060)**  (0.037)** (0.052)             
Log. Inc.                1.146  1.166  0.974       
                (0.056)**  (0.026)** (0.022)       
HSize D.  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes 
Year D.  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes 
Ctry D.  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes 
Ind. D.  No  No  No   No  No   No    No  No  No   Yes  Yes   Yes  
Occ. D.  No  No  No   No  No   No    No  No  No   Yes  Yes   Yes  
 
Obs.  200091  200091  200091  200091  200091  200091    199426  199426  199426  171646  171646  171646 
Pseudo Rsq:  13.70      13.69        13.69      14.51 
 
Notes: EU15 less Luxembourg and Sweden, 1995-2001; dependent variable: 0 if no recent move, 1 if job-related move, 2 if house-related move, 3 if personal reason 
move Robust to clustering standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level ; AgeD1 = 16-24 y.o. ; AgeD2 (ref.) = 25-34 y.o. ; 
AgeD3 = 35-54 y.o. ; AgeD4 = 54-65 y.o. ; Burden = 1 (Shelter costs represent a heavy burden) ; 2 (some burden) or 3 (not a burden) ; Unemp=1 if unemployed, 0 
otherwise Outcome (No mobility) is the comparison group. HSizeD : dummy variable for household size (1, 2 …, 5 & 6+).   125 
Table 4.7. Multinomial models of mobility. 6 level-mlogit 
Benchmark specification. Columns 1-6: Coefficients; columns 7-12: Relative Risk Ratios. 
Reason    Job  Job  House  House  Perso  Perso    Job  Job  House  House  Perso  Perso 
Place    Same area Outside  Same area Outside   Same area Outside    Same area Outside  Same area Outside   Same area Outside 
 
Sex    -0.196  -0.403  -0.110  -0.172  -0.168  0.085    0.822  0.668  0.896  0.842  0.845  1.089 
    (0.090)*  (0.079)** (0.032)**  (0.091)  (0.043)**  (0.082)    (0.074)*  (0.053)**  (0.028)** (0.077)  (0.036)** (0.090) 
AgeD1    0.953  1.053  0.436  0.506  0.713  0.790    2.594  2.865  1.547  1.658  2.041  2.204 
    (0.132)**  (0.113)** (0.062)**  (0.153)** (0.065)**  (0.128)**   (0.342)** (0.324)**  (0.096)** (0.254)**  (0.133)**(0.282)** 
AgeD3    -1.120  -1.297  -1.183  -1.678  -1.431  -1.434    0.326  0.273  0.306  0.187  0.239  0.238 
    (0.080)**  (0.072)** (0.028)**  (0.084)** (0.037)**  (0.083)**   (0.026)** (0.020)**  (0.008)** (0.016)**  (0.009)**(0.020)** 
AgeD4    -2.073  -2.393  -2.108  -2.583  -2.196  -1.813    0.126  0.091  0.121  0.076  0.111  0.163 
    (0.178)**  (0.176)** (0.060)**  (0.178)** (0.073)**  (0.154)**   (0.022)** (0.016)**  (0.007)** (0.013)**  (0.008)**(0.025)** 
Educ    0.048  0.134  0.036  0.072  0.011  0.041    1.049  1.144  1.037  1.075  1.011  1.042 
    (0.010)**  (0.008)** (0.003)**  (0.011)** (0.005)*  (0.010)**   (0.010)** (0.009)**  (0.004)** (0.011)**  (0.005)* (0.011)** 
Burden    -0.114  -0.119  -0.280  -0.285  -0.260  -0.131    0.892  0.888  0.755  0.752  0.771  0.877 
    (0.047)*  (0.042)** (0.016)**  (0.051)** (0.022)**  (0.049)**   (0.042)*  (0.037)**  (0.012)** (0.038)**  (0.017)**(0.043)** 
 
HSize D.    Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes 
Year D.    Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes 
Ctry D.    Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes 
Ind. D.    No  No  No   No  No   No    No  No  No   No  No   No 
Occ. D.    No  No  No   No  No   No    No  No  No   No  No   No  
 
Obs.    196158  196158  196158  196158  196158  196158    196158  196158  196158  196158  196158  196158 
Pseudo-Rsq  13.70           
Additional specifications: with and without control for total net (PPP adjusted) household income and with and without occupation and industry dummies. Columns 
1-6: first model (Relative Risk Ratios) ; columns 7-12: second model (Relative Risk Ratios). 
Reason    Job  Job  House  House  Perso  Perso    Job  Job  House  House  Perso  Perso 
Place    Same area Outside  Same area Outside   Same area Outside    Same area Outside  Same area Outside   Same area Outside 
Sex    0.831  0.686  0.911  0.891  0.843  1.101    0.895  0.662  0.851  0.804  0.833  1.171 
    (0.076)*  (0.054)** (0.029)**  (0.081)  (0.036)**  (0.091)    (0.093)  (0.060)**  (0.032)** (0.090)  (0.041)** (0.114) 
AgeD1    2.617  3.143  1.614  1.932  2.031  2.224    2.746  3.726  1.657  2.073  2.173  2.438 
    (0.352)**  (0.359)** (0.100)**  (0.297)** (0.134)**  (0.288)**   (0.401)** (0.487)**  (0.114)** (0.338)**  (0.158)**(0.350)** 
AgeD3    0.325  0.266  0.301  0.179  0.240  0.238    0.306  0.276  0.308  0.179  0.233  0.217 
    (0.026)**  (0.019)** (0.008)**  (0.015)** (0.009)**  (0.020)**   (0.026)** (0.022)**  (0.009)** (0.016)**  (0.009)**(0.019)** 
AgeD4    0.126  0.089  0.119  0.073  0.112  0.163    0.111  0.080  0.127  0.075  0.105  0.158 
    (0.022)**  (0.016)** (0.007)**  (0.013)** (0.008)**  (0.025)**   (0.022)** (0.016)**  (0.008)** (0.015)**  (0.009)**(0.026)** 
Educ    1.047  1.133  1.030  1.059  1.011  1.039    1.026  1.077  1.026  1.031  1.011  1.023 
    (0.010)**  (0.009)** (0.004)**  (0.012)** (0.005)*  (0.011)**   (0.012)*  (0.011)**  (0.004)** (0.013)*  (0.006)*  (0.013) 
Burden    0.888  0.861  0.741  0.712  0.770  0.874    0.844  0.812  0.730  0.727  0.765  0.842 
    (0.042)*  (0.037)** (0.012)**  (0.037)** (0.017)**  (0.043)**   (0.043)** (0.038)**  (0.013)** (0.043)**  (0.019)**(0.047)** 
log. Inc.    1.055  1.326  1.188  1.668  0.988  1.054             
    (0.078)  (0.093)** (0.028)**  (0.146)** (0.025)  (0.073)             
 
HSize D.    Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes 
Year D.    Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes 
Ctry D.    Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes 
Ind. D.    No  No  No   No  No   No    Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  
Occ. D.    No  No  No   No  No   No    Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  
 
Obs.    195498  195498  195498  195498  195498  195498    168416  168416  168416  168416  168416  168416 
Notes: EU15 less Luxembourg and Sweden, 1995-2001; dependent variable: 0 if no recent move, 11 if job-related move in the same area, 12 if job-related move in 
another area, 21 if house-related move in the same area, 22 if house-related move in another area, 31 if personal reason move in the same area 31 and 32 if personal 
reason move in another area ; robust to clustering standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level ; AgeD1 = 16-24 y.o. ; AgeD2 
(ref.) = 25-34 y.o. ; AgeD3 = 35-54 y.o. ; AgeD4 = 54-65 y.o. ; Burden = 1 (Shelter costs represent a heavy burden) ; 2 (some burden) or 3 (not a burden) ; Outcome 
(No mobility) is the comparison group. HSizeD: dummy variable for household size (1, 2 …, 5 & 6+).   126 
Table 4.8. Probit model of household job-related mobility and income model 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
    Model of  Model of  Model of  Model of 
    Mobility   Mobility   Income,   Income,  
    Reduced form  Semi-struct.  Stayers Only  Movers only 
 
Imputed Income -    0.108    -    - 
Growth       (0.034)**     
Inv. Mills  -    -    2.956    0.552 
Ratio            (0.100)**  (0.075)** 
Sex    -0.081    -0.049    -0.082    -0.108 
    (0.026)**  (0.036)    (0.006)**  (0.045)* 
AgeD1    0.392    0.267     
    (0.041)**  (0.079)**     
AgeD3    -0.341    -0.310     
    (0.024)**  (0.033)**     
AgeD4    -0.695    -0.702     
    (0.052)**  (0.069)**     
Educ    0.033    0.030    0.053    0.057 
    (0.003)**  (0.004)**  (0.001)**  (0.005)** 
Burden    -0.014    -0.035    - 
    (0.016)    (0.021)     
hhszD2    -0.002    -0.074    0.465    0.621 
    (0.032)    (0.045)    (0.010)**  (0.055)** 
hhszD3    -0.131    -0.167    0.563    0.610 
    (0.035)**  (0.047)**  (0.010)**  (0.062)** 
hhszD4    -0.199    -0.204    0.609    0.517 
    (0.037)**  (0.048)**  (0.010)**  (0.074)** 
hhszD5    -0.121    -0.116    0.666    0.560 
    (0.048)*   (0.061)    (0.011)**  (0.076)** 
hhszD6    -0.181    -0.160    0.767    0.687 
    (0.075)*   (0.092)    (0.014)**  (0.086)** 
 
htenD2    0.505    0.450    -    - 
    (0.025)**  (0.033)**     
marD2    -    -    -0.209    0.029 
            (0.020)**  (0.130) 
marD3    -    -    -0.142    -0.293 
            (0.010)**  (0.078)** 
marD4    -    -    -0.061    -0.443 
            (0.016)**  (0.167)** 
marD5    -    -    -0.008    -0.108 
            (0.007)    (0.047)* 
potexp    -    -    0.014    0.048 
            (0.001)**  (0.009)** 
potexpsq  -    -    -0.000    -0.001 
            (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
year D.    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Ctry D.    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Observations  201397    148787    199022    1597 
R-squared          0.9    0.9 
Notes: EU15 less Luxembourg and Sweden, 1995-2001; robust (to clustering) standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5% level; ** 
significant at 1% level ; NB, there is no correction of s.e. for the two-stage procedure ; AgeD1 = 16-24 y.o. ; AgeD2 (ref.) = 25-34 y.o. ; AgeD3 = 
35-54 y.o. ; AgeD4 = 54-65 y.o.; Burden = 1 (Shelter costs represent a heavy burden) ; 2 (some burden) or 3 (not a burden) ; Outcome (No 
mobility or mobility for non-job reason) is the comparison group of probit analysis. hhSizeDn takes value 1 if household size is n if n<6 ; 
hhSizeD6 takes value 1 if household size is >=6 ; marital status variables: reference = married. Rent = 1 if dwelling rented in the private sector. 
Reference is owner.   127 
Table 5.1. A taxonomy of mismatch in Europe 
  FORMAL TRAINING OR EDUCATION THAT 
HAS GIVEN YOU SKILLS NEEDED FOR YOUR 
PRESENT TYPE OF WORK? 
TOTAL 






















Table 5.2. The determinants of over-qualification: Marginal effects from Probit Analysis 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Germany  UK  France  Italy  Spain  All 
marry  -0.006  0.004  0.018  0.020  0.021  0.012 
  (0.32)  (0.20)  (1.14)  (1.38)  (1.76)  (1.67) 
sex  -0.116  -0.090  -0.136  -0.074  -0.033  -0.081 
  (5.75)**  (4.84)**  (8.58)**  (5.42)**  (2.70)**  (11.51)** 
hhsize  -0.004  -0.001  -0.009  -0.001  -0.000  -0.002 
  (0.59)  (0.18)  (1.75)  (0.21)  (0.05)  (1.01) 
yeduc  0.003  0.017  0.021  0.024  0.025  0.021 
  (1.37)  (5.65)**  (7.70)**  (10.80)**  (13.74)**  (20.26)** 
exper  -0.004  -0.002  -0.004  -0.003  -0.005  -0.004 
  (4.69)**  (2.96)**  (4.10)**  (4.37)**  (9.41)**  (12.36)** 
tend2  0.006  -0.016  0.020  -0.039  -0.010  -0.017 
  (0.30)  (0.81)  (1.29)  (2.68)**  (0.81)  (2.33)* 
tend3  0.046  -0.009  -0.004  -0.010  0.002  -0.006 
  (1.85)  (0.39)  (0.20)  (0.52)  (0.13)  (0.73) 
tend4  0.004  -0.029  -0.020  -0.059  -0.037  -0.037 
  (0.17)  (1.17)  (1.07)  (3.43)**  (2.45)*  (4.21)** 
unem  0.062  0.072  -0.004  -0.031  0.022  0.012 
  (2.29)*  (2.81)**  (0.15)  (1.18)  (1.34)  (1.15) 
nunem  -0.034  -0.007  0.044  -0.001  0.007  0.003 
  (0.76)  (0.18)  (1.33)  (0.03)  (0.41)  (0.21) 
lunem  0.063  -0.041  0.006  0.036  0.025  0.020 
  (1.28)  (0.90)  (0.16)  (1.30)  (1.53)  (1.63) 
Dummy France            -0.073 
            (6.24)** 
Dummy UK            0.074 
            (5.61)** 
Dummy Italy            -0.114 
            (9.92)** 
Dummy Spain            -0.053 
            (4.67)** 
Sectoral Dummy   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Occupation Dummmy   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummmy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  10474  7960  20343  31424  31556  101757 
Notes: Robust (to individual clustering) z-statistics (in absolute value) in parentheses. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level   128 
Table 5.3. The determinants of skill mismatch. Multinomial Logit Analysis. Pooled Country 
Sample 
  Coefficients  Relative Risk Ratios 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  NOBM  OWM  OBM  NOBM  OWM  OBM 
marry  -0.124  -0.009  -0.034  0.883  0.991  0.967 
  (2.94)**  (0.23)  (0.76)  (2.94)**  (0.23)  (0.76) 
sex  0.006  -0.381  -0.260  1.006  0.683  0.771 
  (0.14)  (10.36)**  (6.09)**  (0.14)  (10.36)**  (6.09)** 
hhsize  0.056  0.003  0.042  1.057  1.003  1.042 
  (4.00)**  (0.20)  (2.49)*  (4.00)**  (0.20)  (2.49)* 
yeduc  -0.186  0.048  -0.048  0.830  1.049  0.953 
  (26.56)**  (9.47)**  (7.48)**  (26.56)**  (9.47)**  (7.48)** 
exper  0.006  -0.017  -0.009  1.006  0.983  0.991 
  (3.06)**  (8.54)**  (4.21)**  (3.06)**  (8.54)**  (4.21)** 
tend2  -0.009  -0.024  -0.128  0.991  0.976  0.880 
  (0.19)  (0.56)  (2.71)**  (0.19)  (0.56)  (2.71)** 
tend3  0.014  0.085  -0.131  1.015  1.088  0.877 
  (0.26)  (1.69)  (2.38)*  (0.26)  (1.69)  (2.38)* 
tend4  -0.202  -0.080  -0.471  0.817  0.923  0.625 
  (3.85)**  (1.64)  (8.69)**  (3.85)**  (1.64)  (8.69)** 
unem  0.157  0.066  0.182  1.170  1.068  1.199 
  (2.43)*  (1.11)  (2.76)**  (2.43)*  (1.11)  (2.76)** 
nunem  0.077  0.049  0.091  1.080  1.050  1.095 
  (1.02)  (0.66)  (1.17)  (1.02)  (0.66)  (1.17) 
lunem  0.117  0.087  0.210  1.124  1.091  1.234 
  (1.52)  (1.15)  (2.63)**  (1.52)  (1.15)  (2.63)** 
Dummy France  0.974  -0.209  0.411  2.649  0.811  1.509 
  (12.91)**  (3.67)**  (6.16)**  (12.91)**  (3.67)**  (6.16)** 
Dummy UK  0.865  0.508  0.687  2.375  1.661  1.988 
  (9.62)**  (7.45)**  (8.74)**  (9.62)**  (7.45)**  (8.74)** 
Dummy Italy  1.986  -0.206  1.235  7.288  0.814  3.438 
  (26.29)**  (3.43)**  (18.34)**  (26.29)**  (3.43)**  (18.34)** 
Dummy Spain  0.584  -0.074  0.019  1.794  0.929  1.019 
  (7.79)**  (1.31)  (0.29)  (7.79)**  (1.31)  (0.29) 
Constant  1.366  0.346  0.326       
  (6.39)**  (1.74)  (1.50)       
Sectoral Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Occupation Du.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  99535  99535  99535  99535  99535  99535 
Notes: Robust (to individual clustering) z-statistics (in absolute value) in parentheses. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 
1% level 
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Table 5.4. Over-qualification and wages 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 




Over-qualified  -0.015  0.017  0.002  -0.008  -0.032  -0.010 
  (1.35)  (1.36)  (0.23)  (1.44)  (4.56)**  (2.75)** 
Observations  10614  8160  20781  32123  31164  102842 
R-squared  0.31  0.32  0.36  0.42  0.45  0.41 
Notes: Robust (to individual clustering) z-statistics (in absolute value) in parentheses in the OLS regressions. * significant at 5% 
level; ** significant at 1% level. The regressions include a full set of time and country dummies (column 6), male, married and 
household size dummies, experience and its square, and three dummies of unemployment experience during the last 5 years: ever 






Table 5.5. Skill mismatch and wages 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 




NOBM  -0.097  -0.165  -0.087  -0.101  -0.118  -0.112 
  (4.54)**  (8.07)**  (8.61)**  (11.34)**  (11.93)**  (21.36)** 
OWM  -0.012  -0.011  -0.001  -0.029  -0.045  -0.022 
  (0.97)  (0.63)  (0.11)  (2.83)**  (4.75)**  (4.24)** 
OBM  -0.110  -0.149  -0.089  -0.106  -0.149  -0.121 
R-squared  0.32  0.35  0.37  0.44  0.46  0.42 
 
Random Effect Regressions 
 
NOBM  -0.040  -0.090  -0.020  -0.033  -0.040  -0.033 
  (3.70)**  (6.57)**  (4.42)**  (8.69)**  (8.93)**  (14.17)** 
OWM  -0.022  -0.013  0.003  -0.009  -0.011  -0.005 
  (2.46)*  (1.11)  (0.71)  (2.30)*  (2.87)**  (2.29)* 
OBM  -0.071  -0.086  -0.015  -0.030  -0.050  -0.035 
  (6.87)**  (6.53)**  (3.12)**  (7.55)**  (10.79)**  (14.58)** 
Observations  10520  6112  20775  32091  31128  100626 
R-squared  0.31  0.33  0.30  0.40  0.42  0.38 
Notes: Robust (to individual clustering) z-statistics (in absolute value) in parentheses in the OLS regressions. * significant at 5% 
level; ** significant at 1% level. The regressions include a full set of time and country dummies (column 6), male, married and 
household size dummies, experience and its square, and three dummies of unemployment experience during the last 5 years: ever 
unemployed, unemployed more than once and unemployed for more than 1 year. 
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Table 5.6. Percentage of under/over educated workers by year 
  Mean-based  Mode-based 
year  Under  Over  Under  Over 
1997  0.158  0.116  0.147  0.130 
1998  0.148  0.119  0.140  0.134 
1999  0.136  0.121  0.130  0.139 
2000  0.126  0.125  0.116  0.139 
2001  0 .118  0.137  0.110  0.141 
2002  0.113  0.149  0.108  0.153 
2003  0.104  0.158  0.095  0.153 




Table 5.7 Coefficient on the over/under education variables of an augmented standard 
Mincer equation  
   Mean based  Mode based 
 
Year of education  ?  0.071  0.072 
   (86.76)**  (57.25)** 
 
over educated t  -0.083  -0.087 
   (19.09)**  (16.85)** 
 
under educated ?  0.107  0.147 
   (19.41)**  (17.26)** 
Notes: Robust (to individual clustering) z-statistics (in absolute value) in parentheses in the OLS regressions. * significant at 5% 
level; ** significant at 1% level. The regressions also include a full set of regions, sectors and firm size dummies, male, married, 




Table 5.8. Coefficient on the over/under education variables of equation (5.1)  
  Mean based  Mode based 
 
Years adequate educ  ß  0.068  0.071 
  (101.18)**  (62.37)** 
 
years over educ. ?  0.004  0.026 
  (1.14)  (10.21)** 
 
Years under educ d  -0.007  -0.034 
  (2.51)**  (21.90)** 
Notes: Robust (to individual clustering) z-statistics (in absolute value) in parentheses in the OLS regressions. * significant at 5% 
level; ** significant at 1% level. The regressions also include a full set of region, sector and firm size dummies, male, married, 
disable, head of household, on the job training, vocational education and public firm dummies, tenure and its square, age and its 
square.   131 
 
Table 5.9. Occupational /career mobility and education mismatch. Extract of education 
coefficients. 
   Mean based  Mode based  Mean based  Mode based 
 
   Occ. Mobility  Career mobility 
 
Over educated   0.012  0.009  0.011  0.013 
  (6.74)**  (4.43)**  (9.96)  (12.06)** 
 
Under educated   0.022  0.028  0.001  -0.004 
  (10.69)**  (10.04)**  (1.37)  (-6.03)** 
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Table 6.1. Foreign Born Residents of the EU, 1992-1999 
 
Notes:  
a.  In thousands 
b.  Data on place of birth are not available, therefore statistics are based on nationality of residents. 
Source: Author’s Calculation using the Extract of the European Labour Force Survey, (1992-1999) produced by Eurostat for 
Angrist and Kugler (2003).  
 
 
Table 6.2. Foreign Born Residents of the USA, 1990, 2000 
Notes: 
a. In thousands 
Source: Author’s Calculation on IPUMS 1990 and 2000, Minnesota Population Center, http://www.ipums.org 
 
Year  1992  1996  1999 










































EU12  154,007  4.1%  3.9%  156,338  4.7%  4.4%  160,780  4.9%  4.7% 
EU15  na  na  na  167,000  4.8%  4.6%  171,668  5.0%  4.8% 
France  24,525  7.1%  7.2%  25,335  8.2%  8.2%  25,875  8.2%  8.3% 
Spain  15,141  1.1%  1.0%  15,872  1.4%  1.1%  16,339  1.8%  1.4% 
UK  28,556  5.4%  5.5%  28,514  5.3%  5.4%  29,127  5.7%  6.1% 
Germany
b  38,994  5.1%  4.7%  39,082  6.1%  5.8%  39,595  6.1%  5.8% 
Italy
b  22,769  0.6%  0.6%  22,787  0.3%  0.2%  23,346  0.8%  0.6% 
Year  1990  2000 























a  124,772,500  9.3%  7.9%  138,733,660  12.4%  11.0% 
California  15,237,296  25.4%  21.7%  15,984,433  28.0%  26% 
New York  8,969,551  18.2%  15.9%  9,037,552  23.1%  19.9% 
Texas  8,270,447  10.5%  8.9%  9,929,292  15.7%  13.9% 
Florida  6,269,753  15.1%  12.8%  7,469,356  19.2%  16.5% 
Illinois  5,720,396  10.5%  8.4%  6,189,302  14.2%  12.4%   133 
Table 6.3. Internal Mobility in the EU 
Year  1992  1996  1999 
  Labour 
Force 
Population  Labour Force  Population  Labour 
Force 
Population 
EU12  2.2%  2.1%  2.2%  2.1%  2.5%  2.4% 
EU15  n.a.  n.a.  2.2%  2.0%  2.6%  2.4% 
France  3.8%  3.9%  3.7%  3.7%  3.5%  3.6% 
Spain  0.8%  0.7%  0.9%  0.8%  1.0%  0.9% 
UK  2.2%  2.4%  2.1%  2.3%  2.2%  2.5% 
Germany
a  2.8%  2.4%  2.8%  2.3%  2.7%  2.2% 
Italy
a  0.2%  0.2%  0.1%  0.1%  0.2%  0.1% 
Notes: 
a.  The Data on place of birth are not available, therefore statistics are based on nationality of residents. 
The number in each cell represents the percentage of EU.-born labour force/population born in a EU country different from the 
country of Residence. The first two rows reports the average for the whole Union (EU12 or EU15) and each of the following lines 




Table 6.4. Internal Mobility in the USA 
 
Notes: the number in each cell represents the percentage of US-born labour force/population born in a US state different from the 
state of Residence. The first row reports the average for the whole US and each of the following lines reports the percentage of 









Year:  1990  2000 
  Labour Force  Population  Labour Force  Population 
USA  35.3%  32.1%  33.6%  29.2% 
California  36.2%  30.6%  28%  23.7% 
New York  17.8%  16.6%  16.1%  14.5% 
Texas  32.4%  26.1%  30.4%  24.1% 
Florida  61.1%  56.6%  55.6%  50.6% 
Illinois  25.7%  22.5%  23%  20.7%   134 
 
Table 6.5. Skill Distribution of Immigrants, 1990-2000 
  Beginning of Nineties
a (1990-1992)  End of Nineties
b (1999-2000) 
  Overall  HSD  HSG  COG  Overall  HSD  HSG  COG 
USA  9.3%  18.6%  6.1%  9.4%  12.4%  26%  8.6%  12.5% 
EU12  4.1%  4.1%  3.1%  4.9%  4.9%  5.1%  3.5%  5.3% 
California  25.4%  55%  17.2%  19%  28%  57%  21%  25% 
New York  18.2%  32%  14.7%  15.4%  23.1%  42%  18.5%  19% 
Texas  10.5%  25.5%  5.8%  7.7%  15.7%  38%  9%  12.5% 
France  7.1%  6.9%  6.5%  9.3%  8.2%  9.7%  5.9%  9.1% 
Germany  5.1%  8.9%  2.8%  2.7%  6.1%  11%  3.5%  3.5% 
UK  5.4%  6.8%  3.8%  8.2%  5.7%  7.2%  3.3%  7.3% 
Notes:  
a: The data are relative to year 1992 for the EU countries and to 1990 for the USA. 
b: The data are relative to year 1999 for the EU countries and to year 2000 for the US. 
HSD: High school Dropouts, for EU data these are worker with only a primary school degree, HSG: high School Graduates, for 
EU data these are workers with a secondary school degree, COG: College Graduates, for EU data, these are workers with a 
tertiary school degree. Sources: for US, our calculations using the 1990 and 2000 IPUMS data from the U.S. bureau of Census. 
For Europe our calculations using ELFS data.  
 
Table 6.6. Wage differentials of foreign High Skilled Workers relative to US-born, 2000 
Notes: The estimates are from individual regressions on IPUMS, Census 2000 data. The dependent variable is ln(wage) (using 
weekly or yearly wages). Each column is a separate regression. Each regression includes 5-years experience dummies, gender 
dummy, race dummy and marital status dummies. The reported value is the coefficient on a dummy that identifies the country of 
birth. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 






























































































Observations  307,103  307,103  108,933  108,933  55,632  55,632  36,825  36,825   135 
Table 6.7. Impact of wage level, wage dispersion and R&D spending in attracting high 
skilled  
 
Dependent Variable:  1 Foreign-Born 
Ph.D. 














































State fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.20  0.33  0.13  0.34 
Observations  150  150  150  150 
Notes: Period 1970-2000. Panel, 3 decades, 50 US states. Dependent Variable is the change in skilled workers during the decade 
as percentage of the initial size of employment in that skill group.  The explanatory variables are all measured at the beginning of 
the period. *= Significant at 5% level. Huber-White robust standard errors. Sources: Data on wages and education are from the 
US census IPUMS 1970-2000, data on R&D for each decade and in each state are from the National Science Foundation/Division 
of Science Resources Studies, Survey of Industrial Research and Development: 1998. Foreign-born are defined as those workers 
who were born outside the US and without US citizenship at birth. 
 
Table 6.8. Impact of High Skills on Innovation 
Dependent variable  1  Patent Count  2  Patent Count 
adjusted for 
quality 
3  Patent Count  4  Patent Count 
adjusted for 
quality 












   
Log of US born 




Log of Foreign born 




State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98 
Observations  150  150  150  150 
Notes: Period 1970-2000 Panel, 3 decades 51 U.S. states. Column 1 and 3: dependent variable is average yearly count of patent 
granted during each decade. Column 2 and 4: dependent variable is average yearly count of patent weighting each of them by 1 
plus the average citation number received per year in the first 3 years.  Explanatory variables are all measured at the beginning of 
the decade. *= Significant at 5% level. Huber-White robust standard errors. Sources: Data on number of U.S.-born and Foreign-
born PhD’s are from the US Census IPUMS. Data on the number of patents are from the NBER dataset described in Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2002). Patents have been assigned to a state according to the address of the first inventor. Data on R&D by state are 
from the National Science Foundation/Division of Science Resources Studies, Survey of Industrial Research and Development: 
1998.   136 
Appendix 
 
A.2. Appendix to Section 2. Data 
 
List of countries in the IALS 
Belgium (Flemish community, excluding the city of Brussels), Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland (French 
and German communities), the United Kingdom (Great Britain and Northern Ireland), and the 
United States. 
 
Data collection in the IALS 
The data in the IALS were obtained via stratified sampling. Whenever using these data we weight 
the estimates using the sampling weights provided in the survey. 
 
A.4. Appendix to Section 4.  
 
Data definition 
We define the variable Recentmove = 1 if the household has moved within 12 months preceding 
the interview and 0 otherwise; and  Recentmove3 = 1 if the household has moved within 36 
months preceding the interview and 0 otherwise. We also define Bigrmove= 1 if Recentmove=1 
and the household came from another location;  Bigrmove3= 1 if  Recentmove3=1 and the 
household came from another location; BigrmoveJob=1 if  Bigrmove=1 and the move was job-




E(Y|M=1) = Xb+a + Zd + E(e|M=1) = Xb+a + Zd + rse f(Wg) / F(Wg)      (A1) 
 
E(Y|M=0) = Xb+ Zd + E(e|M=0) = Xb      + Zd + rse f(Wg) / (1-F(Wg))     (A2) 
 
and thus the difference is 
 
DYE,imp = a + rse f(Wg) / { F(Wg)  [1-F(Wg)] }                 (A3) 
 
 
A.5. Appendix to Section 4 and 5: definition of education in the ECHP.  
Years of education are not directly observable from the ECHP. Instead, education is broadly 
aggregated into three categories that report the maximum degree obtained by the individual: less 
than secondary, secondary and tertiary education. It also contains information regarding the year 
of end of education from which a proxy for the number of years of education can be constructed. 
We have crossed this information with the above-mentioned three categorical variables of 
education to minimise the noise, and we corrected for outliers. 
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A.5. Appendix to Section 5.  
 
Table A5.1. Definition of variables:  EU 15 
marry  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is married 
female  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is female 
hhsize  Number of members of the household 
yeduc  Years of completed education 
exper  Potential experience: age - years of education - 6 
tend2  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker's tenure is >1 &<=5 
tend3  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker's tenure is >5 &<=10 
tend4  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker's tenure is >10 
unem  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is ever unemployed in the last 5 years 
nunem  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is unemployed more than once in the last 5 years 
lunem  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is unemployed for more than a year during the last 5 years 
indd2  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed in "mining, quarrying, and utilities supply" 
indd3  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed in "manufacturing" 
indd4  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed in "construction" 
indd5  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed in "wholesale and retail trade" 
indd6  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed in "transport, storage and communication"  
indd7  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed in "FIRE" 
indd8  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed in "public administration and education" 
indd9  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed in "health, social work and other" 
ocud2  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed as "professionals" 
ocud3  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed as "technicians and associate professionals" 
ocud4  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed as "clerks" 
ocud5  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed as "service workers, shop and market sales workers" 
ocud6  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed as "skilled agricultural and fishery workers" 
ocud7  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed as "craft and related trades workers" 
ocud8  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed as "plant and machine operators, assemblers" 
ocud9  Dummy Variable, 1 if worker is employed as "elementary occupations" 
yd2  Dummy Variable, 1 if year is 1995 
yd3  Dummy Variable, 1 if year is 1996 
yd4  Dummy Variable, 1 if year is 1997 
yd5  Dummy Variable, 1 if year is 1998 
yd6  Dummy Variable, 1 if year is 1999 
yd7  Dummy Variable, 1 if year is 2000 
yd8  Dummy Variable, 1 if year is 2001 
cd2  Dummy Variable, 1 if country is France 
cd3  Dummy Variable, 1 if country is UK 
cd4  Dummy Variable, 1 if country is Italy 
cd5  Dummy Variable, 1 if country is Spain 
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A.7. Appendix to Section 7. 
   